Karl Marx's theory of history: A defense

A wave of recent publication connected to Hugh Trevor-Roper offers cause to take stock of his life and legacy. He is an awkward subject because his output was so protean, but a compelling one because of his significance for the resurgence of the history of ideas in Britain after 1945. The article argues that the formative period in Trevor-Roper's life was 1945–57, a period curiously neglected hit her to. It was at this time that the pioneered a history of ideas conceived above all as the study of European liberal and humanist tradition. Analysis of the relative importance of contemporary and early modern history in his oeuvre finds that, while the experience of Hitler and the Cold War was formative, it was not decisive. Trevor-Roper was at heart an early modernist who did not abjure specialization. However, he insisted that specialized study must be accompanied by “philosophical” reflection on the working sofa constant human nature present throughout history, a type of reflection best pursued by reading classical historians such as Gibbon and Burckhardt. Yet this imperative in turn fostered purely historical research into the history of historical writing–another branch of the history of ideas.     

The moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence: A critique

Theorists within the just war tradition of ethics differ in their conclusions about nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence. This paper examines three arguments for the conditional moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence—those of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, of J. Bryan Hehir, and of Michael Walzer—and argues that none of the three constitutes intellectually compelling and practically useful moral advice. The bishops fail to convince us that nuclear use can ever fulfil the requirements of proportionality, and therefore that the intention to use nuclear weapons can ever be justified. Hehir fails to convince us that nuclear deterrence policies in fact distinguish categorically between intention and use. Walzer's case that deterrence is bad but necessary is more convincing but it, like Hehir's, does not constitute coherent moral advice for the citizen, soldier or government official. I conclude that, given the inadequacy of attempts to justify nuclear deterrence, even conditionally, we have a strong moral obligation to pursue alternatives.

The level of citizen concern about the dangerous possibility of nuclear war has become greatly heightened in Europe and the United States in the 1980s. This is probably due to at least three factors: the significant technological developments in nuclear weaponry that have occurred during the last decade, the increased fear of Soviet military strength, and the concentration of recent U.S. administrations on developing and improving a nuclear war‐fighting capability. But even before the growth of the peace movement since 1980, a ‘new debate’ about the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy had begun in academic and theological circles. In this paper, I will analyze three arguments of moral philosophers and theologians, all working within the ‘just war’ tradition, about whether nuclear deterrence, in any form, can be morally justified.     

Conceptions of Australian political thought: A methodological critique

This paper takes issue with a number of standard interpretations of Australian political thought and the methods of argument by which they have been reached. It confronts the substantive claims (a) that Australia has produced no significant indigenous political thought, ideology, or ideological conflict, and (b) that which passes for political thought is generally derivative, lacking in originality and inferior. It is argued that such claims are based upon unduly narrow conceptions of political thought and misplaced categories of evaluation. Finally, the paper demonstrates that by expanding our conceptions of political thought beyond that of ‘epic’ or universalist political philosophy, and applying methods of evaluation appropriate to the subject matter, more sensible conclusions can be drawn about the existence and quality of Australian political thought, as well as its place in political life.     

On anthropological epistemology: Praxis and critique

Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. xv + 205 pp. including notes, bibliography, and index. $28.00 cloth, $13.00 paper.

Ulin, Robert C. Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Social Theory. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984. xvii + 200 pp. including notes, bibliography, and index. $19.95 cloth.     

East Asian ideas of regionalism: a normative critique

Little was done to challenge nationalist assumptions in the name of regionalism. Regarding nationalism as a sensitive matter best left to a later stage of regionalism, they [advocates of regionalism] did not focus on how nationalist outlooks in the media and elsewhere stand in the way of both regionalism and internationalism.

Gilbert Rozman (2000: 18)

With an increasing regional integration and development, there are many competing ideas of, and proposals for, regional development in Asia. This article examines the historical evolution of the idea of regionalism, the meanings of Asian regionalisms, variations of Asian regionalisms and their impact on regional cooperation in East Asia. It discusses Mahathir's idea of neo‐Asianism, Japanese new Asianism, Chinese ideas of regionalism, and variations of Korean ideas of regionalism. It also examines a normative basis of regionalism with special reference to the sovereignty question. The paper concludes that behind East Asian regionalism is nationalism which constitutes driving forces for regionalism; that two competing orders (Asia‐Pacific regionalism versus pan‐Asianism) create different expectations and visions of how East Asia region should evolve and they are in tensions and lead to different directions; and that East Asia lacks a convincing and acceptable normative framework.1     

A Crocean critique of Gramsci on historicism,hegemony and intellectuals

Although Gramsci's debt to Croce is well known, most commentators simply accept his criticisms of Croce and his claim to have overcome certain lacunae in the Neapolitan's thought. This article argues that many of these criticisms misfire, and mounts a Crocean critique of Gramsci. Through a comparison of their respective views of historicism, hegemony and intellectuals, it is argued that the radical democratic and libertarian theory many post-Marxists claim to find in the Sardinian is more appropriately associated with Croce. Sebbene il debito di Gramsci verso Croce sia risaputo, molti commentatori tendono semplicemente ad accettare le critiche di Gramsci verso Croce, in particolare il primato da parte di Gramsci stesso nell'aver colmato certe lacune nel pensiero del filosofo napoletano. Questo articolo pone in rilievo che molti di queste critiche risultano essere prive di significato, ed inoltre, tende a far emergere una critica crociana di Gramsci. Dal tentativo di porre in relazione le idee di entrambi su concetti quali lo storicismo, l'egemonia, ed infine l'identitÀ degli intellettuali, si evince che la teoria libertaria e democratico-radicale che molti post-marxisti tendono ad attribuire all'intellettuale sardo, tende ad essere in buona parte il prodotto del pensiero di Croce.     

马克思现代性批判的三重维度

马克思现代性批判不是单向度的线性推进,而是在三个相互连接层面上的有序布展。其具体表现为:以异化劳动为尺度的现代性伦理批判;以分工为基础的现代性实证批判;以资本为核心的现代性本质批判。