The Presidency and Political Equality

When black Americans and white Americans want the president to do different things, who wins? When low-income earners prefer different government action than do middle and high-income earners, whose preferences are reflected in presidential behavior? Recent studies show that congressional behavior often most closely follows the preferences of the white and the wealthy, but we know relatively little about presidential behavior. Since the president and Congress make policy together, it is important to understand the extent of political equality in presidential behavior. We examine the degree to which presidents have provided equal representation to these groups over the past four decades. We compare the preferences of these groups for federal spending in various budget domains to presidents’ subsequent budget proposals in those domains from 1974 to 2010. Over this period, presidents’ proposals aligned more with the preferences of whites and high-income earners. However, Republican presidents are driving this overall pattern. Democratic presidents represent racial and income groups equally, but Republicans’ proposals are much more consistent with the spending preferences of whites and high-income earners. This pattern of representation reflects the composition of the president's party coalition and the spending preferences of groups within the party coalition.     

Patterns of Change in the Congressional Budget Process, 1865-1974

This paper examines five periods of congressional budget reform, from 1865 to 1974, and asks two sets of related questions: (1) What are the external and internal factors that seem to precipitate reform? and (2) Are there systematic differences in the ways Congress responds to internal and external pressures for change? If so, in the process of formulating successful (i.e. adopted) reforms, how are the responses to external stresses balanced against those designed to deal with internal questions? The research indicates that economic difficulties engendered by war and major changes in presidential-congressional relations with respect to fiscal policymaking are the crucial external variables. Internally, major shifts in the power relations of those involved in congressional spending decisions appear to facilitate budget reform. In responding to external pressures on its budget process, Congress tends to centralize its budget procedures. In response to internal pressures, Congress tends to decentralize those procedures.     

Funding Faction or Buying Silence? Grants,Contracts, and Interest Group Lobbying Behavior

During the past decade, numerous congressional bills and amendments have attempted to curtail lobbying by nonprofit organizations that receive federal grants. These policy efforts grow out of an assumption that federal funds are encouraging advocacy at levels that are excessive and encourage additional government spending. Using survey data on more than 700 organizations based in Washington, DC, this article tests this assumption. The data show that for the most part, organizations receiving federal grants and contracts lobby no more frequently than similar organizations that do not receive such benefits. The exception is contacting federal agencies, which charitable organizations receiving federal funds do slightly more often than similar organizations without such funds. A multivariate analysis assesses federal funding together with other variables theorized to affect lobbying—federal tax status, resource levels, and the nature of the lobbying issue—confirming that while these other variables affect lobbying levels, federal funding does not.     

Explaining State Budget Punctuations: Policy Transparency,Political Institutions,and Electoral Incentives

What factors cause policies experiencing long periods of stability to be interrupted occationally by a short period of large changes? This study argues that electoral incentives might influence the search, supply, and processing of information on constituency issues, as well as the associated cognitive or institutional frictions, and thus determine the presence and variation of punctuated policies. This article develops and evaluates this claim within a systemic framework consisting of policy transparency, political institutions, and electoral incentives. For the purpose of identifying policy punctuations, this research uses the Generalized Pareto Distribution in the Extreme Value Theory. This study analyzes budget spending data collected from FY 1988 to FY 2008 for all 50 American states. This study finds that greater policy transparency is associated with larger spending stability. By contrast, greater gubernatorial competition is more likely to produce extreme spending changes. Electoral incentives shaped by public preference and political term limits have a profound impact on nonincremental policy changes. The impact of policy transparency is conditional on public preference, while that of electoral competition and legislative professionalism is moderated by political term limits. Particularly, a transparent policy consistent with public preference and legislative professionalism with term limits are more likely to give rise to punctuated policies, while gubernatorial (legislative) competition leads to less punctuated changes when governors (legislators) are subject to term limits.     

Topping Off and Bottoming Out: Setting Budget Priorities Through Executive Power

This article examines the role of the institutional power of executives in public budgeting; specifically, how executives change spending on particular budget items. Leveraging extant theories of the policy process concerning preference expression, attention, and institutions, we argue that executives deepen large cuts and boost large increases in budgetary change. The strictures of the budgetary process force trade-offs for executives in preference expression such that increases to preferred categories typically require decreases in other categories. Literatures in public policy and political representation suggest that all executives would like to express fiscal preferences, thereby contributing to categorical budget oscillations; however, not all executives are created equal. We employ quantile regression to examine whether the institutional strength of governors determine cuts, stasis, and expansion in spending across all budget functions in the American states between 1985 and 2009. Our model includes a host of political and economic variables found in the literature of fiscal policymaking, such as partisanship and divided government. The desire to change policy may be widely shared across executives, but we find that the ability to “top off” categorical increases and bottom out categorical decreases is a function of an executive's capacity to call attention to preferred categories via agenda-setting power and to secure those changes via veto power. The findings show strong governors are well positioned to influence public policy through the budgetary process.     

Are All Policy Decisions Equal? Explaining the Variation in Media Coverage of the UK Budget

A country's budget is one of the most important public policy instruments, as it establishes the government's policy priorities and has the potential to determine winners and losers. The budget, however, is a mixture of different components and these get varying degrees of attention in the media. Drawing on sociology of news research, this paper seeks to explain this heterogeneous coverage of a budget's policy decisions. To do so, it uses a unique data set of over 5,000 articles of press coverage of six UK budgets (2008–2012). These articles are coded for the presence/absence of each of the budget's policy decision, via automated content analysis. On the basis of a multivariate negative binomial model, we find that the salience of a policy decision in the coverage is determined by its cost, whether it is negative (i.e., tax hikes and spending cuts) or positive, the income group that is the most affected by it, and the level of attention given to it by the government.     

The Right Tool for the Job: The Canalization of Presidential Policy Attention by Policy Instrument

This article investigates how presidential policy attention is allocated across policy tools and whether there is a channeling of tool use by policy area. I also examine whether there is evidence of disproportionate information processing within presidential policy attention allocation and whether it is common across presidential policy tools. Presidential messages, hearings on administrations' legislative proposals, amicus briefs, and executive orders are employed to capture presidential policy tools. The allocation of attention via these four instruments is examined from 1957–2007 in the policy areas of defense and foreign affairs, macroeconomics, banking and commerce, civil rights, law and crime, and labor and immigration. I find that there is a canalization of presidential policy attention by instrument, and that the opportunity structure of policy tools shapes attention allocation. Additionally, I find evidence for punctuated equilibrium theory in the allocation of presidential policy attention via these four tools. When presidents do shift their attention to an issue area, they often attack the issue with some coordination of their policy instruments.     

“Windows of Opportunity,” Revenue Volatility,and Policy Punctuations: Testing a Model of Policy Change in the American States

The growing evidence of policy change patterns characterized as punctuated equilibrium has increasingly directed the attention of policy scholars to the question of what factors cause them. The present study attempts to address this emerging question by developing a comprehensive, multifactorial model and testing it with state budget data. Specifically, based on theories of information processing and agenda setting, it develops a conceptual framework that models punctuated policy change as a function of two main factors: institutional friction (consisting of institutional constraints, legislative streamlining mechanisms, information‐processing capacity, and bureaucratization) and policy windows (consisting of revenue volatility, change in party control, and budget cycle). In doing so, the study pays special attention to cyclical revenue fluctuations whose effect has never been subject to empirical test. Regression analyses reveal that policy window factors including revenue volatility, changes in party control of the governorship and the House, and a budget cycle play an important role in creating policy punctuations.     

Exploring the Factors for Budget Stability and Punctuations: A Preliminary Analysis of State Government Sub-Functional Expenditures

Disproportionate information processing theory asserts that sudden, dramatic changes punctuate otherwise stable growth patterns in U.S. policy and budget processes. The present paper uses state government sub-functional expenditures to explore what factors cause budget stability and punctuations. First, the findings in the present paper generally confirm the observations made in other studies that distributions of governmental budgets are Paretian. Second, while future research is warranted to identify more specific causes, this preliminary analysis suggests that institutional frictions and information oversupply tend to increase both budget stability and punctuations. It also suggests that availability of efficient information reduces budget stability but not necessarily budget punctuations. However, when examined at the level of different fund-type expenditures, which have differing degrees of institutional friction and availability of information that can be efficiently processed, more subtle and distinguishable differences in patterns of budget stability and punctuations emerge, which was not accounted for in disproportionate information processing theory.     

The Modern Presidency and Theories of Accountability: Old Wine and Old Bottles

This study attempts to reconcile two apparently conflicting characteristics of congressional voting–stability in congressional decisionmaking and efforts to influence change in congressional voting decisions–by developing a concept and measurement of congressional voting response to short-term forces. The analysis indicates that congressional members do occasionally deviate from established policy positions on a subset of votes in response to the President of their party. In general, congressional members are more likely to deviate from their general policy positions when the policy area is characterized by change.     

Point Predictions and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Data Mining Approach—U.S. Nuclear Policy as Proof of Concept

In Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), information processing under the constraints of limited attention and bounded rationality leads to stick‐slip dynamics in policy outcomes. Empirical work in this field often focuses on the macro level. Using the case of nuclear energy policy in the United States as proof of concept, we demonstrate how decisive budget changes in a specific policy subsystem can be linked to attention of Congress and the president. We utilize a mixed‐methods data‐mining approach: Maximum likelihood estimation is used to analyze the distribution of the nuclear energy RD&D budget. Then attention data of both Congress and the president are structured by means of cluster analysis and principal component analysis. Finally, these data are used in a generalized linear model to predict specific budget shifts. The article is designed as a proof of concept: In the case of nuclear energy policy, we are able to predict budget shifts without violating the assumptions of PET. More importantly: we can demonstrate that attention is not only affecting the final policy outcome but also the corridor of the possible.     

Evaluating Stakeholder Participation and Influence on State-Level Rulemaking

Despite sustained attention to the role of stakeholders in policymaking—both in legislative and regulatory venues—we lack a systematic understanding of whether and when stakeholders wield influence over decisions. This is particularly true regarding state-level rulemaking in the United States, which has become an important venue of policy action as federal policymaking is increasingly stymied. Although the specifics of the rulemaking process vary to some degree across states, determining whether common patterns of stakeholder influence exist across states and issue areas can advance our understanding of regulatory institutions more broadly. This study contributes to the growing body of scholarship on state-level rulemaking by analyzing the ways in which stakeholders participate in rulemaking processes and the effects on rulemaking decisions of such participation in three policy domains across five states. We find that while industry may be influential during rulemaking across cases, consequential opportunities for non-industry stakeholders to influence regulatory decisions also exist.     

The Tortoise or the Hare? Incrementalism,Punctuations, and Their Consequences

In this article, we contrast the long‐term consequences of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium. We test what the impact of each of these types of policy change is on long‐term budgetary outcomes for the American states. Policy scholars have applied both theoretical approaches to the study of budgetary spending as an extension of policymaking. Given the two contrasting paradigms of policy change, we develop the following line of inquiry: Does punctuated equilibrium create a different budget in the long term than incrementalism? We address this question through an analysis of American state budgets because the U.S. states provide a rich variation in both budgetary outcomes and political institutions. We use budget data from all American states across all government functions for the period between 1984 and 2009. We find that, first, state budgets and budget functions vary in their degree of punctuation and, second, the degree of punctuation in a state's budget function corresponds to smaller long‐term growth. Additionally, the kind of spending matters: allocational budget categories are more likely to exhibit punctuations.     

Punctuated Equilibria and Budgets in the American States

In this article, we examine long-term state budget trends to find evidence of punctuated equilibrium. We use the American states as a broad set of institutional variation with which to examine the nature of policy change through the lens of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theories of policymaking. The strength of this article is its sensitivity of variations in policy outcomes across time (18 years), across space (50 state institutions), and across issue space (10 budget categories). This research advances the characterization of policy outcomes by employing a quantitative measure that is both less sensitive to outliers and one that characterizes budget distributions on a simple numeric scale. Our general findings are: (i) state budget categories are interdependent; (ii) state budgets are generally punctuated; but (iii) to varying degrees: Thus, considerable stability (indicated by tall peaks) and punctuations (represented by fat tails) are a central feature of policy outcomes in the American states. This result confirms the logic of punctuated equilibrium theory, but raises future questions about the impact specific variations in institutional costs have on policymaking across the 50 states.     

When Will New Programs be Mandatory? Determinants of the Decision Between the Mandatory and Discretionary Budget Designs

When creating a new program, an authorizing committee must choose a budget structure, either using mandatory funding or creating an authorization for appropriations to enable the appropriation committees to use discretionary funding. One hypothesis we examine is based on the strategic interplay by congressional committees seeking to control their policy domains. Based on expected purposes of a nascent program, an authorization committee must calculate, whether, if a program is designed as requiring appropriations for spending, will the appropriators provide the funds? Or if instead, a program is funded through mandatory spending, will those funds be blocked by appropriators? For example, when a new program is likely to offer credit claiming opportunities to Congress, such as through legislative earmarks, the authorization committees are less likely design a program to rely on mandatory funding. An alternative hypothesis is that where there is greater expected difficulty in predicting likely program needs—e.g., predicting the annual spending needs for unemployment insurance—a mandatory structure would be expected. We find that the hypothesis associated with the committees' pursuit of autonomy is supported, whereas the rational design hypothesis associated with reduced transaction costs is not supported.     

Acting on the Hill: Congressional Assertiveness in U.S. Foreign Policy

A controversy has developed in recent years pitting those who see a resurgent Congress in U.S. foreign policy against those who argue that Congress remains largely acquiescent and uninvolved. This article addresses the disagreement, using a database of congressional foreign policy activity from 1946 to 1997 to weigh the competing claims. Our results show that congressional foreign policy activity has declined over the post-World War II era while congressional foreign policy assertiveness, relative to the administration's requests, has increased during this same period. Congress is thus less active but more assertive. Based on these results, we offer a two-dimensional model of congressional foreign policy behavior that better reflects the variety of congressional roles in U.S. foreign policy.     

Tracing Issue Definition and Policy Change: An Analysis of Disability Issue Images and Policy Response

We examine the role of issue definition in disability policy change. Based on qualitative and quantitative evidence from media coverage and congressional hearings, we conclude that policy change was influenced by the redefinition of disability issues from medical and economic definitions to a new sociopolitical perspective. Specifically, we find evidence that media attention and tone influenced the number of congressional hearings and the tone of these hearings. The change in the congressional definition subsequently contributed to the passage of key legislation based on the sociopolitical/civil rights definition of disability. Importantly, our research supports previous studies that suggest problem definition helps to explain significant policy change.     

DO FEDERAL DEFICITS MOTIVATE REGIONAL FISCAL (IM)BALANCES? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE

This paper studies the vertical and horizontal interactions between federal and regional governments in terms of public deficits. Recent studies commonly restraint budget slippages to the incentives created by the institutional arrangements within a country. Alternatively, we estimate here a fiscal reaction function for the Spanish regions over the period 1995–2010, paying special attention to the impact of the federal fiscal stance on regional fiscal imbalances. Our results indicate that higher public deficits for the central government encourage larger fiscal imbalances at the regional level. This vertical interaction is interpreted in the context of yardstick competition models. We also find a significant impact from fiscal decisions taken by governments at the same decision‐making tier in a specific region.     

Rethinking Bureaucrats in the Policy Process: Criminal Justice Agents and the National Crime Agenda

Policy scholars have noted that bureaucrats can play an important role in defining policy alternatives. Few studies, however, examine the extent of their involvement in this process. This study contributes to public policy scholarship by offering a framework for understanding the strength of bureaucratic involvement in the process of defining problems and policy alternatives. Using witness data from congressional hearings on crime between 1947 and 1998, I find that federal, state, and local criminal justice bureaucrats have come to occupy a central role in the process of defining policy alternatives. In addition, I find that the centrality of criminal justice actors comes at the expense of interest groups, community organizations, and citizens/victims. Implications for criminal justice policy and understanding bureaucratic involvement in the policy process are discussed.     

Matching Rates and Mandates: Federalism and Children's Medicaid Enrollment

An important focus of the federalism literature has been on analyzing the responses of lower levels of government to the financial incentives of intergovernmental grant programs. But grant conditions and mandates are also important features of grant programs, and these have received considerably less attention in the literature. This article examines the implementation of federal Medicaid mandates during the 1980s and 1990s to explicitly compare the relative responses of the states to matching rate incentives and statutory mandates. Using individual-level information on program enrollment to measure policy implementation, the results indicate that the federal mandates led to large changes in children's Medicaid enrollment. In contrast, the effects of the federal matching rate were much more limited. Moreover, the statutory mandates not only raised the average level of enrollment but also reduced the degree of policy variation across the states. While the current pattern of federal Medicaid matching payments reduces policy variation to some extent, these effects are modest compared to the impacts of the mandates. Mandates are a more powerful instrument for national policymakers than the comparatively weak fiscal incentives provided by matching rates.