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1.
In November 1960 a conference of eighty‐one communist parties convened in Moscow to try to resolve serious differences which had arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC or CCP). It was ‘probably the most important gathering of its kind in the entire history of Communism’ (Zagoria 1962:343).

Several years later the position adopted at that conference by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) became the subject of an acrimonious and inconclusive controversy between pro‐Soviet and pro‐Chinese elements in the Australian party.

Of various scholars who commented on the CPA's stance, almost all ([Rigby] 1964:37; Mayo‐Wren 1981:87; Turner 1961:7; Turner 1965:154) claimed categorically that the CPA's delegates, Sharkey and Dixon, backed China. However in one exhaustive account of the conference (Griffith 1962) the CPA did not appear among the CPC's partisans. Most observers outside Australia relied heavily on Kremlinologist Edward Crankshaw. Crankshaw originally omitted the CPA from his list of pro‐Chinese parties (1962:10) but later revised his account (1963:61; 1965:120, 134).1

In the standard historical work on the CPA Davidson (1969:160,152) qualified the notion that the CPA had supported China. ‘After a careful study of various views’ he concluded:

At the conference of eighty‐one communist parties in Moscow in 1960 the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) supported the Chinese interpretation of Marxist‐Leninist doctrine in preference to that of the Soviet party. Previous emphasis on the CPA's commitment to international communist unity has tended to obscure and even deny this.  相似文献   


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On July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's cabinet commenced a historic transformation of post-war Japan's security policy by overturning previous interpretations of the constitution's pacifist clause, Article 9. The Cabinet Decision on the Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect Its People stated that collective self-defence was consistent with the constitution and, consequently, Japan would immediately develop a more proactive and less constrained security policy. But while this outcome may seem sensible and overdue from a realist perspective of Japan's standing as a mature democratic nation in an increasingly difficult geopolitical situation, the manner in which it is being enacted may seriously undermine the normative legitimacy of Japan's new security identity. In this article, the author examines how Shinzō Abe's administration has attempted to shape the norms surrounding security policy revision in Japan, and how these norms, in turn, have affected or constrained Abe's agency. This is done with specific reference to the external contexts of the USA's ‘rebalance’ policy and the deepening of Japan's security relationship with Australia, with a view to anticipating how normative turmoil might impact on the potential of this relationship.  相似文献   

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This article considers recent developments in Australia–Japan security and defence ties and their trilateral dimension with the United States. I argue that the security links bilaterally and through their main ally the US have scope for development while the three nations share perceptions of security and strategic matters. However, there are elements of inherent unpredictability that may come into play to hinder the move towards a further strengthening of the current trilateral security arrangement. Possible impediments come from both external and internal sources making it difficult for the three nations to transform their trilateral security relations into an institution, alliance or treaty that formally links the three partners strategically.1 1. This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at a workshop held at the Australian National University on 31 July 2006. The author would like to thank Bill Tow, Andrew MacIntyre, David Walton and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of the paper. However, the normal academic caveat applies. View all notes  相似文献   

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Graeme Cheeseman and StJohn Kettle (eds), The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1990).

Gary Smith and StJohn Kettle (eds), Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1992).

Peter Jennings, Searching For Insecurity: Why the ‘Secure Australia Project’ is Wrong About Defence (Current Issues, Institute of Public Affairs, June 1994).  相似文献   


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ABSTRACT

This article explores the complex and changing relationship between technological development, intellectual property, and national security in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Its specific case study concerns an important invention developed by a naval officer. Technological innovations not only were vital to British security but also embodied commercially valuable intellectual property. The state’s interest in acquiring control of the intellectual property to maintain Britain’s naval supremacy was not automatically aligned with the interests of inventors. The alignment was especially fraught in the case of service inventors—that is, inventors in government service, rather than in the private sector. Service inventors, who played a crucial role in maintaining Britain’s naval-technological edge, were governed by special regulations, and they invariably utilized state resources for their inventive work. Exploring these issues sheds important light on the attitude of the British state toward innovation and technological development from the 1850s through the 1920s.  相似文献   

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The March 2007 Japan-Australia Security Declaration has garnered more than its share of hyperbole. Described variously as an historic milestone for peace or an agreement designed to encircle China; the declaration's actual strategic consequences are somewhat unclear. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the security declaration and to assess its impact in the context of the changing patterns of the region's security setting. Some have argued that it marks a small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture. The article assesses this claim and argues that while the declaration is of some diplomatic importance, and clearly contributes to improving cooperation in disaster relief and other humanitarian operations, it is of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term. Each side's operational constraints, their different strategic priorities, most obviously their perceptions of China, as well as the continued military predominance of the US, means that the agreement will be of little immediate significance for East Asian security. That said, it remains an important development for the respective parties and is a leading edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia.  相似文献   

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Most of the available literature on Tehran between the two world wars deals with the morphological transformation of the city and the role of the Pahlavi state in accomplishing massive urban projects. In contrast, this article focuses on the reciprocal relationship between the sociality and spatiality of the city. It demonstrates how the consolidation of the discourse of modernity resulted in the development of social and political desires for the production of new forms of social life and spaces. The article argues that the formation of the modern middle class and its alignment with the Pahlavi state’s reform projects contributed to a twofold process: first, the decline of the traditional forms of social life and spaces and, second, the production and prevalence of alternative forms. This process resulted in the establishment of social dichotomies with vast spatial manifestations and polarized the city both socially and spatially.  相似文献   

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