Preserving the Status Quo: Britain,the United States,and Bolivian Tin, 1946–56

This article analyses the relationship between Britain, the United States, and Bolivia in the context of the tin nexus after the Second World War. While the connection between Britain and Bolivia was long-standing - Bolivian tin had been shipped to Britain since the nineteenth century - it extended far beyond simple bilateralism. Such was the intricate web of connections in the global tin industry that any rupture in the Anglo-Bolivian relationship would have fundamental ramifications on the equilibrium of the industry, and, in turn, Britain's predominant position within it. The United States had overtly challenged Britain's dominance during the Second World War by constructing a smelter to be supplied by Bolivian ores. Despite the financial exigencies of the post-war period, the profound upheavals in the domestic Bolivian tin industry, and the contentious, destabilising tin-procurement policy pursued by the United States, Britain was determined to confront this threat. By actively seeking to preserve its long-term contract for Bolivian tin, Britain was able to maintain its predominance in the post-war global tin industry. At the same time, Bolivia deftly utilised Anglo-American rivalry to ensure more than one outlet for its most critical export commodity.     

Integration and Disintegration: The Attempted Incorporation of Malta into the United Kingdom in the 1950s

Existing interpretations stress that challenges to British interests elsewhere in the Mediterranean were central to Britain's initial support for Maltese incorporation into the United Kingdom. Through a close examination of official British records, this article demonstrates, by contrast, that Britain saw integration primarily as a means of solving the complex constitutional and financial problems which had impeded smooth Anglo-Maltese relations since the restoration of responsible government in 1947. Equally, the waning of British enthusiasm for integration can be traced to concerns about the costs of the scheme, especially in the face of Maltese insistence on ‘economic equivalence’, rather than to any downgrading of Malta's importance in the wake of the 1956 Suez debacle. The Maltese premier Dom Mintoff's insistence on equivalence as the price of integration and Britain's equal determination to resist such claims provide the key to explaining the scheme's demise. Ultimately, Malta followed a more conventional path to independence within the Commonwealth by September 1964.     

Economic Imperialism and Financial Citizenship: Reconsidering British Subjectivity in Martin Chuzzlewit and Lawrie Todd

During the tumultuous time of financial and colonial expansion between 1825 and 1855, both Charles Dickens and John Galt published picaresque novels depicting transatlantic travel and land speculation. If emigration is the act of permanently leaving one's homeland and living in another, then neither novels' eponymous protagonist Martin Chuzzlewit nor Lawrie Todd is an emigrant. By reading Martin Chuzzlewit (1843–44) and John Galt's Lawrie Todd (1830) alongside nineteenth-century developments of the geo-political and financial spheres, this article shows how these works form a counter-narrative to traditional novels of emigration. Both protagonists leave Britain with the explicit intent to seek their fortune in America through engagement with land speculation companies. Though the characters' experiences of transatlantic financial speculation is dichotomous (with Todd becoming rich and Chuzzlewit losing all he has), both characters ultimately return to Britain. In these counter-narratives, we argue that America is deployed as Britain's financial periphery, rather than an alternative imperial centre, working to entrench British nationalism through transatlantic financial speculation. It is through the act of returning from America that Dickens and Galt counter typified emigration narratives that represent the choice to emigrate to America as synonymous with abandoning the Empire for the ‘Great Republic’. Instead, Dickens and Galt show how America can be exploited as a financial extension of Empire where Britons can maintain national loyalty while simultaneously responding to an unstable global financial market that was increasingly dependent upon speculation and foreign investment practices.     

Britain's coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests

The formation of a coalition government by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, combined with the need for important cuts to Britain's armed forces has raised significant uncertainties about Britain's attitude to defence cooperation within the European Union. Since taking office the coalition, while grappling with the implications of Britain's fiscal challenges, has shown an unprecedented interest in strengthening bilateral defence collaborations with certain European partners, not least France. However, budgetary constraints have not induced stronger support for defence cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, under the new government, Britain has accelerated its withdrawal from the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article assesses the approach of the coalition to the CSDP. It argues that, from the perspective of British interests, the need for EU defence cooperation has increased over the last decade and that the UK's further withdrawal from EU efforts is having a negative impact. The coalition is undermining a framework which has demonstrated the ability to improve, albeit modestly, the military capabilities of other European countries. In addition, by sidelining the EU at a time when the UK is forced to resort more extensively to cost‐saving synergies in developing and maintaining its own armed forces, David Cameron's government is depriving itself of the use of potentially helpful EU agencies and initiatives—which the UK itself helped set up. Against the background of deteriorating European military capabilities and shifts in US priorities, the article considers what drove Britain to support EU defence cooperation over a decade ago and how those pressures have since strengthened. It traces Britain's increasing neglect of the CSDP across the same period, the underlying reasons for this, and how the coalition's current stance of disengagement is damaging Britain's interests.     

The Geopolitics of the ‘Future Return’: Britain's Century-Long Challenges to Norway's Control over the Spitsbergen Archipelago

Within the context of Arctic geopolitics, the article focuses on British policies toward Spitsbergen or Svalbard over the past century. The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty accorded Norway sovereignty over the archipelago, but it gave other signatories, including Britain, non-discriminatory access to its natural resources. It is argued that while geopolitical interests have played a role in Britain's policy-making, its main rationale has been a determination to use international law to protect pre-existing mining rights and potential future oil rights in the Svalbard area. Apart from Russia, Britain has been most active in challenging Norway's interpretation of its sovereign rights, especially the view about the treaty's non-applicability to Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves. It is shown that the Britain's economic focus was tempered during the Cold War by the need for Western solidarity and for supporting Norway's resistance to Soviet Spitsbergen claims. But having been instrumental in watering down Norway's sovereignty provisions in the negotiations on the Spitsbergen Treaty, Britain has never been prepared to abandon its interpretation of the treaty's stipulations on natural resources and equal access to the archipelago's maritime areas.     

Securing the Sinews of Sea Power: British Intervention in the Baltic 1780–1815

This article argues that Britain's standing as a maritime nation must be considered if we are to fully understand the objectives behind British foreign policy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It focuses on one of the most important challenges successive British governments faced during this period; the need to secure shipbuilding resources. Both British economic prosperity and national security depended upon the continued supply of naval stores. These resources could only be procured from the Baltic region, which meant the region took on a crucial strategic importance for policy-makers. This article will focus on Britain's relationship with the Baltic between 1780 and 1815 tracing Britain's sensitivity to the changing political environment in Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and particularly Russia, and outlining how this came to dictate foreign policy. Britain hoped to rely on diplomacy and economic interdependence to maintain the movement of naval stores from the Baltic; however intransigence from the Baltic powers forced Britain to resort to military measures on three occasions between 1800 and 1815, such was the importance of these shipbuilding resources.     

‘A Hazardous Task’: Britain and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

In 2014, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations celebrated its fiftieth anniversary since its coming into force in 1964. Setting out the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomats and diplomatic missions, the negotiations of this convention were part of the United Nations' plan to strengthen the international rule of law. This article analyses the role of Britain, one of the major actors in the negotiation process. It explores how Britain's negotiation position was shaped by diplomatic realities of the 1950s, and the strategies used to ensure Britain's interests being reflected in the final convention. The focus will be on the overall political pressure that underlined Britain's negotiation position, in order to reveal the general UK position on the codification of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Despite the remarkably friendly atmosphere at the 1961 Vienna conference, Britain could not press through all its amendments which, through the concluding legislation process, protracted Britain's ratification process. The article shows while London was supporting the codification of international law, codification by convention was not its ultimate choice. Therefore, the subsequent legislation process was marked by an inter-departmental dispute between the Foreign Office and Treasury, inter alia, on the exemption of Scotch whisky from excise duties.     

Whispers from Below: Zionist Secret Diplomacy,Terrorism and British Security Inside and Out of Palestine, 1944–47

This article discusses the global aspect of Zionist terrorism against Britain during 1944–47, relying on recently declassified documents and Hebrew records. Britain struggled against a global terrorist campaign which attacked British targets in Palestine, Egypt and the wider Middle East, continental Europe and the United Kingdom. This article refutes claims by other authors that British rule in Palestine failed because of intelligence failure. Intelligence failure was limited, but so were successes. British intelligence produced reasonable assessments on Zionist politics, but could do little to prevent violence without the cooperation of the Jewish Agency. Success was driven by a combination of signals intelligence, secret agents, one key defector, interrogations and intelligence shared by the Jewish Agency. Failure resulted from a weak understanding of the Zionist underground and from lack of cooperation by Agency authorities. Normally Britain's junior partner, the Jewish Agency was, by 1945, struggling against British restrictions on Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. Its militia, Haganah, turned to cooperation with terrorists. British intelligence predicted that such developments could occur, but failed to identify them as they unfolded. Britain's dependence on Zionist security intelligence was a key vulnerability that never was addressed by policy-makers. The Jewish Agency leveraged its cooperation, applying it to prevent terrorism in Egypt and the United Kingdom, where violent incidents would harm the Zionist cause. It had little reason to prevent terrorism in the key battlegrounds of Palestine or Europe, and so terrorism harmed Britain's will to continue fighting. The root cause of Britain's failure was at the policy level. Despite known weaknesses, government never assessed its own will and ability to uphold restrictions on Zionist immigration, or to fight terrorism, as against the Yishuv's will and ability to struggle against Britain.     

A Chronicle of Failure Foretold: The UK,Israel and Arms Sales to Argentina in the Era of the Falklands War

In spite of fierce British protests, Israel supplied Argentina with arms both during the Falklands war and with greater intensity after the fighting. While the weapons sales were vital for Israel's economy and its arms industry, recently declassified papers suggest that the Begin government viewed the arms supplies to Argentina as a bargaining chip to exert pressure on Britain to halt its own sale of weapons to Israel's Arab adversaries and to end London's arms embargo against the Jewish State. Britain's restrictions on arms sales had long cast a shadow over Anglo-Israeli ties, and Israeli resentment towards Britain was exacerbated by anger over London's strong condemnation of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its leading involvement in the EEC Venice Declaration of June 1980 which recognized Palestinian self-determination and a role for the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Israelis also perceived the arms supplies as a means to influence the junta in its treatment of Argentina's Jews. Yet, there was actually a rise in the level of anti-Semitism in Argentina during the period in question. At the same time, Britain's approach in attempting to dissuade its allies from selling arms to Argentina was riddled with inconsistencies and ultimately misconceived.     

Gnawing Pains,Festering Ulcers and Nightmare Suffering: Selling Leprosy as a Humanitarian Cause in the British Empire,c. 1890–1960

When British attention was drawn to the issue of leprosy in the empire, humanitarian organisations arose to take on responsibility for the ‘fight against leprosy’. In an effort to fund raise for a distant cause at a time when hundreds of charities competed for the financial support of British citizens, fundraisers developed propaganda to set leprosy apart from all other humanitarian causes. They drew on leprosy's relationship with Christianity, its debilitating symptoms and the supposed vulnerability of leprosy sufferers in order to mobilise Britain's sense of humanitarian, Christian and patriotic duty. This article traces the emergence of leprosy as a popular imperial humanitarian cause in modern Britain and analyses the narratives of religion, suffering and disease that the charities created and employed in order to fuel their growth and sell leprosy as a British humanitarian cause.     

Informal Empire,Independent Egypt and the Accession of King Farouk

Egypt's monarchical succession in the spring of 1936 has conventionally been seen as an internal Egyptian matter in which Britain, despite its continuing imperial presence in the country, played little or no role. King Fuad died, his 16-year-old son Farouk replaced him as monarch and a largely uncontested regency council was established for his ensuing 15-month minority. By first highlighting Britain's longer-standing structural imperial interests with the Mohammed Ali dynasty and then scrutinising the secret politics and diplomacy of Anglo-Egyptian relations during a crucial four-week period, this article provides a fundamental reinterpretation of what was a highly significant moment in Egypt's modern history. The upshot is a delineation of the limits of Egyptian ‘independence’ and a case study of the etiquette of Britain's informal imperialism in the Middle East during the second half of the 1930s.     

Two flags in the sand: anti-Communism in early Cold War Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

This article reveals how the Cold War impinged upon not just national, but local political considerations and became woven into communal narratives. It contributes to the examination of religion in the conflict, adds to the historiography of Britain and the Cold War, and provides a context by which British Cold War experience and responses can be assessed. With Northern Ireland’s political similarities to Great Britain, its consistency with European norms and its overlaps with popular sentiment in the United States, Northern Ireland offers a gauge to better understand the nature of anti-Communism in the Cold War’s first decade and offers an unexplored perspective on the conflict.     

The Atomic Marshall Plan: Atoms for Peace,British diplomacy and civil nuclear power

British policy towards President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech was characterised by ambiguity. The world's third nuclear power, Britain sought to re-establish nuclear cooperation with the United States. Multilateral nuclear diplomacy was of secondary importance. This position is exemplified in Britain's conflicting attitude to the International Atomic Energy Agency which oscillated from warm enthusiasm to qualified rejection before settling on a policy of grudging acceptance. The paper focusses on British reactions to Eisenhower's proposal and shows that the fate of the agency was secondary to the ultimate aim of restoring the nuclear relationship with Washington which was realised in 1954 resulting in a British volte-face concerning the agency's future.     

Imperial Rome and Britain's Language of Empire 1600–1837

Britain's pre-Victorian overseas expansion stimulated Roman comparisons. But imperial Rome was a warning as much as an inspiration to future empires, a harsh and uncomfortable model for Britain as a former Roman colony. Roman dignity was claimed for British monarchs and achievements by Dryden and others. But there were mixed feelings about identifying expanding Britain as a second Roman Empire. In the eighteenth century the British freedom-fighter Caractacus, defeated by the Romans, appealed far more to popular taste than Virgil's Aeneas or the Emperor Augustus. Sustained unease about imperial Rome, going right back to Tacitus, anticipated the liberal critique of imperialism of some Victorian and Edwardian commentators.     

The social representation and reality of BSE's impact in North Central Alberta

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), popularly known as ‘Mad Cow’ disease, was discovered in the late 1980s in Britain; in 1996, scientists announced a ‘probable’ link between eating BSE‐contaminated meat and a new form of Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease, a fatal human brain disease. Britain's beef industry was devastated, beef consumption dropped, export markets closed and a mass cull of older cattle was implemented. This article uses social representation theory to analyze how Canada's 2003 BSE outbreak was portrayed to Canadians in major newspapers and compares this representation with BSE's impact in two rural Alberta counties. The day Canada's BSE case was reported, the United States closed its border to Canadian cattle and beef. The event was represented as ‘devastating’ to Canada's cattle and beef industries and rural areas in general, a view that went largely unchallenged and was critical to gaining government support for the affected industries. Little evidence of economic devastation was found in the heart of Alberta's cow‐calf producing area; producers adapted to their changing economic circumstances and acquired other sources of income. But there is little doubt that the financial uncertainty associated with BSE added to stress levels among farm families.     

Measure of Despair: the Syndicate for Commerce and Industry,the London Tribune,and German Foreign Policy, 1906–8

Based on fresh archival sources in Germany and Britain, this article offers new insight into the mindest of the German Foreign Ministry in the aftermath of the First Morocco Crisis of 1905/06. Eager to arrest the deterioration in the Anglo-German relationship and concerned about its fallout for US-German relations, the German Foreign Ministry, in league with twenty of the country's top financiers, took a radical initiative which resulted in Germany's largest expenditure, before the First World War, on influencing the press. The article closes with a transnational comparison, detailing a similar influence-buying scheme masterminded by a high-level British political wire-puller.     

Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, 1965

Britain mediated successfully in the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch region in spring 1965, but when hostilities broke out over Kashmir soon afterwards, 10 Downing Street managed to alienate New Delhi with what was supposed to be an even-handed statement. The Indian government seemed to feel that the Labour government had violated some kind of historic special obligation to them, and the Anglo-Indian relationship was damaged. For his part Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned the ‘pro-Pakistani faction’ in the Commonwealth Relations Office responsible for drafting the statement, although he had been warned of the likely consequences. Eventually, the Soviet Union, operating through the United Nations, mediated an end to the war. The article draws upon British government documents to fill a gap in the literature, and it ends with a few reflections on Britain's ‘decline’ as demonstrated by the failure to end the conflict over Kashmir in 1965.     

Cultural Landscapes of Britain

'Britain' and 'cultural landscape' as used here are defined. The World Heritage categorisation provides the basis for a brief review of the range of such landscapes in Britain, with specific examples being named and briefly characterised. Relict landscapes are particularly noted. 'Threats to cultural landscapes are identified as of both development and decrepitude. A short discussion of the purpose and viability of cultural landscapes in Britain, for national and global purposes, concludes by noting a number of British cultural landscapes recognisable in World Heritage terms and potentially relevant to the European Landscape Convention 2000.     

Understanding the British Empire

In the immediate post-war period and during the early cold war, Britain regularly defended Switzerland's interests against the two emerging superpowers: the Soviet Union and especially the United States. This advocacy was not, however, altruistically motivated. In light of their experiences during the Second World War, British policy-makers could still see the benefits of a neutral Switzerland. But more importantly, the relatively wealthy Swiss were willing to pay for British support and a neutral Switzerland implied other financial, political, and strategic advantages. When there were no such advantages, London abstained from defending Berne. In the case of the negotiations leading to Switzerland's informal participation in the Western strategic embargo against the Eastern Bloc, Whitehall did not stand up to defend Swiss neutrality against US might. Yet this article demonstrates that even if the British had been willing to help the Swiss in their dealings with the Americans, they would have lacked the power to prevent Washington from imposing its will. Britain's power continued to decline after the war, and advocacy for Switzerland could only be successful if the Swiss position was acceptable to the United States.