Certainty, Severity, and Their Relative Deterrent Effects: Questioning the Implications of the Role of Risk in Criminal Deterrence Policy

In the late 1960s, Gary Becker incorporated into his formal model of deterrence theory an explicit statement that the theory's components—certainty and severity of punishment—are more or less influential than the other depending on an individual's preference for risk. The certainty of punishment is more influential than the severity of punishment in the decision of whether or not to commit crime if an individual is risk acceptant; if a criminal is risk averse, then the severity of punishment is more important than the certainty of punishment. Many aggregate deterrence studies arrive at estimates that reveal varying effects of the certainty and severity components of deterrence theory, with the certainty of punishment carrying the greater, and many times the only, weight. Leaning on Becker's extension of deterrence theory, empiricists assume that criminals have a preference for risk. Assertions that arrests and convictions are greater deterrent tools imply important worldly consequences because they indicate to governmental authorities where resources should be invested to insure the best deterrent payoff. In this article, I question both the need to take risk into consideration in aggregate‐level deterrence studies and the empirical evidence that has been offered in support of attaching greater weight to the certainty of punishment. I show, first, that deterrence theory, from an applied policy standpoint, is encumbered through the explicit consideration of risk preferences. Next, I work through the algebra of the statistical formulations of deterrence models and demonstrate that the greater weight associated with certainty could well be an artifact of the model specification. Finally, I reanalyze data that appear to be consistent with the greater weight for certainty than severity argument and show that the evidence does not support that inference. Potential criminals mentally combine the three deterrence components—regardless of whether they are risk neutral, averse, or acceptant. I conclude by considering what it means to a worldly application of criminal deterrence theory to place equal weight on the certainty and the severity of punishment.     

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

The moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence: A critique

Theorists within the just war tradition of ethics differ in their conclusions about nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence. This paper examines three arguments for the conditional moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence—those of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, of J. Bryan Hehir, and of Michael Walzer—and argues that none of the three constitutes intellectually compelling and practically useful moral advice. The bishops fail to convince us that nuclear use can ever fulfil the requirements of proportionality, and therefore that the intention to use nuclear weapons can ever be justified. Hehir fails to convince us that nuclear deterrence policies in fact distinguish categorically between intention and use. Walzer's case that deterrence is bad but necessary is more convincing but it, like Hehir's, does not constitute coherent moral advice for the citizen, soldier or government official. I conclude that, given the inadequacy of attempts to justify nuclear deterrence, even conditionally, we have a strong moral obligation to pursue alternatives.

The level of citizen concern about the dangerous possibility of nuclear war has become greatly heightened in Europe and the United States in the 1980s. This is probably due to at least three factors: the significant technological developments in nuclear weaponry that have occurred during the last decade, the increased fear of Soviet military strength, and the concentration of recent U.S. administrations on developing and improving a nuclear war‐fighting capability. But even before the growth of the peace movement since 1980, a ‘new debate’ about the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy had begun in academic and theological circles. In this paper, I will analyze three arguments of moral philosophers and theologians, all working within the ‘just war’ tradition, about whether nuclear deterrence, in any form, can be morally justified.     

Deterrence Theory and the Implementation of Speed Limits in the American States

Despite the ubiquitous nature of these policies, there is disagreement in the literature regarding the direction and size of the impact that speed limits have on traffic‐related fatalities. We argue in this paper that the mixed results in previous work may arise because these studies have missed an important component of the implementation of speed limit laws. More explicitly, they have failed to adequately control for the deterrent effect of enforcement and sanctions. We develop the argument that the observed impacts of speed limits will be overly large when the certainty and severity of punishment are not accounted for. We test this assertion in a cross‐sectional time series analysis of state‐level traffic fatalities from the years 1990–2006 and find that lower speeds do save a significant number of lives. Interestingly, we find that the impact is significantly overestimated for 65‐mph limits and significantly underestimated for 70‐mph limits when enforcement, penalties, and the interaction of the two are excluded. The results also suggest that fines have a rather modest impact on fatalities unless states employ a sufficient number of troopers to enforce posted limits. In addition to clarifying previous findings related to speed limit policy, therefore, the findings contribute to the general application of deterrence theory by empirically confirming that the importance of sanction severity is dependent on the perceived certainty of punishment.     

RE-EXAMINING THE ABM MORATORIUM

The argument of this essay is that current U.S. strategic postures and weapons systems, based essentially on mutual assured destruction (MAD), are defective, in that they over-deter and under-defend. MAD provides far more than sufficient deterrence against deliberate, full-scale nuclear war launched by the government of the Soviet Union, but provides little deterrence and no defense against the far more likely nuclear catastrophe of the future: an accidental, unauthorized, or third-party missile attack. The proposed solution is the reintroduction of superpower ABM (anti-ballistic missile) protection, on a limited, negotiated basis, which could provide defensive systems heavy enough to defend against light attacks but not heavy enough to defend against full-scale superpower attacks (and thereby undermine deterrence).     

The Behavioral Impact of Drinking and Driving Laws

All U.S. states have laws designed to discourage people from drinking and driving, but enforcement varies across the states. Existing studies offer conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of these strategies in deterring drinking‐and‐driving behavior. Deterrence theories imply that the mere existence of such laws has little impact on criminal behavior, but the perception of enforcement and the probability of being detected have a deterrent effect. To test these hypotheses, we develop a measure of the propensity to drink and drive using item response theory and national survey data. Inferential models test the impact of perceptions of enforcement, actual enforcement levels, and deterrence laws on criminal propensity. Results indicate that the existence of statutes impacts only those least likely to drink and drive, while perceptions of the likelihood of arrest and individual agreement with the goals of drinking and driving laws significantly reduce the propensity for almost everyone. Actual enforcement rates display no behavioral effect.     

Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use

The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons , by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research , by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states.     

Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?

A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty‐first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.     

Theoretical change and therapeutic innovation in the treatment of syphilis in mid-nineteenth-century France

This article examines changes in the treatment of venereal disease in mid-nineteenth-century France in light of theoretical developments in the understanding of these diseases. It focuses on three theories of venereal disease: the orthodox theory of the "unity" of gonorrhea and syphilis; the physiological theory of Fran?ois Broussais, which essentially denied the actual existence of such a disease; and Philippe Ricord's new doctrine of venereal disease, a theory that is often credited with having established the distinction between syphilis and gonorrhea. The argument is that theoretical considerations played a major role in the evaluation of the relative merits of these theories and that any understanding of the appeal of Ricord's new doctrine must consider not only its pathological claims but its therapeutic implications as well. This was not, however, simply an instance of theory applied. These two aspects of Ricord's new doctrine, its pathology and its therapeutics, were inextricably bound up with one another, so that judgment of the one necessarily entailed judgment of the other. The argument is that therapeutic practice should not be seen simply as a downwind consequence of changes in the theoretical understanding of disease, but rather as an integral part of the process of change. These were the kinds of developments that led doctors to believe that French medicine was making very real progress at mid-century.     

Managing escalation: missile defence,strategy and US alliances

Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the alliance bargains that underpin agreement on extended deterrence strategy. Although increased defensive capacity is a clear net benefit, the strategic effects of its deployment and use can still be complex if, for example, missile defence increases the chances of localizing a conflict. The article discusses the role of missile defences for the US homeland, and of the territory and population of US allies, for extended deterrence credibility and the reassurance of US allies in Asia and in NATO. It argues that there is increased scope in strengthening deterrence by enmeshing the defence of the US homeland with that of its allies, and that allies need to pay closer attention to the way the deployment and use of missile defence influence pressures for escalation. In general, missile defence thus reinforces the need for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia to negotiate an overall alliance strategy.     

改革开放以来小康社会理论的形成与发展

小康社会理论是中国特色社会主义理论体系的主体组成部分之一,是马克思主义现代化理论与中国发展实际相结合的产物,丰富和发展了对中国特色社会主义现代化过程的理解。在1980年代由邓小平提出,经历了六个发展阶段,到中共十七大提出＂全面建设小康社会新要求＂之际,完全成熟。由＂大同论＂向＂小康论＂转型,有其深刻的现实、历史、理论与文化的根源。＂小康论＂立足于社会主义初级阶段的基本国情,以社会化大生产与工业市场文明为目标诉求,在强调公有制的主导作用下,显示出对个人利益的认可、宽容与疏导,强调＂法治＂、＂市场＂＂、共同富裕＂与＂民主＂。注重循序渐进而不急于求成。小康社会理论的形成与发展,是对中国特色社会主义现代化理论的创新。     

Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO

Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence'— that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.     

稻盛和夫的经营与日本的文化模式

美国人类学家本尼迪克特在《菊与刀》中提出的“耻感文化”的概念已经为学界熟知,实际上,这一概念的理论基石——“文化模式理论”更有助于我们全面地认识日本文化。本文将运用“文化模式理论”分析稻盛和夫的经营活动,并且指出,稻盛哲学具有明显的日本特色:讲求实用主义,固守民族传统,提倡“和魂洋才”等。     

Integrating Delegation into the Policy Theory Literature

Public policy scholars have developed a number of theories of the policymaking process. Their work has come to define what some now refer to as the "policy theory" literature. Our task is to identify theoretical and empirical courses of study that will advance this research program. We limit ourselves to identifying an existing theory that already provides such an advance and discuss some of its theoretical benefits and empirical support. Specifically, we make the case that there exists a well-developed theory of delegation that rivals what we deem to be the best of the existing policy theories. We also suggest that existing theoretical frameworks might benefit from incorporating delegation theory explicitly and conclude that policy research has much to contribute to the development and useful application of delegation models.     

New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

Virtuous War/Virtual Theory

Strategic discourse and the use of force in the twentieth century have become increasingly virtual. Leading the way, as the dominant actor in global politics, is the United States, whose diplomatic and military policies are now based on technological and representational forms of discipline, deterrence, and compellence that could best be described as virtuous war . At the cyborg heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance—with no or minimal casualties. Using networked information and virtual technologies to bring 'there' here in real time and with near-verisimilitude, virtuous war exercized a comparative as well as a strategic advantage for the digitally advanced. It has already become the 'fifth dimension' of US global hegemony, with a very real gap opening between technological capability and strategic value on the one side, and theoretical understanding and ethical awareness on the other. There is a clear and present need to develop a virtual theory that can assess the perils and promises of this intimate relationship between modes of representation and violence.     

The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing.     

The Psychological Basis of Historical Explanation: Reenactment, Simulation, and the Fusion of Horizons

In this article I will challenge a received orthodoxy in the philosophy of social science by showing that Collingwood was right in insisting that reenactment is epistemically central for historical explanations of individual agency. Situating Collingwood within the context of the debate between simulation theory and what has come to be called "theory theory" in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology, I will develop two systematic arguments that attempt to show the essential importance of reenactment for our understanding of rational agency. I will furthermore show that Gadamer's influential critique of the reenactment model distinguishes insufficiently between the interpretation of certain types of texts and the explanation of individual actions. In providing an account of individual agency, we are committed to a realistic understanding of our ordinary scheme of action-explanations and have thus to recognize the centrality of reenactment. Nevertheless, Collingwood's emphasis on reenactment is certainly one-sided. I will demonstrate its limitations even for accounting for individual agency, and show how it has to be supplemented by various theoretical considerations, by analyzing the different explanatory strategies that Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen use to explain the behavior of the ordinary men in Reserve Battalion 101 during World War II.     

Ankersmit's Postmodernist Historiography: The Hyperbole of "Opacity"

Ankersmit's articulation of a postmodern theory of history takes seriously both the strengths of traditional historicism and the right of historians to decide what makes sense for disciplinary practice. That makes him an exemplary interlocutor. Ankersmit proposes a theory of historical "representation" which radicalizes the narrative approach to historiography along the lines of poststructuralist textualism. Against this postmodernism but invoking some of his own arguments, I defend the traditional historicist position. I formulate criticisms of the theory of reference entailed in his notion of "narrative substance," of his master analogy of historiography with modern painting, and finally of his characterization of historical hermeneutics. In each case I find him guilty of the hyperbole which he himself cautions against. While it is true that historical narratives cannot be taken to be transparent, in taking them to be opaque Ankersmit puts himself in an untenable position. Finally, Ankersmit seeks to buttress his theoretical case by an interpretation of the new cultural historical texts of authors like Davis and Ginzburg. While this is a concreteness heartily to be welcomed in philosophers of history, I cannot find his construction of this new school's work plausible.