Anthropology and the Iraq war: An uncomfortable engagement

The Iraq war has preoccupied anthropologists. However, this has not materialized in panels dedicated to independent study of Iraq at annual conferences at our major professional associations. In the US, we have been predominantly preoccupied with the implications of intelligence gathering for our profession. The author considers some of the differences between our dealing with the Iraq war presently, and the successful campaigns against the Vietnam war of the 60s. He concludes that there is scope for anthropologists to learn from the past and to make a renewed concerted effort to, independent from government demands on their skills, inform and change public opinion and ultimately government policy.     

Greetings from the cybercaliphate: some notes on homeland insecurity

One of the paradoxical effects of the 7 July bombings in London was to expose the ambivalence in the British government's attempt to wage war on terror by forcefully prosecuting war against those who resort to jihad abroad, actively participating in coalitions of the willing whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, while affording some of Islamism's key ideologists and strategists a high degree of latitude in the United Kingdom itself. This indicates a number of contradictions in official policy that simultaneously recognizes the globalized threat from violent Islamic militancy while, under the rubric of multiculturalism, tolerating those very strains of Islamist radicalism, some of which draw upon the interdependent and transnational character of conflict, to render the UK vulnerable to those very same violent forces. Consequently, the British authorities displayed a studied indifference towards this developing transnational phenomenon both during the 1990s and in some respects even after the London bombings. To explore the curious character of the government's response to the Islamist threat requires the examination of the emergence of this radical ideological understanding and what it entails as a reaction to modernization and secularism in both thought and practice. The analysis explores how government policies often facilitated the non-negotiable identity politics of those promoting a pure, authentic and regenerated Islamic order both in the UK and abroad. This reflected a profound misunderstanding of the growing source and appeal of radical Islam that can be interpreted as a consequence of the slow-motion collision between modernity in its recent globalized form and an Islamic social character, which renders standard western modernization theory, and indeed, the notion of a 'social science' itself, deeply questionable.     

‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: beheading videos and the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS

This article examines the role of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS's) beheading videos in the United Kingdom and the United States. These videos are highly illustrative demonstrations of the importance of visual imagery and visual media in contemporary warfare. By functioning as evidence in a political discourse constituting ISIS as an imminent, exceptional threat to the West, the videos have played an important role in the re‐framing of the conflict in Iraq and Syria from a humanitarian crisis requiring a humanitarian response to a national security issue requiring a military response and intensified counterterrorism efforts. However, this article seeks to problematize the role and status of ISIS's beheadings in American and British security discourses by highlighting the depoliticizing aspects of reducing a complicated conflict to a fragmented visual icon. The article concludes by emphasizing the need for further attention to how the visibility of war, and the constitution of boundaries between which acts of violence are rendered visible and which are not, shape the political terrain in which decisions about war and peace are produced and legitimized.     

Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': the Bush Administration and Iraq

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's 'war on terrorism'. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.     

Iran's Shortsighted Policies in Iraq: Between Inflaming and Containing of Radical Sunni Islam: 2003–2015

The main goal of the 2003 war with Iraq of the coalition forces led by the United States was to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and establish a new political system that would adopt democratic practices. Iran, a country that deemed Saddam's regime to be a threat, considered this war to be very helpful in many ways — first because it put an end to Clinton's “dual containment” approach and would thus help Iran to become a regional superpower at Iraq's expense. Second, a war with Iraq could put an end to the decades of oppression of the Shi'a community in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's involvement in Iraq's internal affairs created chaos in Iraq and contributed to the sectarian conflict against Sunni terror groups, notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known by the Arabic name Daesh, a terror group with the most extreme form of Sunni Radical Islam ever known. The sectarian conflict that resulted from the above is now taking place between the Sunnis and the Shi'a of both Persian and Arab backgrounds and this clash could not have become as radical as it is without Iran's aggressive foreign policy. It should, however, be noted that Iran is not the sole player in the country and therefore its part in inflaming sectarian conflicts should be viewed through a realistic prism that allows other forces — domestic and foreign — to be seen as having influenced the events for their benefit.     

The United States, The United Nations and Iraq: 'Multilateralism of a kind'

Much is made of the need for any second war against Iraq (following Desert Storm of 1991) to be sanctioned by a resolution of the UN Security Council, approved necessarily by all five Permanent Members. Yet only two of the five, the USA and the UK, show any enthusiasm for renewed war in the Persian Gulf; and British policy is undeniably following rather than leading American actions on the diplomatic and military fronts. What are the sources of this American policy? Some critics say oil; the latest arguments of proponents invoke humanitarian concerns; somewhere between the two are those who desire ‘regime change’ to create the economic and political conditions in which so‐called western political, economic and social values can flourish. To understand the present crisis and its likely evolution this article examines American relations with Iraq in particular, the Persian Gulf more generally and the Middle East as a region since the Second World War. A study of these international relations combined with a critical approach to the history of American actions and attitudes towards the United Nations shows that the United States continues to pursue a diplomacy blending, as occasion suits, the traditional binaries of multilateralism and unilateralism—yet in the new world‐wide ‘war on terrorism’. The question remains whether the chosen means of fighting this war will inevitably lead to a pyrrhic victory for the United States and its ad hoc allies in the looming confrontation with Iraq.     

Voice of Civilisation: advertising and its critics in austerity Britain

The advertising industry was on the defensive during World War Two, with advertising regarded by many British people as deeply unpatriotic, potentially undermining the national interest and the fight against fascism. This article analyses the debate on the role of advertising in Britain in the immediate aftermath of war, when the advertising industry regrouped to meet the challenge of working within an economic environment shaped by the imperatives of a Labour government committed to wide scale state intervention. Critics of advertising within the labour movement were emboldened by this context, and the industry was threatened with punitive taxation in 1947. Focusing particularly on this flashpoint and its aftermath, the article sheds new light on the increasingly open struggle between private enterprise and state planning during this volatile period.     

The Case for a Pre-emptive Strike,and so forth …

Abstract

This article is a response to the piece by Stephen Strehle in issue 5.1. It is recognized that a variety of theological and political perspectives come from the US, but argues that this is a poor illustration of contemporary political theology. Strehle, it is suggested, has a mistaken understanding of US history and represents a strand of American thought which has failed to acknowledge the faults of an imperial past, in particular the crimes committed against ‘native’ peoples. The war against Iraq is presented as a further illustration of an imperial mentality which pervades parts of US culture. Strehle fails to recognize the flaws apparent in the morality of the West. The critique of the place of just war theory in contemporary geo-political conflicts is challenged, as is the assertion that the church has a duty to follow the government of the day. The article ends with a recognition of the value of, and inspiration resulting from, much US political theological thought.     

Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice

Ten years after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the United States remains embroiled in a long‐term struggle with what George W. Bush termed the existential threat of international terrorism. On the campaign trail, his successor as US President, Barack Obama, promised to reboot the ‘war on terror’. He claimed that his new administration would step back from the rhetoric and much of the Bush administration policy, conducting a counterterrorism campaign that would be more morally acceptable, more focused and more effective—smarter, better, nimbler, stronger. This article demonstrates, however, that those expecting wholesale changes to US counterterrorism policy misread Obama's intentions. It argues that Obama always intended to deepen Bush's commitment to counterterrorism while at the same time ending the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq War. Rather than being trapped by Bush's institutionalized construction of a global war on terror, the continuities in counterterrorism can be explained by Obama's shared conception of the imperative of reducing the terrorist threat to the US. The article assesses whether Obama has pursued a more effective counterterrorism policy than his predecessor and explores how his rhetoric has been reconstituted as the actions of his policy have unfolded. By addressing his policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Guantánamo Bay and torture, the uses of unmanned drone attacks and domestic wire‐tapping, this article argues that Obama's ‘war’ against terrorism is not only in keeping with the assumptions and priorities of the last ten years but also that it is just as problematic as that of his predecessor.     

The power of the “Stockpile”: American aid and China’s Wartime everyday

ABSTRACT

This article argues that American and British narratives about the existence of a “stockpile” of Chinese goods had a powerful impact on US-China relations, China’s war effort, and China’s wartime everyday. Focusing on both the material and discursive construction of the so-called stockpile in the early 1940s, the work seeks to deconstruct a powerful symbol that was long used by both British and American officials (particularly in the US War Department) to delegitimize the Nationalist government’s war effort against Japan. Drawing on sources collected at archives in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan, the article seeks to rethink many commonly held assumptions about American aid and to reveal the powerful influence that the symbolic presence of the stockpile had in shaping Sino-American relations in the wartime period and beyond.     

Selkirk in Singapore

This article explores the strained relationship between HaroldMacmillan's Conservative government and its senior representativein South-East Asia, the former minister George Selkirk. In particularit considers the impact of that relationship on the final yearsof colonial governance in Singapore. Between 1959 and 1963 Singaporeremained a British colonial territory enjoying internal self-government,and the most important British military base in South-East Asia.During these years Britain was the People's Action Party's guarantoragainst subversion. Newly released British documents deal withthe assessment of the communist threat. They reveal that Britaindid not have a single view of that threat. The British HighCommission in Kuala Lumpur and Britons remaining in the employof the Federation of Malaya after it gained independence inAugust 1957 argued that Britain should act as if the threatwas serious, in order to encourage the Malayan government tocreate a Malaysian federation. The United Kingdom Commissionin Singapore believed that Singapore's communists were indigenousleftists with valid claims to political legitimacy. They arguedthat these leftists could be overcome by political means ratherthan by mass detention. The British government in London hadlittle interest in Singapore's internal politics. Iain Macleodand Reginald Maudling were tardy in establishing any firm policyfor the island. Their successor as Colonial Secretary, DuncanSandys, accepted the advice of Selkirk on most issues in Singaporeanpolitics but overrode his reluctance to suppress the leftists.Singapore provides a case-study of the dilemmas of British ColdWar policy during the process of decolonization. ^* The author wishes to thank the Humanities Research Board ofthe British Academy for its generous financial support of theresearch upon which this article is based.     

The Battle of Sha’iba, 1915: Ottomanism,British Imperialism and Shia Religious Activism during the Mesopotamian Campaign

This article analyses relations among the Ottoman Empire, British imperialism and Shia religious proto-nationalism in the period before and after the battle of Sha’iba of 1915, one of the pivotal engagements of the Mesopotamian campaign. It illustrates how the narrow victory of the British at the battle led them to draw a number of over-optimistic conclusions regarding their role in Iraq and their ability to co-opt the Arabs of the province against their ‘Turkish’ overlords. The victory at Sha’iba and in particular the ambivalent role played by a number of the Arab mujahidin volunteers led the British to conclude that there had never been any real enthusiasm for the jihad declared by the Ottomans against the British occupiers. However, this was based on the false perception that lack of commitment to Ottomanism could be equated with sympathy for British imperialism. In particular, the British failed to recognise that the Ottoman summons to jihad had strengthened the developing forms of Shia proto-nationalist consciousness led by various mujtahids influenced by the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.     

从"伊拉克门"到"情报门"——美国对萨达姆政权政策探析

美国当代有两次所谓"伊拉克门"丑闻:一次发生在海湾战前,以美国纵容伊拉克发展大规模杀伤性武器借以改善美伊关系为特征;另一次又称"情报门",发生在2003年伊拉克战争前,以美国政府夸大伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的威胁度和紧迫性,为发动伊战寻求借口为特征。两次"伊拉克门"特征迥异,却都与大规模杀伤性武器紧密相关。大规模杀伤性武器成为美国处理对伊关系、制定对伊政策的核心因素。两次"伊拉克门"期间,随着国际环境以及战略重心的改变,美国的伊拉克政策也发生了巨大的转变,美国对伊外交政策的务实主义本质在两次"伊拉克门"丑闻中得到了充分的体现。     

Past,present, and future: the role of the Cold War in legitimising Danish foreign policy activism

The Cold War has had an extended life span in Danish foreign policy due to the establishment of a right-wing revisionist agenda. This article argues that this revisionism came to serve different contemporary purposes under the Anders Fogh Rasmussen governments. Externally it was used to legitimise the Danish participation in the Iraq War and came to serve as a tool to discipline the war-sceptical social democratic led opposition and secured parliamentary support for an offensive Liberal-inspired activism in Danish foreign policy. Domestically the revisionism became entangled with the overall cultural war that the Liberal-led government launched and thereby became a part of the overall ideological war that united the governing coalition from 2001 to 2011.     

The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War

This work examines British conservative attitudes towards the Weimar Republic through the lens of several specific issues from the armistice up to the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. The author argues that a curious feature of British conservative opinion following the First World War was the consistent hostility British conservatives demonstrated towards the new German democratic state. To be sure, Great Britain had just fought a long and costly war against Germany, and there had been little time for the passions generated by the war to cool. Still, from the early days of the political changes in October and November of 1918, the German government was firmly committed to democratic principles. This was a development that the British nation claimed to favour, but the war left many British conservatives ill disposed to consider that the ‘inner change’ in Germany might be genuine or that a stable German democracy was possible. During its formative years, the Weimar Republic faced enormous challenges that would have tested any nation. Yet, even as political and economic conditions within Germany undermined prospects for democracy to succeed in that country, many British conservatives declined to take these developments seriously. Indeed, the attitudes of British conservatives substantially added to the difficulties the German government faced in dealing with the problems of the post-war world.     

Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence After 9/11

Against the commonly held view that morality implies a critique or restraint of strategic violence, this article analyses a range of moral discourses that have been deployed to support the war on terror, including its extension to Iraq. It analyses the ambiguity between legal and extra-legal responses in Bush administration rhetoric and policy, and critically surveys the humanitarian costs–in civilian life, instability and suffering–sustained during the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This article places just war theory, in particular, under extended critical scrutiny, and finds its formalized system of moral rules and concepts–particularly civilian immunity and proportionality–deeply flawed in the light of actual US war-fighting strategies. By insisting on the acceptability of unintentional killing (as opposed to an alternative concept such as avoidable harm) just war theory may actually expose civilians to mortal danger and liberate war rather than morally restrain it. In the light of the flaws of current moral discourses on strategy, the article concludes by developing 'ethical peace' as an alternative conceptual framework that seeks to create a genuinely universal moral community in which it is never, in principle, legitimate to secure one group of citizens by placing others in moral danger.     

Breaking the covenant: governance of the British army in the twenty-first century

This article argues that the military covenant between senior army commanders and soldiers is breaking down for two reasons: first, British forces are being engaged in new and controversial wars of choice, putting new and distinct pressures on the covenant; and second because senior military commanders have not fully appreciated the changes to their authority and power in governing the British army. It further suggests that military commanders, central staff and ministers need to acknowledge the scale of the internal challenges to the military covenant and develop appropriate responses. Drawing on examples from gender equality and sexual orientation, allegations of war crimes in Iraq, the military's duty of care and the proposed launch of a British Armed Forces Federation, this article argues that these challenges show that the military leadership has no choice but to rethink its outdated approach to governance of the British army, if it is to remain fi t for purpose. Without appropriate adaptation, army chiefs will have themselves contributed to the breaking of the military covenant, between the army and the individual soldier.     

The Abbott government and the Islamic State: a securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse

This article analyses the foreign policy discourse that surrounded the Abbott government’s 2014 decision to fight the Islamic State (IS). An analysis of parliamentary Hansard reveals that the debate featured three prominent axes: the legacy of the 2003 Iraq War; the strategies and objectives of the 2014 mission; and Australia’s domestic terror threat level. Throughout, the Abbott government not only marginalised dissenting views, but also justified its renewed engagement in the Middle East via a highly securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse. This finding has consequences beyond the battle against the IS. It reveals a deep-seated tension between the ideals of democratic pluralism and the reality that securitised and elitist foreign policy discourses protect governments from serious scrutiny.     

In the Eye of the Storm: Sri Lanka's Front‐Line Civil Servants in Transition

This article narrates how bureaucrats in eastern Sri Lanka operated during and after the war. They managed to keep minimal state services running whilst being locked between the government and the insurgent Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). When the government defeated the LTTE in 2009, civil servants were freed from rebel coercion, but they also lost their counterweight against unappreciated policies from the capital and interference by local politicians. The article links the thinking on armed conflicts with the literature that conceptualizes ‘the state’ not as a coherent entity, but as a subject of continuous negotiation. The state's insigne provides a sense of legitimacy and supremacy, but governments have no monopoly on using it. Other powerful actors capture state institutions, resources and discourse for contradictory purposes. This perspective helps us reconcile the appearance of bureaucratic order with the peculiar and hybrid forms of rule that emerged in the war between rebels and government, and it sheds light on some of the surprising changes and continuities that occurred when that war ended. Public administration is neither just a victim of war, nor plainly a victor of the post‐war situation.