Ukraine's Financial Crisis, 2009

A prominent specialist in the economic affairs of the former Soviet Union relates and analyzes the state of Ukraine's economy in light of a series of discussions and interviews with the country's Prime Minister and leading economic officials in Kyiv in 2008 and April 2009. The author, a former economic advisor to the country's government and co-chair of the UN's Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine, devotes this paper to a penetrating analysis of the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 on Ukraine's budget, banks, exchange rates, money supply, industrial sectors (particularly energy and steel), GDP, and inflationary pressures. Due attention is given to economic relations with the EU and Russia as well as to financial assistance from the IMF.Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: E500, E600, O520, P200. 1 table, 4 figures, 38 references.     

Ukraine’s unfinished natural gas and electricity reforms: one step forward,two steps back

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explain Ukraine’s natural gas and electricity sector reforms, to outline the challenges facing these two sectors going forwards and to identify prospects for renewables. It makes three core arguments: First, the regulatory templates promoted by the European Union do not lend themselves to swift implementation. This is because the EU’s approach has been supply-driven, in the sense that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the EU; it is not, therefore, a suitable problem-solving measure for a crisis-stricken country with limited capacities and powerful vested interests. Second, there has been very slow progress made in innovative and creative shifts in Ukrainian energy transition policy, showing a lack of commitment to the transformation and modernisation of energy systems that should in principle be based on the promotion of new business models backed up by reformed political, regulatory and industrial infrastructures. Third, Ukrainian elites have been formally open to the flow of rules as evidenced by a number of agreements concluded between the EU and Ukraine. But, in practice, the pre-existing, deep-seated preferences of those elites have perpetuated the opaque gas trading system, resulting in them being very selective about the rules that they are actually prepared to adopt.