High Court Review 2001: Politics,Legalism and the Gleeson Court

This article provides a general political review of recent High Court decisions that have significant implications for Australian constitutionalism. In examining the Court's judgments on issues such as cross-vesting schemes, immigration and Native Title, it seeks to articulate major themes in the Court's jurisprudence and delineate the important and changing role of the High Court in Australian politics. The article is the first in what this journal intends to be an annual review of the High Court from a political-science perspective.     

Wilson, Brandeis, and the Supreme Court Nomination

In late January 1916, many readers of the New York World chuckled as they looked at Rollin Kirby's editorial cartoon entitled, "The Blow that Almost Killed Father." In the drawing, Kirby showed a Wall Street big-shot—one who looked a little like J. P. Morgan—prostrate in his desk chair, the ticker-tape machine broken and leaning against the desk, a picture of the New York Stock Exchange askew on the wall, and a newspaper dropped to the ground, its headline blaring " Brandeis for the Supreme Court ."     

Many Voices,One Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court

E pluribus unum—out of many, one—is the phrase emblazoned on the Seal of the United States, which refers to the notion that a single American voice emerges from the many diverse groups that constitute the nation. The legislative and executive branches of government often act as one voice through legislative bills and executive acts, aggregating diverse interests that reflect the national will. The notion of e pluribus unum, however, is not often applied to the judiciary, a branch of government the members of which are viewed, not as outlets for the will of the people, but as gatekeepers of the rule of law. But while the Supreme Court may not speak directly for the people, its opinions speak to the people, and the methods used by the Justices to express those opinions have revealed changes in the conception of the Court's voice throughout history.     

Margaret Beaufort,Royal Tapestries,and Confinement at the Tudor Court

The English royal household ordinances document the important role tapestries played in Tudor court ceremony. This paper re-examines one specific aspect of the 1493 ordinances: whether or not Margaret Beaufort, mother of Henry VII, dictated the textile practices surrounding royal childbirth. Once widely believed to have done so, scholars have abandoned the idea for lack of evidence. The issue is more complicated than it seems, in part because of longstanding bibliographic error and also because texts associated with two events involving Margaret — the birth of Princess Margaret and the publication of William Caxton’s Blanchardyn and Eglantine — suggest that she was highly attuned to the importance of royal spectacle as mandated by the household ordinances.     

Pivotal Politics,Presidential Capital,and Supreme Court Nominations

We analyze the Supreme Court nomination process in order to provide a general explanation of presidents' propensity to win confirmation battles even in the face of an ideologically hostile Senate. The analysis serves two purposes. First, we argue that employing the conventional measure of the Senate's power to constrain the president's choice of nominees–the median senator–provides an inaccurate picture of this process. In its stead we argue that the filibuster pivot (or the sixtieth most liberal or conservative senator) more accurately captures the Senate's power over the president (Krehbiel 1998). Second, we argue that even under this more stringent spatial constraint, presidents still have the ability to win most confirmation battles with the Senate. Indeed, our results indicate that presidents often overcome situations where the Senate should reject their nominees, or where it should force them to make a less desirable choice, by invoking political capital.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.