Assessing party structures: why some regimes are more authoritarian than others

This article attempts to answer the puzzle of why, amongst undemocratic states, some regimes are more authoritarian than others. The author contends that differing party structures result in different authoritarian outcomes. A ruling, competitive authoritarian regime that has a party structure akin to a cadre party, or where there is little or no intra-party democracy, is more likely to be more authoritarian than a party which has intra-party democracy. The lack or absence of intra-party democracy ensures that elites remain cohesive and that there are lesser opportunities for the opposition to take advantage of divisions in the party, whereas in a party with intra-party democracy, there is a greater possibility of elite disunity, which could be capitalised on by the opposition, and there is also a greater likelihood of a different ideology being propagated by defectors from the party. The cases of the People's Action Party in Singapore and the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia are used to illustrate the author's case.     

Security in Latin America

This article provides an overview of recent trends in Latin American security and examines three common assumptions that underpin both academic analysis and policy debate—assumptions about the links between political democracy, economic integration and regional stability, and about the need to broaden the agenda of regional security. In contrast to the liberal orthodoxy, there is little reason to believe that the promotion of political democracy and economic liberalization and integration will automatically tend towards regional stability, especially given the weakness of regional institutions, the fragility of many states, the inequality of power among states, and the lack of consensus over the meaning and implications of the 'new security agenda'.     

Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia

The security dimension of regionalism and regional structures in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has been limited by Russia's influence as a regional hegemon, aswell as by various other constraints specific to the region and the local states. Moreover, as a peripheral zone in the world system, Central Eurasia has not shown much evidence of regionalization as a process. But in response to the proximity of hegemonic power the smaller states have tried to adopt bandwagoning and balancing strategies in regional formats. Although their fixation on 'regime security' has encouraged them to accommodate Russia through CIS structures, this is changing as new bilateral security relationships develop with the United States. The Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization is unable to address the most serious challenges for regional security management in Central Asia. Yet the local states have been unable on their own to establish a regional security consensus and to institutionalize cooperation on that basis. The diffuse GUUAM grouping (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) has not offered a basis for selfsustaining regional security cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a venue to engage China in the security dialogue on Central Asia, particularly over counterterrorism, but has otherwise failed to tackle security challenges among and within the Central Asian states. Overall, the current focus of these states and their sponsors on bilateral relations to provide security assistance continues to displace security-related regionalism.     

Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South‐East Asia

In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South‐East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non‐interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: ‘to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single‐party dominant regimes in South‐East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy.     

Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis

This article explores explanations of Russia's unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al‐Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin's resistance to any scenario of western‐led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy‐makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.     

The Perpetuation of Regime Security in Gulf Cooperation Council States: A Multi‐Lens Approach

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have been engaging in diversification efforts, yet the types of efforts suggest that the primary interest is regime security. Regional foreign policy is complex; hence we propose a multi‐lens approach to analyze overlapping and complementary political, economic, and social forces. The international political economy of hydrocarbons demonstrates the similarities among GCC states, regional dynamics illustrate interstate relations and similar patterns, while economic diversification suggests individual state trajectories and comparative and competitive patterns. By outlining the contemporary context for GCC states, we argue that low oil prices, regional dependence on hydrocarbons, and trends in economic diversification efforts signal GCC states' preference to reinforce their rentier systems with alternative state revenue streams. GCC states' diversification into new markets and sectors and use of state‐owned enterprises in microcompetitions indicate a new search for alternative revenue streams and prestige, which in turn are used to assure the perpetuation of regime security. This finding sets trajectories and implications for the region, specifically economic stagnation and supplementary diversification processes.     

Exploiting Sino-US Geostrategic Competition: The View from Seoul and Singapore

The mainstream literature on weak status quo states’ diplomacy tends to identify their regional security roles in terms of dealing with non-traditional security issues. This article argues that such a limited approach is not sufficient to explain the current security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. This article reviews the literature on weak status quo states’ influence on regional order. It then identifies a security environment in which they are more likely to exert some impact on maintaining and building a regional order. After contextualising these discussions in the Asia-Pacific setting, the article examines the experience of South Korea and Singapore as secondary powers in the East Asian region. Although both countries enjoy high levels of security cooperation with the US, both have also been able to exercise a certain amount of influence in advancing their own geostrategic interests amidst the growing Sino-US geostrategic competition. Yet their exploitation of Sino-US geostrategic competition is neither a simple balancing strategy against China nor a simple bandwagoning with the US, since both South Korea and Singapore have been increasing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with China.     

Middle power strategic choices and horizontal security cooperation: the 2009 Australia-South Korea security cooperation agreement

ABSTRACT

This article examines why Asia-Pacific middle powers cooperate with each other on security issues. The article challenges the assumption that middle powers are primarily influenced by great-power structural factors in their security relations with each other. It argues that the dominant structural explanations of security cooperation between secondary states—balancing against the rise of China, responding to burden-sharing pressure from the United States, or hedging during a period of great power transition—have not been sufficiently tested. Using the 2009 Australia-South Korea security cooperation agreement as a representative example of middle power security cooperation, it finds that inter-personal leadership preferences played a key intervening role in filtering existing structural incentives into actual policy cooperation. It shows how congruence in leadership preferences shapes when and with whom middle powers are likely to cooperate on security issues. The article opens up the research agenda on middle powers by examining how they approach security relations in bilateral and horizontal contexts with each other.     

Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons from Irano-U. S. Relations, 1962–77

By examining the lessons of Irano-US. relations, the article contends that a post-Cold War American foreign policy relying on middle powers can achieve American security interests while avoiding the potential for excessive entanglements arising from a direct role. The effective implementation of this policy is argued to be consistent with the promotion of regional stability and the diffusion of democracy.     

Authoritarian power in space,time and exile

Autocrats have been shown to exert influence over their populations and dissidents abroad through strategies such as ‘transnational repression’ or ‘diaspora engagement’ policies, demonstrating that authoritarian power carries across borders. But existing work on extra-territorial authoritarian power has tended to view state power as a stand-alone variable that endows regimes with a relatively free hand to make their own diaspora policies. This is despite that studies of authoritarianism inside states, including those observing the ‘dynamics of contention,’ have consistently highlighted the relational and contingent nature of authoritarian power. This paper asks whether the iterative dynamics of contention that describe regime-opposition relations within state boundaries endure between authoritarian regimes and their exiles? It brings together the literatures on extra-territorial authoritarian power and the topology of power with that on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes to undertake a case study on the relationship between the Syrian government and the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. It finds that extra-territorial authoritarian is relational and contingent on the political context and its recipients, and shares many of the characteristics of authoritarian power inside state boundaries.     

The Japan-Australia contribution to a liberal and inclusive regional order: beyond the ‘China gap’

This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relations. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values.     

Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe

This article examines the potential of human security as a narrative and operational frame for the European Union's external relations. Human security is about the security of individuals and communities and it links physical and material security—‘freedom from fear’, and ‘freedom from want’. The article addresses both the lexis (language) and praxis (practice)of human security in relation to the EU. Much of the language currently used in EU external relations, particularly crisis management, civil—military cooperation and conflict management, already contains elements of a human security approach. At the same time, the concept of human security goes beyond these terms and if formally adopted and elaborated could greatly strengthen the EU's role as a global security actor. The article develops five principles of human security—human rights, legitimate political authority, multilateralism and regional focus—and makes the case that the application of these principles would increase the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of EU missions. The article concludes that the adoption of a human security approach would build on the foundational ideas of Europe in overcominga history of war and imperialism and could help to rally public opinion behind the European idea. More importantly, it would contribute to closing the real security vacuum that exists in large parts of the world today.     

The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia

This article examines the record of American policy towards regional cooperation in Central Asia. It begins with the determinants of regionalism and the role of external states therein. It then considers the nature of American interests in Central Asia. This is followed by a historical account of the three stages of American policy towards the region. The article argues that regional cooperation has not been a significant aspect of US policy. Instead US policy-makers have preferred bilateral relations or multilateral structures (e.g. the Partnership for Peace, the GUUAM [Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova] group) which draw the region's states beyond its boundaries. US policy tends to reduce incentives for regional actors to develop multilateral cooperation. It may also encourage competitive regionalist agendas on the part of other interested major powers (Russia and China).     

Democracy and National Cohesion in Multiethnic African States: South Africa and Nigeria Compared

Abstract. This article advances the argument that national cohesion cannot meaningfully be pursued in multiethnic African states in the absence of democracy. But in order for democracy to facilitate cohesion, it must have the capacity to address issues of unequal power relations among the competing groups and regulate the conflicts which ensue therefrom. The article discusses four dimensions of pluralist democracy which address this capacity: democratisation of the state, strengthening of regulatory and oversight institutions, civil society and promotion of cross-sectional affiliations in party politics. The contrasting experiences of South Africa and Nigeria are then used to illustrate the formidable obstacles to democratic national cohesion in multiethnic African states, and the efforts that have been made to overcome them.     

Malaysia’s role in two South-East Asian insurgencies: ‘an honest broker’?

The conflicts in Thailand’s southern border provinces and Mindanao have not only posed a challenge to the Thai and Philippine governments, but have also affected the respective governments’ relations with Malaysia. From a comparative perspective, this article aims to illustrate how a complicated web of interactions between domestic and international factors has not only shaped domestic decision-making, but also influenced how states interact with one another in regard to the conflicts, which has resulted in a mix of cooperation and contention. It is argued that despite past downturns in bilateral relations, various developments have paved the way for Malaysia to play a role in the current peace processes in Thailand’s southern border provinces and Mindanao. However, Malaysia has been able to accomplish more in Mindanao’s peace process due to several favourable conditions, including the Philippine government’s openness towards third-party involvement, regional security concerns and politics that have been less polarised until 2016.     

Humanitarian security regimes

This article introduces a novel concept, humanitarian security regimes, and enquires under what conditions they arise and what is distinctive about them. Humanitarian security regimes are driven by altruistic imperatives aiming to prohibit and restrict behaviour, impede lethal technology or ban categories of weapons through disarmament treaties; they embrace humanitarian perspectives that seek to prevent civilian casualties, precluding harmful behavior, protecting and ensuring the rights of victims and survivors of armed violence. The article explores how these regimes appear in the security area, usually in opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful states. The existing regimes literature has mostly taken a functional approach to analyzing cooperation, lacks a humanitarian hypothesis and does not explore the emergence of new regimes in the core area of security. The author argues that in the processes of humanitarian security regime‐making, it is the national interest that is restructured to incorporate new normative understandings that then become part of the new national security aspirations. This article intends to fill this gap and its importance rests on three reasons. First, security areas that were previously considered to be the exclusive domain of states have now been the focus of change by actors beyond the state. Second, states have embraced changes to domains close to their national security (e.g. arms) mostly cognizant of humanitarian concerns. Third, states are compelled to re‐evaluate their national interests motivated by a clear humanitarian impetus. Three conditions for the emergence of humanitarian security regimes are explained: marginalization and delegitimization; multilevel agency, and reputational concerns.     

Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Convoluted Rise to Regional Influence

This article seeks to explain revolutionary Iran's convoluted rise to regional prominence over the last three decades. We hold that perceptions and misperceptions of regime stability (both of one's self and of others) by the relevant actors have played a major role in Iran's recent. The main logic is that the success of many strategies employed by relevant regional actors to augment their regional influence (both Iran seeking more influence and others seeking to stem that influence) have crucially hinged on making correct assessments of regime stability. This study has both theoretical and empirical findings. Theoretically, we find that failures to accurately estimate regime stability stem from three main sources: (1) objective uncertainties regarding the target state's level of regime stability, given the high strength of societal forces shaping state‐society relations in the Middle East and given the distinct variation between autocrats in terms of their ability to develop effective counterrevolutionary/repressive tools; (2) ideological blinders, from which both the United States and regional actors frequently suffer, which have often led them to be falsely optimistic regarding the existence of either subversive opportunities or opportunities to stabilize regimes facing domestic pressures; and (3) incorrect theories regarding sources of regime stability which lead experts and policymakers to overlook factors which may destabilize a regime. This article has two major empirical findings. First, Iran's rise may be at least partly attributed to Iran demonstrating a slightly better learning curve at the tactical level (i.e., learning subversive skills from its Lebanese experience in the 1980s–1990s and applying them to Iraq in the 2000s–2010s) as well as at the strategic level (i.e., understanding the limits of its subversive capacities and correctly assessing when it can engage in successful stabilizing operations). Second, two errors committed by the United States have been far more consequential than those committed by Iran for the regional balance of power: First, the George W. Bush Administration myopically opened up subversive opportunities for Iran when it invaded Iraq in 2003 by thinking that it could stabilize a democratic regime and insulate it from outside influence; second, on two occasions Washington overestimated the transformative effect that its concessions to Iran would have in terms of sufficiently empowering reformists so as to bring about complete regime transformation from within.     

Are Monarchies Exceptional to the Arab Uprisings? The Resilience of Moroccan Monarchy Revisited

With the onset of the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 and the emergence of popular demonstrations that raised the issue of crises of legitimacy across the Arab states, the literature on democratization in the Middle East and North African (MENA) studies has taken on new dimensions recently. One of the primary theoretical debates that has surfaced in the post‐2011 era has revolved around on whether or not the demonstrations will lead to regime change or increased authoritarianism in the MENA region. One of the crucial developments of the Arab Spring has, then, been the overthrow of some long‐standing rulers like Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt, as well as the questioning of authoritarian regimes by the masses. The public protests submerged some Arab republics, but monarchies found ways to overcome the public outcry through containing the opposition. This paper, therefore, takes the monarchy of Morocco as a case study with the aim of analyzing the methods and regime‐survival strategies the regime has employed to sustain itself and consolidate power in the post‐2011 Arab uprisings era. Additionally, the role of the Justice and Development Party as an emerging threat in the postdemocratization era, and the changing nature of the party’s relations with the palace, will be addressed.     

Limiting democracy and framing the economy: Hayek,Schmitt and ordoliberalism

This article shows how Hayek’s understanding of ‘unlimited democracy’ was influenced by the work of Carl Schmitt. It goes on to make the case that ordoliberal ideas informed his suggestions for limiting democracy, made in response to Schmitt’s work. A number of authors have drawn attention to the influence of Schmitt on Hayek’s thought. Similarly, the ordoliberal relationship has been explored. However, these two influences must be read alongside each other in order to arrive at a full understanding of Hayek’s deep ambivalence towards democracy and how that developed from the 1930s through to the 1970s. Finally, the article makes the case that the decisive influence on Hayek’s later authoritarian turn was not the work of Schmitt, as certain authors have argued, but ordoliberal interpretations of dictatorship. It also argues that Hayek’s model constitution is informed by fundamental ordoliberal concerns.     

Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation?

This article surveys current security challenges and identifies obstacles to effective global and regional responses and cooperation in an era when security has become increasingly divisible. The new situation is partly explained by the complexity and variety of security challenges, both traditional and new, and by the linkages between them. It argues that a new pattern of improvised, ad hoc and often case‐specific security mechanisms has developed, which it calls Collective Conflict Management (CCM). The argument is illustrated by reference to cases of CCM where a wide range of actors—multilateral institutions at the global and regional levels, individual states or ad hoc coalitions, professional and commercial bodies, and non‐governmental organizations—collaborate in an effort to manage specific security threats and challenges, bringing together a variety of relationships, resources and skills. The urge for collective action, rather than unilateral or single actor‐led, is motivated by a number of factors and ‘drivers”, not all of them necessarily positive or constructive. The article concludes that the success or failure of CCM will depend in part on the severity of the problems it faces and in part on the motives and incentives behind collective responses. This new pattern raises interesting and important questions for the future of international security. While CCM may be untidy and lack clear norms and standards, in many cases it may be the best available in an increasingly fractured world.