Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy

Power in Britain has changed hands from a prime minister who sought to balance intense UK‐US consultation on foreign policy with the ambition to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ to one whose approach towards both the United States and the European Union has yet to be tested. It is an appropriate moment, there fore, to assess how these two contextual poles of British foreign policy‐making have changed over recent years and what this might mean for UK foreign policy choices. The premise of this article is that the days are now largely over when the UK can or should start out by trying to build an Anglo‐US position on a foreign policy challenge before trying to tie in the European and transatlantic positions. The UK is now a central player in the development of increasingly activist European foreign policies, whether these can later be coordinated effectively with the United States or not. A strong, bilateral relationship continues to serve the interests of both sides on multiple levels, but this relationship does not sit upon the same foundations as during the Cold War. There are now significant underlying factors, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the US and July 7 2005 in the UK, that pull the US away from Europe and the UK, while pushing the UK towards Europe as the first port of call in developing foreign policy strategies. It is also notable that, today, UK positions on most global issues and foreign policy challenges tend to conform more closely to the dominant EU line than to the United States. On balance, the UK might think about European integration more from a US than from a European perspective, but it now thinks about global problems more from a European than from a US or transatlantic perspective.     

Assessing Australia’s options in the context of Brexit: engaging with the UK and the European Union

ABSTRACT

The Brexit vote will fundamentally transform the European Union (EU) and will change how the UK relates to Europe and the rest of the world. What are the implications for Australia at this critical juncture? The UK has been a major player in the Australia–EU relationship, and Australia will now need to recalibrate its approach to both the UK and the EU across a range of policy areas. This article examines the future of Australia–UK and Australia–EU relations in the wake of Brexit, and assesses Australia’s options going forward. The authors advance three considerations. Firstly, Australia’s national interests are best served by adopting a pragmatic rather than nostalgic approach towards future relations with the UK and the EU. Secondly, Australia should avoid pursuing one relationship at the expense of the other and creating a zero-sum dynamic. Finally, Australia’s future strategy must consider broader global developments, such as events within its own region and the US presidency.     

The collapse of British foreign policy

British foreign policy has tried to balance between the United States and continental Europe for the past half-century, with an unambiguous commitment to a special relationship with Washington and an ambiguous commitment to European integration. New Labour has followed its predecessors in this, claiming that Britain can act as a bridge between America and Europe, or as a pivot around which transatlantic relations turn. In the wake of the Iraq war, deepened scepticism in Washington about whether close European cooperation is in America's interest, and scepticism across continental Europe that Britain can or should act as a privileged interlocuteur, have undermined both ends of the bridge on which British foreign policy claims to rest. The end of US commitment to Atlanticism, together with post-Cold War divergence between US and European interests and values, should have led to a shift in British priorities towards closer cooperation with other major European states and-from that shared perspective-an attempt to reconstruct a more balanced transatlantic relationship. The EU presents a sadly weak framework for such a strategy; but Britain's domestic debate, in which this government-like its predecessors-has allowed a Eurosceptic press to shape the language of foreign policy, has made it more difficult for any government to change direction. Recent government speeches on foreign policy, however, suggest that ministers still cling to the illusion that Britain has a 'unique' position between Europe and the United States.     

'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British security strategy

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patterns of alliances in world politics. Since 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded power in the economic and security institutions of the post‐1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between ‘Old Europe’ and the new conservatives in Washington. The Prime Minister's decision to be there ‘when the shooting starts’ shows that Britain continues to place the bilateral connection with the United States above all other obligations. This article questions whether the Atlanticist identity that underpins the strategic rationale for the special relationship is likely to succeed in delivering the interests and goals set out in the recent UK security strategy document.     

Differentiation as a double‐edged sword: member states’ practices and Brexit

The reform of the eurozone and the concerns surrounding a potential ‘Brexit’ has given rise to a new debate about differentiation but also disintegration in the European Union. This article provides a theoretical and analytical approach to understanding how differentiation is related to the debate on distribution of competences across various levels government. It finds that differentiation has played an important role in the EU integration process since the 1950s, even though the risk of fragmentation has always existed. Facing the benefits and costs of differentiation, the member states have developed their own practices. Three ideosyncratic groups of member states can be identified in this regard: first, a group of Anglo‐Scandinavian member states which refuse centralization of the EU; a Franco‐German group which considers the integration through the promotion of a ‘core Europe’; and, third, a group of central and east European member states who fear that differentiation would set their interests aside and relegate them to second‐class status within the EU. Finally, Brexit is not only about the status of the UK in the EU, but casts deeper questions on how to clarify the nature of relations between the eurozone and the EU as a whole.     

Transatlantic triage? European and UK ‘grand strategy’ after the US rebalance to Asia

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European ‘grand strategy’ could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post‐austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly ‘American‐lite’ European neighbourhood.     

Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the Europe question

This article scrutinizes the merits of holding a referendum over UK membership of the EU. It queries the assumption that direct democracy can somehow resolve the longstanding Europe question in British politics. To do this, the analysis traces the existence of an exceptionalist approach to the EU within Britain, now associated with re‐negotiating UK membership in the shadow of a referendum. The article argues that the prospects for a radical reconfiguration of the UK's treaty obligations are slim, thereby increasing the risk of a vote to withdraw. Yet withdrawal would be the opposite of a simple solution to the Europe question. Political and economic interests dictate lengthy politicking over a highly complex post‐Brexit settlement revisiting free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Such negotiations undermine any mooted cathartic benefits of a popular vote, while Eurosceptics will remain dissatisfied in the event of a yes, a result likely to further destabilize the Conservative Party. Consequently, the simplicity and decisiveness that a referendum—particularly one that spurns the EU—promises is merely a mirage as relations with the EU necessarily form part of an enduring British political conversation.     

A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates

Whether a ‘Brexit’ would threaten the United Kingdom's national security has become a central theme in the run‐up to the in/out referendum on EU membership. Although national security has been a central facet of both the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns thus far, there has been little mention of the implications of a Brexit for UK defence industries or defence procurement, let alone formal debate or analysis. The article addresses this gap by analysing the potential implications of a Brexit for defence procurement and industries in the UK and the EU member states. The first section analyses the policy context for a Brexit by exploring existing levels of EU defence procurement integration in the UK's and Europe's defence industries. The second section draws on Jozef Bátora's ‘institutional logics’ framework to identify two pro‐Brexit and two pro‐Remain narratives, each employing differing assumptions on the relative benefits of national sovereignty and closer EU integration The final section analyses the way in which these ‘logics’ or narratives will be deployed by their advocates in the run‐up to the UK's EU referendum. The article concludes that the national security battleground in the 2016 referendum will be fought over competing narratives and arguments, partly because there is a dearth of data and evidence concerning UK and EU defence procurement and industries, which renders this crucial area of national security vulnerable to the politics of spin.     

Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Gold War, 19477ndash;1955

This article illustrates US policy on European integration and the European Economic Community (EEC) by focusing on the General Agreement on Tarriff and Trade (GATT) Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–7). However underestimated in the history of international relations, GATT provides in fact an outstanding framework for analysing the foreign policy of its members. Whilst analyses of the Round per se already exist, no scholar thus far has focused on US policy towards European integration. Moreover, no previous author has utilised the European archives and has examined the stances of the EEC. This article shows that US support for European integration, which both Kennedy and Johnson followed at the behest of the ‘Europeanists’ in their respective administrations, conditioned the bargaining position of the United States in Geneva. The US negotiators tried to enhance US trade interests while at the same time attempting to encourage European regional integration. In so doing, the United States played a role in the strengthening of European regional integration by favouring the unity of the area. Moreover, contrary to previous accounts, this article shows that US negotiators were able to direct and move forward a complicated negotiation, showing Washington's leadership. The article concludes by showing that the Kennedy Round ended a period of about twenty years during which the United States acted to promote the unity of Western Europe. At the end of the 1960s, with the worsening of the US economic conditions, the tension in transatlantic relations over monetary and security issues, and the strength that the EEC demonstrated during the Kennedy Round, ‘the Europeanists’ were no longer able to prevail with their line in the internal discussions. This change became apparent when the Nixon administration shifted to a more detached and ambiguous policy towards European integration.     

Brexit,Ireland and the World Trade Organization: possible policy options for a future UK–Australia agri-food trade agreement

Prior to the UK’s accession to the then European Economic Community in 1973, Australia was a significant supplier of Britain’s food. Membership of the European Union (EU) resulted in trade diversion, closing the British market to Australian sugar, for example. This article questions whether the UK’s exit from the EU (‘Brexit’) might usher in a new agri-food trade regime, restoring Australian farmers’ access to the British market, or whether other opposing political economy considerations might prevail. Would the UK unilaterally adopt free trade? Can a comprehensive free trade area agreement between Australia and the UK, including agri-food products, be negotiated? Any new relationship will need to reflect the UK government’s stated preference for a frictionless border with EU 27 (particularly on the island of Ireland), the World Trade Organization’s rule book, and the interests of the UK’s farm lobbies, as well as the UK’s quest for ‘free trade’ with the wider international community.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

Reassessing the special relationship

The resignation of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister and the transition from Bush to Obama in the US mark the end of the second revival of the US–UK special relationship. The classic era of the special relationship began under the Labour government in the 1940s, though it was Winston Churchill who inspired the concept. It ended with the resignation of Harold Macmillan in 1963. Margaret Thatcher revived close personal relations with the US President as a guiding principle of UK foreign policy and Tony Blair successfully revived them again, even though the end of the Cold War had transformed the framework of transatlantic relations. Over the past 60 years US–UK relations have embedded specific security arrangements which have persisted, largely unquestioned, through the ups and downs of political relations at the top: close links between the two countries' armed forces; access to defence technology and procurement; intelligence ties through the UKUSA Agreement; a semi-independent nuclear deterrent and provision of military bases in the UK and its overseas territories. Public debate on the costs and benefits of these links has been limited; successive governments have discouraged a wider debate. The Obama administration enters office with few of the personal ties to Britain and to English culture, which have underpinned the special relationship. Earlier US administrations have approached relations with the UK from the perspective of US interests, while many British political leaders have felt—and have hoped to find in Washington—a sentimental attachment to Anglo–American partnership. British foreign policy would benefit from a reassessment of the structures of US–UK relations in terms of British interests, costs and benefits.     

New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?

In late 1994 and 1995, senior figures on both sides of the Atlantic advocated a transatlantic free trade area: in December 1995 the EU and the United States signed the New transatlantic agenda and the Joint EU–US action plan in Madrid; in March 1998, the European Commission proposed 'a new transatlantic marketplace', which was vetoed by France in the following month; and in September 1998 the Commission offered its latest plan–the Draft action plan for transatlantic economic partnership . This article examines the political and economic case for new institutions, drawing on the arguments the Commission used to support its proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace. These arguments are found to be unpersuasive. For an EU stance in trade policy matters to be improved by a French veto may be unprecedented. That is what has happened, however. The French veto actually led to the Draft action plan which provides transatlantic trade relations with a better framework than the proposal for a new transatlantic marketplace could possibly have done.     

Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?

Terrorist attacks on the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom have underlined the differing responses of Europe and the United States to the 'new terrorism'. This article analyses these responses through the prism of historically determined strategic cultures. For the last four years the United States has directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards this threat and has emphasized unilateralism. Europe, based on its own past experience of terrorism, has adopted a regulatory approach pursued through multilateralism. These divergences in transatlantic approaches, with potentially major implications for the future of the relationship, have appeared to be mitigated by a revised American strategy of counterterrorism that has emerged during 2005. However, this article contends that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult. This problem will be compounded by the fact that neither Europe nor America have yet addressed the deeper connections between terrorism and the process of globalization.     

The end of the West: the once and future Europe

Europe and the United States—the West—urgently need political leadership, economic fortitude and a clear vision of the future if they are to contend with the challenges posed by emerging regional powers and to resist the downward pressures of ‘relative decline’, the central focus of David Marquand's book, The end of the West: the once and future Europe. Central to this goal will be the West's ability to ‘rebalance’ between its institutions and democracy; its power and commitments; and its political and moral authority. Europe must ‘rebalance’ on issues related to ethnicity and identity, governance and authority, and civilization and territory. EU enlargement and its institutional reform processes have exacerbated this imbalance. American foreign policy objectives currently exceed its resources and are hampered by lack of strategic clarity and intellectual vision which keeps the United States from achieving an adaptive leadership model more capable of successfully operating in an increasingly complex and multipolar world. For Europe to become internally healthy and externally productive—both politically and economically—it needs to regain balance between its utopian, institutional objectives and democratic support for its future ambitions and policy course. Strong leadership and a powerful vision of prosperity from the West will be vital to return the transatlantic partnership to global economic and political advantage.     

Between national sovereignty and international power: what external voice for the euro?

Does the creation of the euro imply that the European Union is now speaking with one voice in international monetary matters? Is the EU therefore likely to challenge the hegemony of the United States on the world stage, at least in the realm of international financial diplomacy? This article analyses the current state of external representation of the common currency and asks why the issue of the euro’s single voice has not yet been resolved. Comparing other areas of common policy–making that have an external dimension, such as trade, the authors explore the specificities of monetary and financial affairs that make the conflict between national sovereignty and international efficiency so difficult to settle. In particular, the authors focus on a set of international institutional arrangements regarding economic policy–making within the EU, and external arrangements within international fora (the IMF and the G7), which have so far impeded the ability of the EU to play a coherent role on the international monetary stage. The authors argue that the fact of the euro means there needs to exist a clear system of political representation in the area of monetary and financial governance in the EU, and they explore various options for who the external voice of the euro could be. Finally, the implications of creating the euro’s external voice for transatlantic relations, for EU enlargements, and for the debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ in Europe are analysed.     

Europe,the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden‐sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As Asian powers reach westward and the US shifts its strategic priorities eastward, classical geostrategic delimitations become gradually tenuous. Particularly important are the ‘middle spaces’ of the Indian Ocean, central Asia and the Arctic, in that they constitute the main avenues of communication between the Asia–Pacific and the European neighbourhood. The article seeks to understand how evolving geostrategic dynamics in Europe, the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific relate to each other, and how they might impinge on discussions on transatlantic burden‐sharing. It is argued that the ability of Europeans to contribute to a more equitable transatlantic burden‐sharing revolves around two main tenets. First, by engaging in the ‘middle spaces’, Europe's key powers and institutions are helping to underpin a balance of power in these regions. Second, by stepping up their diplomatic and economic role in the Asia–Pacific, strengthening their security ties to (US) regional allies and maintaining an EU‐wide arms embargo on China, Europeans are broadly complementing US efforts in that key region. There are a number of factors that stand in the way of a meaningful European engagement in the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific, including divergent security priorities among Europeans, the impact of budgetary austerity on European defence capabilities and a tendency to confine foreign policy to the immediate neighbourhood. The article discusses the implications of those obstacles and outlines some ways in which they might be overcome.     

Getting the best of both worlds? Britain,the EU and migration policy

In perhaps unexpected ways Britain has become quite closely linked to key aspects of EU migration and asylum policy. This could be a rather surprising outcome given that the UK is outside Schengen, opted out of the free movement, asylum and migration provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and remains fixed on the maintenance of border controls at ports of entry to the UK. However, the differential and conditional engagement that has developed with EU migration and asylum policy has been described by Tony Blair as ‘getting the best of both worlds’. What could it mean to get the best of both worlds? Can the ‘two worlds’ of Britain and Europe be so neatly distinguished? To answer these questions the article surveys the extent of British engagement with EU migration and asylum policy and explains when, how and why the UK has opted into key aspects of it, particularly the more coercive components concerned with asylum and border controls.     

A Quiet Revolution in Diplomacy: Quebec–UK Relations Since 1960

ABSTRACT

Quebec’s modern international outlook and its current paradiplomacy can be dated largely from the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Since then, the provincial government in Quebec City and the federal government in Ottawa have had to tread a fine line in accommodating each other’s constitutional rights in the field of international relations—a line that has occasionally been breached, especially in the years following the Quiet Revolution and in critical periods such as those prior to the 1980 and 1995 referenda. Foreign governments have also had to engage in careful diplomacy in order to avoid upsetting either Ottawa or Quebec City—and this has been especially true in the case of the countries historically most involved with Canada and Quebec—France, the United States, and Britain. But whereas there has been some academic writing on Quebec’s relationships with France and the United States, very little attention has been devoted to Quebec–UK relations since the Quiet Revolution. This article seeks to fill that gap and argues that the Quebec–UK relationship since the 1960s can itself best be characterized as a “quiet revolution” in diplomacy that has largely avoided the controversies that have sometimes dogged Quebec’s relations with France and the United States.     

US missile defence and China's nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race

This article examines the rising prominence of strategic nuclear deterrence in Sino‐US relations. China is the only major nuclear power that has been actively expanding its offensive capabilities. Its nuclear modernization has inevitably caused concerns in the United States. The article suggests that China's nuclear programme is driven significantly by US missile defence, which has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for Chinese nuclear deterrence. The article also assesses the latest Chinese perception of US strategic adjustment under the Obama administration and its potential impact on arms control. It reveals that recent measures by the United States to restrain its missile defense could be conducive for achieving a strategic nuclear understanding between the two countries. The article then suggests a number of concrete actions for China and the United States to realize such an understanding.