The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

Conceptions of Australian political thought: A methodological critique

This paper takes issue with a number of standard interpretations of Australian political thought and the methods of argument by which they have been reached. It confronts the substantive claims (a) that Australia has produced no significant indigenous political thought, ideology, or ideological conflict, and (b) that which passes for political thought is generally derivative, lacking in originality and inferior. It is argued that such claims are based upon unduly narrow conceptions of political thought and misplaced categories of evaluation. Finally, the paper demonstrates that by expanding our conceptions of political thought beyond that of ‘epic’ or universalist political philosophy, and applying methods of evaluation appropriate to the subject matter, more sensible conclusions can be drawn about the existence and quality of Australian political thought, as well as its place in political life.     

The geographical lives of commodities: problems of analysis and critique

In two programmatic essays, Peter Jackson has reviewed new critical research on the geographical lives of commodities. This paper offers a constructive critique of his particular reading of this research. It is argued that three major issues require urgent attention if critical geographers and fellow‐travellers are to take their commodity research forward. First, there is too much imprecision in the use of the related terms ‘commodities’, ‘commodification’ and ‘commoditization’. This threatens to render all three terms meaningless or at the very least confusing. Secondly, this lack of conceptual clarity is linked to the problem of superficial engagements with normative issues. It is argued that the recent geographical research on commodities has thus far glossed over important questions of both academic and lay judgement. Finally, the paper suggests that the ‘modest’ role for critical academics envisaged by Jackson and other commodity researchers is only defensible if questions of voice, message and audience are addressed systematically. Overall, the paper presents a menu of explanatory and normative issues that require attention if critical commodity analysts like Jackson are to maximize the potential of their research agenda.     

Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use

The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons , by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research , by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states.     

Stephen Pinker and the long peace: alliance,deterrence and decline

It is now widely accepted, at least among academic students of war, that there has been a great and generally benign transformation in the character of war. The sort of big wars involving the world's greatest powers, those that in practice or in prospect dominated international affairs from the rise of Napoleon to the collapse of communism, are now considered to be essentially obsolescent. But to what extent is that really true?