The Supreme Court as a Policy Arena: The Strategies and Tactics of State Attorneys General

Presently, state governments are more active and more successful in the U.S. Supreme Court than at any time since the New Deal. These rates of activity and success are a function of two coincident forces—the emergence of the Republican Court and the increased capacity of the states to pursue their policy goals aggressively before the High Bench. In this analysis, we seek to offer a better-defined portrait of the states' evolving advocacy in the Supreme Court. Using archival and survey data, we find that, as a group, the states are more capable Supreme Court litigators, that their perceptions of the Republican Court have encouraged them to increase their pursuit of policy goals through litigation, and that they are "procedurally rational"—i.e., their estimates of success enter into their decisions to engage the Court.     

Oversimplifying the Supreme Court

I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to be at the Supreme Court Historical Society. Of course, the Supreme Court is fortunate to have a Chief Justice who is also Chief Historian. I have read each of Chief Justice Rehnquist's books on the Court, and they are engagingly written narratives filled with a love and knowledge of this institution. The Chief Justice is steeped in the folklore of this remarkable Court as few have ever been. This is just one reason those of us throughout the federal judiciary admire and love the Chief. He has shown kindness to me ever since I was a young law clerk for Justice Lewis Powell. I don't know if it's appropriate or not to dedicate a speech, but I am going to do so anyway. This speech is for him.     

Presidents as Supreme Court Advocates: Before and After the White House

Eight men who took the presidential oath also appeared before the Supreme Court of the United States as advocates. From Senator John Quincy Adams at the outset of the Marshall Court to Richard M. Nixon during the high-water mark of the Warren Court, future and past Presidents have argued before the Supreme Court on such varied and important topics as land scandals in the South, slavery at home and on the high seas, the authority of military commissions over civilians during the Civil War, international disputes as an aftermath of the Alaskan Purchase, and the sensitive intersection between the right to personal privacy and a free press. Here, briefly, are stories of men history knows as Presidents performing as appellate lawyers and oral advocates before the nation's highest court.     

High Court Review 2001: Politics,Legalism and the Gleeson Court

This article provides a general political review of recent High Court decisions that have significant implications for Australian constitutionalism. In examining the Court's judgments on issues such as cross-vesting schemes, immigration and Native Title, it seeks to articulate major themes in the Court's jurisprudence and delineate the important and changing role of the High Court in Australian politics. The article is the first in what this journal intends to be an annual review of the High Court from a political-science perspective.     

Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002

What factors explain Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases? Despite the importance of this question of law and policy, few empirical studies have explored the problem on the area of racial and ethnic discrimination. This study seeks to fill this gap by assessing the importance of the solicitor general, the federal government's representative before the Supreme Court, as a litigant and in the filings of amicus curiae briefs. The findings confirm that the solicitor general's presence in civil rights cases does matter when explaining whether the Supreme Court reaches a liberal or conservative outcome. This research demonstrates the significance of executive‐judicial interaction in explaining Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases.     

Beginning to Write Separately: The Origins and Development of Concurring Judicial Opinions

While political scientists and legal academics have both evinced a “fascination with disagreement on courts,” ¹ this scholarly concentration on conflict rather than consensus has tended to focus on dissent and dissenting opinions. As far as we can tell, there is no authoritative history of concurring opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court. This article is a first effort to correct that oversight by examining developments and change in concurring behavior from the founding through the White Court (1921). This period covers the emergence of an institutionally independent national judicial branch and ends before the start of the modern, policy‐making Court era, which we argue begins with the Taft Court and the creation of a fully discretionary docket.     

The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and Individual Expression on the Supreme Court

Readers of Supreme Court opinions have become so accustomed in recent years to the multiple concurrences and dissents that accompany important opinions that it is difficult to recall that this is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is only in the past century that the Court's traditional balance of the institutional and the personal has shifted from an insistence on presenting what Learned Hand termed "monolithic solidarity" to the world. That insistence began with Chief Justice Marshall's determination that the Court should resolve its cases, not seriatim, with each Justice writing separately, but instead in a single, unified opinion. The resulting culture of the Court, one that discouraged both dissenting and concurring opinions as assaults on this unified front, persisted from Marshall's day into the 1930s.3 The Court in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thus deliberately submerged the idea of a personal voice in the fiction of a collective voice, one that spoke for the institution rather than for the Justice who served as its designated scribe.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.     

The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General

"When the Supreme Court invites you, that's the equivalent of a royal command. An invitation from the Supreme Court just can't be rejected." ¹ The guest most frequently invited to the Supreme Court is the Solicitor General. Even before the practice of the Supreme Court calling for the views of the Solicitor General process developed, the Court occasionally invited the Solicitor General to participate as amicus in important cases by submitting a brief and/or participating in oral arguments before the Court. ² As then–Solicitor General Simon E. Sobeloff remarked to then–Attorney General Herbert Brownell in a 1954 letter about the landmark school desegregation cases, "The Supreme Court has expressly extended an invitation to the United States to participate in the reargument. While this by no means compels participation, such an invitation is not to be lightly declined." ³     

中国古代史官称谓内涵的嬗变

"史官"作为中国古代史学研究中经常提及和运用的名词或概念,是一个历史的范畴。早期的史官因其官为"史",故被后人称为"史官",后期的史官,则因其职为"记史"、"写史",而被称为"史官"。这种称谓的变化经历了天官和巫官、著作官和天官的分离过程,到隋唐时期,史官的称谓才固定为专指记录和撰述史事的官员。     

Roman Pottery Research in Britain and North-West Europe: Papers Presented to Graham Webster. Edited by A.C. and A. S. Anderson

The Court House at East Meon was a country residence of the medieval bishops of Winchester. Of this residence, the great hall, a solar, and a garderobe block survive largely intact. The Court House is remarkable not only for its fine state of preservation but also because of the detailed record of its development to be found in the magnificent records of the bishopric of Winchester. Until recently, there had been disagreement as to the date of its construction but the discovery of the original building accounts has allowed this to be established with certainty. Unlike larger bishopric residences which could accommodate the entire episcopal household for long periods, it seems to have served partly as a retreat for a select number of the bishop's household or friends. Although the name ‘Court House’ is not recorded until 1647, it is used here to denote the medieval house. All places referred to in the text are in Hampshire, unless otherwise stated.     

High Court Review 2002: The Least Dangerous Branch

The article provides a general political review of recent High Court decisions and explores the extent to which the judiciary can be said to be the 'least dangerous branch'. By examining recent events such as the 'Kirby incident', as well as the important judgments handed down by the High Court concerning Native Title, IVF and the Web, it seeks to delineate the influence and changing role of the High Court in Australian politics and constitutionalism. This is the Australian Journal of Political Science 's second annual review of the Australian High Court from a political-science perspective.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Change at the Supreme Court may be most visible and frequent in the progression of statutory and constitutional questions the Justices resolve collectively, but it may also be equally highlighted by an individual Justice's decision. This reality became plainly apparent in a letter that Justice John Paul Stevens sent to the White House on April 9, 2010, just eleven days shy of his 90^th birthday: “My dear Mr. President: Having concluded that it would be in the best interests of the Court to have my successor appointed and confirmed well in advance of the commencement of the Court's next Term, I shall retire from regular active service as an Associate Justice … effective the next day after the Court rises for the summer recess this year.” ¹ His statement was dated almost a year after Justice David Souter dispatched a similar notice to President Obama on May 1, 2009, announcing his intention to leave the Bench. Thus, for the fifth time in as many years, the machinery of executive nomination and senatorial advice and consent for the High Court churned again.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Decisions by the Supreme Court that are accorded "landmark" status are chiefly remembered for their holdings and effects. Such cases are also typically linked to a particular era of judicial history, as Marbury v. Madison ¹ was to the Marshall Court and Jefferson's presidency, as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer ² was to the Vinson Court and Truman's presidency, and as Miranda v. Arizona ³ was to the Warren Court and the tumultuous 1960s. But probably only serious students of the Court will recall that Marbury was decided in 1803, Youngstown in 1952, and Miranda in 1966. And fewer still will know, without first consulting a reference, that Marbury came down on February 24, the Steel Seizure Case on June 2, and Miranda on June 13. Scholars typically associate decisions with years, not the day of the month.     

The Life and Career of Justice Robert H. Jackson

Robert H. Jackson was one of the most influential Justices of the Supreme Court in the twentieth century. His tenure on the Court ran from 1941 to his death in 1954, and during that time he participated in landmark cases involving the programs implemented by Roosevelt's New Deal to rescue the country from Depression, having previously served the administration in other roles. He authored a memorable dissent in United States v. Korematsu, the notorious Japanese internment case. ¹ He is also remembered for the role he served as the chief American prosecutor before the International Military Tribunal that tried Nazi leaders after World War II. In some ways, Jackson's fierce independence and the lessons he learned growing up in a small town were the ideal training for the demands and competitiveness of the nation's highest Court. That Jackson's words and beliefs still have relevance in the twenty‐first century is evidenced by the fact that both recent Supreme Court appointees quoted him during the confirmation hearings. ² In this essay, I will examine how Jackson's life experiences influenced his legal career and informed his jurisprudence, and to what extent Jackson lived up to his own vision of the role of a Supreme Court Justice.     

The "Lone Dissenter"

The tenure of Associate Justice—and later Chief Justice—William H. Rehnquist on the Supreme Court spanned more than three decades. Despite his public importance, he was a quite private man. During his time on the Court, relatively few accounts appeared of what life was like inside the Rehnquist chambers, especially during his years as an Associate Justice. In the aftermath of his death last fall, former clerks have begun to reminisce about what it was like to clerk for him.     

Unlikely Abolitionist: William Cushing and the Struggle Against Slavery

One of the striking differences between the federal Union established under the Constitution and the Confederation of States established under the Articles of Confederation is the creation under Article III of a judicial power of the United States and of a Supreme Court to exercise that power. Acting pursuant to its power to determine the structure of that Court, Congress determined that the Court should consist of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices. The six lawyers President Washington named to the Court ¹ were leading members of the bar, yet none achieved lasting distinction by reason of his service on the Court. Chief Justice Jay, for example, is best remembered for the treaty with England which bears his name; and when he resigned in 1795 following his election as Governor of New York, local papers referred to his new office as "a promotion." ²     

The Case of William Dick: Ransom County, North Dakota

In May 2009, a decision of the United States Supreme Court with North Dakota roots turned fifty years old. A case unique in the annals of the law, Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company ¹ still fascinates lawyers today. Factually, the case presented a strange question: could an experienced hunter accidentally shoot himself not once, but twice? Some of North Dakota's finest lawyers, including Philip Vogel, Donald Holand, and Norman Tenneson, aimed to get to the bottom of that matter. The judges were equally impressive: Judge Ronald Davies of the federal district court; Judge John Sanborn of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; and Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Finally, as a matter of Supreme Court jurisprudence, Dick may have been the last time the High Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case that turned almost exclusively on questions of fact. In honor of its golden anniversary, this article recounts the captivating story of Dick v. New York Life.     

John J. Parker and the Beginning of the Modern Confirmation Process

Ideological concerns' dominance of the Supreme Court confirmation process has certainly become routine, especially in the form of issue-driven interest groups' influence over the agenda for Senate debates. More significantly, the Senate normally focuses on what Laurence Tribe has called “the net impact of adding [a] candidate to the Court” ¹ in terms of steering the Court toward adherence to a particular judicial philosophy, such as originalism ² or pragmatism, ³ or toward a specific outlook on a given constitutional issue. And when the President nominates someone with prior judicial experience, the candidate's decisions, as well as his or her prior speeches or other public activities, become fair game as supposed indications of his or her fitness for service on the Court.     

The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker: Ashton Embry and the Supreme Court Leak Scandal

On December 16, 1919, Ashton Fox Embry, law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Joseph McKenna, abruptly resigned from the position he had held for almost nine years. His explanation? His fledgling bakery business required his undivided attention. Newspapers that morning hinted at a different reason: Embry resigned because he had conspired with at least three individuals to use inside knowledge of upcoming U.S. Supreme Court decisions to profit on Wall Street.2 A grand jury returned an indictment against Embry and his associates a few months later, and Embry’s argument that he had committed no crime ultimately reached the Supreme Court, the very institution he was accused of betraying. Despite the sensational headlines and fierce legal battle arising from his indictment, the United States Attorney quietly dismissed Embry’s case in 1929, almost ten years after the story had broken. Few Court scholars have ever heard of Embry, and the memory of Embry, much like the case against him, has disappeared with time.3 This article unravels the “Supreme Court Leak Case” by reconstructing what happened almost eighty years ago.