Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.     

BIMSTEC and emerging patterns of Asian regional and interregional cooperation

The first phase of India's Look East Policy in 1991 was exploratory in nature and tinged with more idealism and optimism to break out of the South Asian region which was stagnating in economic growth. The second phase of India's Look East policy took stock of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 to 1998 and China's growing linkages with the Southeast Asian region. In 1997, mainly through the diligence of Thailand, a new grouping that could act as a bridge between Southeast and South Asia was established called BIMSTEC. The objective of the paper will be to argue that BIMSTEC balances India's engagement with Southeast and South Asia but it also counters China's growing influence among ASEAN members, in particular Myanmar. Thailand is the driving force behind BIMSTEC activities as this would enhance its trade hub status and engagement policy with Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam (CMLV) states.     

Tribal diplomacy and frontier territoriality in modern China: Hunza and Nationalist China, 1947–1948

In the immediate post-World War II period, the Chinese Nationalist regime was eager to consolidate its position and formulate a proactive policy toward China's traditional Central Asian peripheries. Postwar Nationalist China's momentary confidence in extending central influence into the Pamir and Kashmir regions can be understood in such a geopolitical context. The withdrawal of British colonial rule in India further increased Nanjing's optimism about bringing Hunza, a Muslim tribal state in northwest Kashmir, under its territorial and administrative sway. To prevent possible infiltration of Soviet influence in Central Asia, the Nationalists at one point even considered resorting to the restoration of imperial “tributary ties” as a political expedient in their dealings with postwar China's frontier territorial issues. A careful examination of the Nationalists' previously unknown abortive attempt to reclaim Hunza enables us to fill an important scholarly lacuna in the history of modern China's external relations with its South and Central Asian neighbors. This reevaluation, moreover, may also lead us to further reconsider modern China's intriguing and complicated frontier diplomatic and territorial scenario, as well as how that scenario could have been manipulated by a certain group of ambitious distant Nationalist border officials during the course of postwar China's problematic frontier undertakings.     

Gender,Class, and Patriotism: Women's paramilitary units in first world war britain

Abstract

Scholarly histories of twentieth-century China, commonly identified as an East Asian power, tend to cover only the eastern half of the country. As John King Fairbank suggests, Chinese foreign affairs are considered principally as a matter of East Asian international relations.¹ Yet China is also a Central Asian power: present-day China encompasses large parts of Central Asia — Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet — of which the population is chiefly composed of non-Han ethnic minorities. When the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s removed a major security threat to China, the creation of the Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan — gave it the opportunity to reassert its historical claims to influence throughout Central Asia.² The launch of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization in 1996, and the annual Shanghai summits that followed, are clear evidence of China's attempts to dominate Central Asian affairs in the post-Soviet era.³     

China's New Generation of Leaders and Regional Challenges in East Asia

A pair of Hong Kong and U.S. specialists on China examines the dynamic international environment China's new leadership now faces, focusing on East Asia. They first examine the complex balance the leadership seeks to strike between: (1) China's projection of increasing economic, military, and political power internationally; (2) the primary domestic goals of economic growth and stability; and (3) rising public awareness, demand for information access, and (in some quarters) nationalism among the Chinese people. The authors then proceed, in successive sections of the paper, to assess in greater detail China's international and regional security environment, Sino-American relations, China's relations with its East Asian neighbors, and the complex interconnections between the country's domestic and foreign policy. They conclude that Sino-American relations will continue to be pivotal to Beijing's foreign relations in general and its relations with countries in the East Asian region more specifically.     

Reassessing Human Geography in the Wake of China's Rise

A prominent human geographer, introducing a series of papers in a Eurasian Geography and Economics mini-symposium devoted to China's emergence, surveys the myriad global impacts of that country's rapid recent rise. The topics covered include the economic (i.e., rapid growth in the size of China's economy, preeminence as an exporter of manufactured goods, and role as a major natural resource consumer, overseas investor, and purchaser of U.S. debt obligations), the geopolitical (increasing involvement in international organizations, rising assertiveness in defense of territorial claims), and the environmental (e.g., carbon footprint, accelerated urbanization, dam building), as well as the implications of China's rise for the study of geography and development. He argues that assessment of the consequences of the country's emergence should not be based on simple extrapolation of present trends, but must take into account a number of looming questions relating to the competitiveness of China's manufacturing labor force (vis-à-vis other developing countries), capacity to innovate (as well as imitate), and transformative societal impacts of modernization and development.     

China's New Leaders: Perspectives on Geographic Trends and Realities

A senior American specialist on the geography of China examines several aspects of China's society, economy, regional organization, and geopolitical position in light of the change in the country's leadership at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. After a brief comparison of the incoming and retiring leadership groups in terms of backgrounds and past policy pronouncements (as well as discussing the challenge posed by corruption), the author proceeds to discuss a series of key social and regional development policies that may be subject to some degree of change under the new leadership, including hukou and the one-child policy. He then focuses on the 12th Five-Year Plan, which provides a broad outline of the new leadership's goals, and particularly its emphasis on balanced regional development (a commitment to further develop the interior of the country as well as to revitalize the old heavy industrial region, the Northeast). The author then turns to China's growing military (and particularly naval) power in connection with its increasing assertion of territorial claims in the South and East China Seas as well as ability to project naval power across the Taiwan Strait and beyond into the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters.     

China's Energy Security: Challenges and Priorities

In a companion paper to the essays comparing China's and India's economic rise (Prime, 2009) as well as India's energy security (Dadwal, 2009), two specialists on China's energy industries review the country's challenges posed by the need to dramatically increase energy use in order to support economic growth while coping with pressures to reduce environmental impacts from emissions of greenhouse gases. After reviewing the current mix of fuels in the economy and discussing each major energy resource (in terms of proven reserves, production, consumption, and foreign import requirements), the authors focus on measures undertaken by the Chinese government and corporations to improve access to vital supplies. The paper covers efforts to enhance the country's energy security, which include diversifying sources of oil supply, purchasing oil and gas concessions and financing of energy infrastructure development in African and Central Asian countries, instituting reforms to encourage more efficient energy use, and developing alternative energy sources. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O130, P280, Q400. 7 figures, 2 tables, 82 references.     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

Economic statecraft in China's new overseas special economic zones: soft power,business or resource security?

China's rapidly growing economic engagement with other developing countries has aroused intense debates, but these debates have often generated more heat than light. The Chinese government is clearly pushing its companies to move offshore in greater numbers, and state‐owned firms figure prominently in many of the major investments abroad. Yet relatively little research exists on when, how and why the Chinese government intervenes in the overseas economic activities of its firms. China's state‐sponsored economic diplomacy in other developing countries could play three major strategic roles: strengthening resource security, enhancing political relationships and soft power, and boosting commercial opportunities for national firms. This article examines China's programme to establish overseas special economic zones as one tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. It traces the process by which they were established and implemented, and investigates the characteristics of the 19 zones initially selected in a competitive tender process. The article concludes that even in countries rich in natural resources, the overseas zones were overwhelmingly positioned as commercial projects. Particularly in the Asian zones, China is following in the footsteps of Japan. The zone programme, and the Chinese foreign investment it hoped to foster, represents a clear case of the international projection of China's developmental state. However, in Africa (but not generally elsewhere) discourse surrounding the zones publicly positions them as a transfer of China's own development success, thus potentially enhancing China's political relationships and soft power on the continent.     

A Geospatial Analysis of China's Exports, 1991-2008

Three Taiwan-based economists employ a range of exploratory spatial data analysis tools (e.g., Moran's I and LISA statistics) to investigate trends in the growth of China's exports over the period 1991-2008. A particular focus is on the detection of spatial correlations between China and 40 export destination countries in major world regions. Emphasis in the paper on the key years of 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2008 has enabled the authors to analyze the impacts on China's trade of such major events as the country's accession to the World Trade Organization and the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. The results of the spatial analysis reveal the continuing importance of the U.S. and Asian countries in China's export trade (despite changes in the character of trade relations) and identify the spatial outliers (e.g., in Latin America) that may serve as the basis for new export markets for China in the future.     

Not-so-new silk roads: Japan's foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar

Scholarly narratives concerning China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) tend to contextualise this project within China's rivalry with the United States and Japan. Such interpretations often reduce and misconstrue Japan's initiatives in Asian infrastructure finance as mere reactivity to China's advances. This paper will showcase Japan's own foreign and financial policies regarding infrastructure in Asia and the New Silk Road regions since the end of the Cold War. I argue that Japan's presence in that field is underappreciated and under-researched, as Japan's infrastructural footprint in the New Silk Road significantly pre-dates the BRI. Furthermore, I stress the fact that Japan's foreign policy in Asian infrastructure finance featured important cooperative postures toward China, especially within multilateral development banks. The paper makes a contribution to emerging scholarship on the BRI—often reliant on strategic communications and projections—by highlighting Japan's role in regional infrastructure to show how our understanding of international relations and international political economy in Asia can be better informed by economic history and area studies.     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

The Ob' will enter the Caspian: the Yenisey-Ob'-Aral-Caspian Water Connection and the Energy Problem

An early 1949 version of Davydov's grandiose scheme for diverting water from the Yenisey and Ob' Rivers to Kazakhstan and Central Asia via the Turgay Gates and the Aral and Caspian Seas in order to stabilize the level of the Caspian, expand the irrigated acreage of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, generate abundant hydro-electric power, provide a cheap water transport route between Siberia and Central Asia, eliminate sukhovei (dry winds) at their source, and ameliorate the continental climate of Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. The plan reflects the anthropocentric “transformation of nature” and the large-scale “great projects of communism” drives of the late Stalinist period. The translation was prepared by James R. Gibson of York University, Toronto.     

A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Eight Transition Economies in Europe and Asia

Two senior World Bank economists provide a broad comparative overview of transition economies, covering the former Soviet Union, East Central Europe, China, and Vietnam. In the process, they assess the experience of each of the 20 European and 8 Asian countries up to 1996, focusing on the wide variation in exposure to economic and political liberalization and distinguishing growing and recovering economies from the lagging. Based on recent measures of key macroeconomic indicators, the authors' classification and analysis embrace the impact of specific factors (e.g., different duration and intensity of reforms; exposure to regional tensions) on economic growth and inflation. Also included in the study is a comparison of inter-industry linkages and macroeconomic feedback in Russia and China. 9 figures, 8 tables, 25 references. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: P21, P41, P51, P52.     

Angola 2025: The Future of the “World's Richest Poor Country” as Seen through a Chinese Rear‐View Mirror

Abstract: As Africa's foremost “emerging market” Angola is receiving increasing recognition for its oil wealth, leading to attempts to engage it as a strategic partner, especially amongst the “rising powers”. In particular, there has been considerable escalation in development cooperation between Angola and China recently, though relatively little is known about the precise terms of this “partnership” despite China's key role in Angola's post‐conflict reconstruction. The growing importance of Chinese credit lines and increasing presence of Chinese corporate agencies across Angolan territory raise important questions about development, poverty reduction and inequality; governance and labour relations; and Angola's institutional capacity and the social structure of its cities. This paper critically examines the specific outcomes of Angola's “partnership” with China along with the hybrid conceptions and tangled geographies of “development” produced as a result. In particular, it seeks to interrogate the visions of Angola's future articulated by the Angolan state and the reference points and “models” of development that they draw upon.     

Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty‐first century

Is the much hyped ‘rise of Asia’ translating into global public good? The leading Asian powers, China, India and Japan, demand a greater share of the decision‐making and leadership of global institutions. Yet, they seem to have been more preoccupied with enhancing their national power and status than contributing to global governance, including the management of global challenges. This is partly explained by a realpolitik outlook and ideology, and the legacies of India's and China's historical identification with the ‘Third World’ bloc. Another key factor is the continuing regional legitimacy deficit of the Asian powers. This article suggests that the Asian powers should increase their participation in and contribution to regional cooperation as a stepping stone to a more meaningful contribution to global governance.     

HOW FAST IS THE POPULATION AGEING IN CHINA?

Using adjusted 2000 population census data, this paper conducts projections of China's population up to 2050. Three fertility and four mortality scenarios yield 12 sets of results. Even though fertility is below replacement, China's population will continue growing for many years. One of the notable trends is the rapid ageing of the population. By the end of 2050, one-fifth to one-third of China's population will be aged 65 and over. The demographic dividend is expected to continue in next 10 to 20 years depending on future fertility which, in turn, is determined by changes in China's one-child policy. The Chinese government should be aware of all possible situations of population change, and particularly population ageing in the first half of the century, and be well prepared for all possible challenges that may arise.     

Beyond win–win: rethinking China's international relationships in an era of economic uncertainty

China is the least disadvantaged major economy in the current era of global economic uncertainty. Thus it is becoming the focus of attention of its neighbours and is achieving a prominence in the world political economy unparalleled in its modern history. To a great extent, China's success is the result of ‘good neighbour diplomacy’ such as ‘win–win’ and the policies of reform and openness of the past thirty years. However, despite continuity in policy, China's ‘peaceful leap forward’ since 2008 has changed the context of its external relationships. The increasing asymmetries between China and its neighbours, as well as decreasing asymmetry with the United States, require an adjustment of win–win values beyond mutual benefit to credible reassurance. As China's neighbours become more dependent, they also become more anxious concerning their interests. Meanwhile, China's relative gain on the US requires a different kind of confidence‐building diplomacy.