The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia's strategic policy

The proposition that Australia faces an ‘arc of instability’ to its north has been an important feature of the Australian strategic debate in the early twenty-first century. Prompted by worries in the late 1990s over Indonesia's future and East Timor's uncertain path to independence, the ‘arc’ metaphor also encapsulated growing Australian concerns about the political cohesiveness of Melanesian polities, including Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. While tending to overlook the divergent experiences of countries within its expanding boundaries, the ‘arc’ fed from Australia's historical requirement for a secure archipelagic screen. As such it has became an important weapon in the debate over whether the locus of Australia's strategic priorities should be increasingly global in the ‘war on terror’ period or remain closer to home in the immediate region. The ‘arc of instability’ metaphor was consequently adopted by leading Australian Labor Party politicians to argue that the Howard Coalition government was neglecting South Pacific security challenges. It became less prominent following the Howard government's greater activism in the South Pacific, signalled by Australia's leadership of the East Timor intervention in 2003. But its prominence returned in 2006 with the unrest in both Honiara and Dili. In overall terms, the ‘arc of instability’ discussion has helped direct Australian strategic and political attention to the immediate neighbourhood. But it has not provided specific policy guidance on what should be done to address the instabilities it includes.     

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia's approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector

Since 2005, a burgeoning wave of Chinese investments has set off a new ‘minerals boom’ in the Australian iron ore and coal mining sectors. While normally a welcome development, the state-owned and strategic nature of the investors has raised concerns in Australia about how these should be regulated. As a result, in February 2008 the Australian government declared an intention to more closely screen foreign direct investment (FDI) from state-owned sources, which both supporters and detractors alike have claimed is evidence of ‘resource nationalism’ in Australia's approach towards its trade and investment relationships with China. This article challenges this understanding through an examination of the characteristics of Chinese mining FDI, the dilemmas these present to the Australian government, and the relatively restrained nature of its response. Through this, Australia's FDI policy is explained as a defensive move against the potential for strategic behaviour by Chinese investors resulting from their state ownership, rather than any national program to subject minerals trade and investment to political control. On this basis, the article argues that Australian government policy instead evidences a ‘resource liberalism’ approach, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia's minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes.     

Conceptualising Future Threats to Australia's Security

Much of the recent Australian security studies literature has focused on contemporary challenges to Australia's role in Asia, the evolving trajectory of defence strategy, and the various factors that have shaped the nation's ‘discourse of threats’. While this body of work is important and valuable, there is a distinct lack of scholarship that discusses the types of future security threats likely to confront Australian policy makers in the twenty-first century. Indeed, there is a tendency among scholars to assume that this sort of ‘futures’ work is best left to those outside the academy. I argue, however, that it is an area which is too important to leave to the authors of defence White Papers, think tank reports, and classified strategic assessments. Australia's future security environment in a complex international system has not been subject to the sort of systematic scholarly analysis the topic merits. This article seeks to provide a stepping stone for more substantial work in the area and outlines a conceptual framework that can aid us in understanding the factors likely to impact on Australia's security environment in the early part of the twenty-first century.     

Unlocking Australia's Relationship with the Middle East

Historically, Australia's interests in the Middle East related primarily to its role in the Commonwealth imperial defence system which resulted in the deployment of Australian forces in the Middle East during both the First and Second World Wars. Similarly, the current involvement of Australian troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is driven by the country's strategic alliance with the United States. However, Australia's current involvement reflects a multifaceted relationship that spans economic, political and strategic spheres. Yet it is at the level of cultural and civilisational contacts that this relationship appears at its most vulnerable. This paper argues that a deeper understanding of this cultural dimension combined with a broader emphasis on good governance and human rights would be conducive to more robust ties in the longer term.     

US-China relations after 11 September: a long engagement or marriage of convenience?

This article traces the evolution of US–Sino relations in the period since the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. It argues that the resultant, largely unanticipated rapprochement that has occurred between Beijing and Washington is actually more robust than many analysts have thus far been prepared to acknowledge. While conflictual elements will remain a feature of this all-important bilateral relationship, the article contends that the current ‘honeymoon period’ in US–Sino relations is likely to persist for some time yet, largely because it is underwritten by a deeper combination of economic, political and strategic considerations. While recognising that it is both natural and necessary to contemplate the ‘worst of times’ that may still lie ahead in US–Sino relations, the article concludes that it is particularly important for Australian policymakers to acknowledge the potential for a prolongation of the post-11 September ‘honeymoon’ and to actively encourage this possibility as they contemplate alternative approaches to managing China's rise.     

Australian reactions to Britain's declining presence in Southeast Asia, 1955–63

This article examines Australia's long-held doubts about Britain's willingness and ability to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, where Australia's main strategic interests lay. The article argues that Australian concerns long predated the Wilson government's attempt to disengage from east of Suez in the mid-1960s. In doing so, it shows that the Menzies government had since the mid-1950s become increasingly concerned about Britain's resolve and capacity to station substantial forces in the region. In illustrating the extent to which policy-makers in Canberra became suspicious of British long-term strategic aims in Southeast Asia, this article reveals some interesting aspects of the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-war period.     

Australia's ‘special strategic relationship’ with Japan: another ‘China choice’?

In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.     

Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems.     

The politics of Antarctic minerals: The Greening of white Australia

On 22 May 1989 the Australian Government announced that it would not sign the Antarctic Minerals Convention that had been concluded in June 1988. Australia had been a strong supporter of the minerals treaty approach to regulating Antarctic mineral development. This case study in Australian foreign policy examines four well known approaches to foreign policy making in order to explain Australia's volte face on the minerals treaty. It is concluded that domestic politics best explains Australia's decision and that students of Australian foreign policy need to pay more attention to the domestic determinants of the policy making process.     

The impotence of being earnest? Avoiding the pitfalls of ‘creative middle power diplomacy’

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities.     

From forward defence to self‐reliance: Changes and continuities in Australian defence policy 1965–90

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's ‘declared’ defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its ‘operational’ policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid‐course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid‐1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of ‘defence self‐reliance’. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's ‘operational’ policy is flawed and in need of replacement The danger is that, as in the past, Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances.     

Asylum-seekers in Australia's international relations

The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I offer some observations on the nature of 'sovereignty', and on the place of 'border controls' within sovereignty discourse. In the second, I discuss what it means to be a 'middle power', and what 'soft power' resources a middle power may need to use. In the third, I argue that crude populism has shaped recent responses to asylum-seekers, with scant regard to some of the wider consequences for Australia's reputation, but suggest that part of the blame lies with past failures of the foreign policy establishment to recognise genuine concerns entertained at mass level about the morality of Australian alignments and affiliations. In the fourth, I outline the key elements of Australia's recent policies towards asylum-seekers, and argue that they entail costs in terms both of Australia's reputation, and the nature of the Australian polity. In the fifth, I suggest some new directions to pursue.     

Unintended consequences: an examination of Australia's ‘historic policy shift’ on East Timor

The Howard government's foreign policy objectives concerning East Timor remain the subject of intense historical debate. Given that some Indonesians harbour suspicions about Australia's role in East Timor's independence, it is important to reflect on Australia's diplomacy throughout this period. This article draws on 15 interviews with former politicians and officials—including Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer—to argue that in 1998, Australia's foreign policy was focused on supporting Indonesia's democratisation process and maintaining the bilateral relationship. It was only when Indonesia moved towards a ‘special status’ of autonomy for East Timor that Australia reconsidered its own position. Although rarely acknowledged, Australia's policy shift actually precipitated outcomes that it had sought to avoid. As such, Habibie's decision to allow self-determination in East Timor can only be viewed as an unintended consequence of Australian diplomacy—independence was never the objective of Australian foreign policy.     

Is strategic geography relevant to Australia's current defence policy?

Unless you are a major power, a nation's geography is one of the most important factors driving military posture and force structure. But the idea that Australia's strategic geography primarily determines the size and shape of its defence force is being discarded in favour of expeditionary forces designed to operate in a subordinate role to allies in distant theatres. As a result the nexus between strategic geography and force structure is now broken. Purchases of expensive military equipment are being made without any clear articulation of strategic necessity. This article argues the case for force structure planning based on the abiding nature of Australia's regional strategic geography, while providing an improved (albeit still limited) expeditionary ability to support our US ally. The consistent application of strategic geography should be an iron discipline for a country with Australia's modest sized defence force and limited resources.     

One continent,two federalisms: rediscovering the original meanings of Australian federal ideas

Federalism is usually described in political science as a single body of ideas—in Australia's case arriving in the 1840s–50s and moving to constitutional reality in the 1890s. This article re‐examines the origins and diversity of federal ideas in Australia. It suggests that federal thought began influencing Australia's constitutional development significantly earlier than previously described. This first Australian federalism had a previously unappreciated level of support in British colonial policy and drew on Benjamin Franklin's American model of territorial change as a ‘commonwealth for increase’. The revised picture entrenches the notion of federalism's logic but also reveals a dynamic, decentralist style of federalism quite different from Australia's orthodox ‘classic’ or compact federal theory. In fact, Australian political thought contains two often‐conflicting ideas of federalism. The presence of these approaches helps explain longstanding dissent over the regional foundations of Australian constitutionalism.     

Tax Havens and Global Capitalism: Vanuatu and the Australian Connection

The growth of tax haven activities has been a feature of recent global capitalist development, yet geographical analysis of these activities has been limited. Vanuatu has become the South Pacific's major tax haven, expanding through its ability to capture (mainly) Australian and Asian investment in the 1970s and 1980s. Tax haven activities in Vanuatu have increasingly contributed to local employment and income generation, despite the growth of competition from newer tax havens in the region. Vanuatu is not used by major Australian public companies to the extent that either Hong Kong or the Caribbean tax havens are used, and it is suggested that activities from Asia are increasingly dominating Vanuatu's finance centre. Recent Australian taxation legislation may reduce Australia's role in the Vanuatu tax haven further, although it is apparent that there are limitations to the legislation's effectiveness in stopping tax haven activities.     

The abandonment of procurement-linked strategic activism in Australia: standing still with room to move

In this paper I examine the extent to which preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit the Australian government's ability to use public procurement for local industry development ends. I do so not only by examining Australia's PTA obligations, but also by examining how other governments with similar obligations—such as Korea—are using public purchasing policies to promote local industrial advancement. I find that the PTA obligations of the Australian and Korean governments leave them both significant scope to use public purchasing strategically. Interestingly, however, Australian policymakers have been standing still in the room that remains, and even abandoning PTA-compliant procurement-linked development policies. South Korean policymakers on the other hand have been capitalising on every inch of space left open to them—and even experimenting with new forms of strategic public purchasing that nonetheless comply with their international obligations. I conclude by offering some suggestions as to how we might explain these countries’ radically different approaches to procurement policy, despite their very similar international obligations.