The Foreign Policymaking Role of Congress in the 1990s: Remote Sensing Technology and the Future of Congressional Power

In the midst of a period of Congressional assertiveness on foreign policy, a new technology has emerged for commercial use with the potential for enhancing Congress' information-gathering processes and agenda-setting role. The effect may alter the balance of power in the relationship between Congress and the President. Congress' access to news media stories of imagery may provide an independent information source on U.S. or foreign military installations and activities. Such a source could be utilized to assess issues such as Pentagon appropriations, treaty compliance, and foreign aid funding. The thesis of this article is that when interest groups and the news media use remote sensing imagery on foreign policy issues, the foreign and national security policymaking process will be transformed by enhancing the information status and the public agendasetting role of previously excluded segments such as interest groups, the news media, and the general public. The expanded role of these groups will decentralize decisionmaking by fragmenting power and likely restructure the relationship between the Congress and the executive over these policy areas during the 1990s.     

Roll Call Votes on Cabinet Confirmations

Studies of cabinet nominations by the Senate have focused on the process and the outcomes of cabinet confirmation votes in the Senate, while the individual votes of senators have received little attention. This study examines roll call votes on all cabinet nominations since 1969 in an effort to explore the effects political and personal factors have on senators' votes on cabinet confirmations. Three basic conclusions emerge: the most significant influences on senators' confirmation votes are personal factors, especially perceptions of the nominee being a policy extremist; negatives matter more than positives; and there are partisan differences, as presidential party senators have a higher probability of voting to confirm when allegations of wrongdoing are made.     

Congress and Back Seat Driving

Few pieces of legislation in the realm of foreign policy decisionmaking have greater potential effect or are more controversial than the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution was intended originally to create greater leverage for Congress over executive use of military force. In this effort, it is widely believed that the Resolution has been ineffective. This paper uses an information theoretic model to examine the War Powers Resolution. Results of the modeling process allow for two general assertions. First, the model suggests that the Resolution is an optimal choice of procedure by the legislature. In other words, the War Powers Resolution is better for Congress than its alternatives. Second, the information theoretic approach used here seems to coincide with an anecdotal history of the war powers debate better than do alternative explanations. Indeed, the analysis helps to explain why war powers legislation was not considered seriously sooner. Though criticism of the War Powers Resolution has its merits, claims for a variety of alternative procedural systems may be open to challenge. Those wishing to establish mechanisms for curtailing executive adventurism abroad may find it more rewarding to focus efforts on the budgeting process or on the reduction of military force structures.     

Reform in the Canadian Parliament and the US Congress: Institutional Choices and Member Power

A spate of recent work on the Canadian Parliament highlights the importance of constituency pressures in understanding the legislative behavior of individual Members of Parliament (MPs). In light of this renaissance, we reexamine decisions by Canadian Liberal Party MPs to defy Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and his cabinet by supporting party-weakening reform in 2002. More specifically, we model votes on the question of selecting committee chairs through secret ballot as a function of factors both internal and external to the Parliament. While we find some evidence of exogenous, constituency-based forces, we find that support for reform was largely driven by internal party power dynamics. We gain additional insight into our findings by comparing this reform to analogous reforms in the US Congress. The patterns we uncover highlight the stark difference between the “double monopoly of power” held by party leaders in Westminster-style legislatures and the lack of such a monopoly in Congress. We conclude by advocating for more such comparisons, arguing that careful efforts to synthesize these and other similar reforms can improve our understanding of both legislatures despite the obvious and important differences between them.     

An Item Veto for the President?

In their efforts to reduce federal deficits, national political leaders sometimes have embraced bold constitutional and statutory “reform” measures. President Reagan, for example, has campaigned for a constitutional amendment to permit the President to veto subsections contained within appropriations bills. This article describes the history and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of this proposed item veto. By pointing out potentially undesirable consequences of the item veto, we note that unintended side-effects may weaken Congress and provide more power than an effective president needs, and more power than an imperial president should ever have. We conclude the item veto is overrated and its effects not well understood. It would not greatly reduce deficits and it would disrupt the existing system of checks and balances. More important, it is an example of escapism from the basic tasks of statecraft and political decisionmaking that should be center stage in the legislative and executive branches.     

Executive Publicity and Congressional Resistance, 1905-1913: Congress and the Roosevelt Administration's PR Men

Theodore Roosevelt circumvented Congress and expanded presidential power at the beginning of the 20th century, in part, by using the press to establish executive leadership of public opinion. This article describes how Roosevelt and his chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, launched a crusade in the press for Progressive conservation despite the opposition of congressmen who tried to block the use of publicists by executive agencies. Although Congress forbade the hiring of "publicity experts" in 1913, they were already common in executive agencies.     

Patterns of Change in the Congressional Budget Process, 1865-1974

This paper examines five periods of congressional budget reform, from 1865 to 1974, and asks two sets of related questions: (1) What are the external and internal factors that seem to precipitate reform? and (2) Are there systematic differences in the ways Congress responds to internal and external pressures for change? If so, in the process of formulating successful (i.e. adopted) reforms, how are the responses to external stresses balanced against those designed to deal with internal questions? The research indicates that economic difficulties engendered by war and major changes in presidential-congressional relations with respect to fiscal policymaking are the crucial external variables. Internally, major shifts in the power relations of those involved in congressional spending decisions appear to facilitate budget reform. In responding to external pressures on its budget process, Congress tends to centralize its budget procedures. In response to internal pressures, Congress tends to decentralize those procedures.     

Japan's Political Leadership Deficit

Analysts have long pondered the question: 'Who rules in Japan?'. Prime Ministers who have exercised strong leadership have been the exception rather than the rule. Despite the widespread acknowledgment that Japan's political leadership deficit undermines the ability of the government to act swiftly in a crisis and to exercise international leadership in trade and foreign policy, a systematic explanation for Japan's weak political executive is yet to be advanced. While historical and cultural factors cannot be ignored, more relevant in a contemporary context are institutional factors that restrict the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. A parliamentary Cabinet system is not incompatible with strong leadership but, in Japan's case, the inability of the political executive to exercise indisputable authority, or indeed, merely to exercise the legitimate prerogatives of Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Office, is directly attributable to the constraints imposed by a collection of informal power structures within the ruling conservative party and by an autonomous central bureaucracy, all of which have held power away from the political executive. Various institutional remedies are currently being pursued to enhance the leadership of the executive branch. They are part of a deliberately engineered shift in power from non-elected bureaucrats to elected politicians. The reforms will also help to diminish the influence of ruling party factions over personnel selections to executive office and the ascendancy of internal policy cliques within party policymaking.     

Neo-Conservatism and Presidential Nomination Reforms: A Critique

The neo-conservatives fault the post-1968 reforms in presidential nominations because, they argue, increased participation opportunities have weakened political parties and produced unrepresentative candidates who are unable to govern. They favor changes that would enhance the influence of party regulars and professionals because it is asserted that such participation would strengthen parties and encourage the selection of more popular and better qualified nominees. We argue that the critique suffers from several weaknesses: a failure to consider other plausible explanations for the effects attributed to the reforms; the use of inadequate or misleading measures; and the misuse of historical examples. In addition, we find that a key concept in their critique–professionalism– is not clearly defined, and that the several plausible definitions suffer from a variety of logical and analytic shortcomings. Although many political scientists     

First Mayan Women's Congress

In October 1997, over 200 participants attended the First Mayan Women's Congress in Mexico and called for financial assistance, capacity building, and training to help Mayan women escape poverty. The Congress was initiated by the UN Development Fund for Women in collaboration with the Small Grants Program of the UN Development Program. Traditionally, Mayan women and men have played distinct roles in society, and efforts are underway to increase gender sensitivity and achieve a new balance of power. Mayan women attending the Congress reported that they face daily challenges in gaining their husbands' approval for participation in income-generating activities outside of the home. Eventually, however, some husbands also start working in these enterprises and are learning to assume their share of domestic responsibilities. Mayan women have been forced to reevaluation their role in society by a prevailing agricultural and environmental crisis as well as a high unemployment rate. Crafts that were once produced only for household consumption are now considered for export. Because the women need funds to initiate income-generating activities, the Conference linked women's groups with development practitioners, policy-makers, and donors. The women requested financial aid for more than 30 specific projects, and Congress participants agreed to pursue innovate strategies to support the enterprises with funds, training, and technical assistance. The Congress also encouraged environmental nongovernmental organizations to include Mayan women in mainstream development activities. This successful Congress will be duplicated in other Mexican states.     

Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government and the Modern Congress: The "Universal Principle" of Change

In Congressional Government Woodrow Wilson analyzes change in Congress during its first century of development. This essay argues that Wilson's analysis of the 19th century Congress, which explains congressional behavior as an outgrowth of both institutional and societal forces, provides a more useful interpretation of change than the institutionalist perspective dominant in the specialized studies of the modern Congress. The essay illustrates the value of Wilson's analysis to contemporary scholars by tracing its impact on the evolution of the author's interpretation of the congressional reforms and changes of the 1970s. The essay attributes the continuing value of Congressional Government to its broad and unified portrait of Congress as a whole.     

Tinkering Toward a National Identification System: An Experiment on Policy Attitudes

The REAL ID Act was passed in 2005 by Congress in part to address preoccupations with breaches to homeland security after the 9/11 attacks. The Act requires states to introduce more standardized state driver's licenses by 2008. The goal of this paper is to understand citizens' opinions in the area of personal identification and how these opinions may be shaped by alternative framings of the issue. Using survey responses from Michigan residents provides evidence of the following: (i) a majority of the Michigan public supports the current reforms in identification; however, a majority is not willing to incur larger costs or delays; (ii) framing the issue around immigration can generate as much support as framing the issue around terrorism; however, a more balanced discourse can dampen support; and (iii) partisan and ideological leanings moderately structure support for identification reforms. Overall the findings suggest a comfortable margin for reforms around personal identification if public safeguarding interpretations can predominate.     

革命的形成:清季十年的转折(上)

清季十年间,朝廷正以前所未有的速度和广度推行全面改革,并无太多特别明显的暴戾苛政和"失道"作为,却爆发了革命,且能较为轻易地速成。对于从帝制到共和的"五千年之大变",应有更深层的梳理、分析和诠释。帝国主义的全面入侵,造成中国权势结构前所未有的巨变。中外竞争的新局面使朝野面临着政治方向、政治结构和政治伦理的根本变革。一个推行了数千年的小政府政治模式,被迫走向必须展现政府作为的"富强"新路;而制度的困境,则使新政带有自毁的意味。更因政治伦理的转换远不如条文制度那样可以速成,政治体制的转型便遇到进一步难以逆转的困境,终不得不让位于被认为更迅捷更有效的革命。     

A New Model of Executive Power: A Montesquieuan Explanation of the Obama Presidency

Abstract

The perennial concern over executive overreach continues well into Obama's presidency, leading many to wonder if the “unitary executive” is here to stay. Discussions of executive war powers focus on three models. The Hamiltonian perspective gives presidents the lead position in foreign affairs; the second model, following Madison, presents Congress as the leader when initiating hostilities. Finally, Jeffersonians present emergency powers as extra-legal, giving presidents a sphere of actions that cannot be contained within constitutional discussions. Problematically, current scholarship implicitly or explicitly grounds these explanations in Locke's political philosophy. This occurs despite a dearth of references to Locke during the Constitutional Convention and infrequent references to his thought during early debates over executive-congressional divisions of war powers. Comparatively, all of these seminal American figures frequently mention Montesquieu, often fighting over the specifics of his theory. While scholars widely acknowledge this influence, they rarely mention him during discussions of war powers or the nature of executive power in general. This article examines the Montesquieuan understanding of executive power and shows how this model represents a viable alternative to the Lockean one. Most importantly, examining the executive from a Montesquieuan perspective provides solutions to current problems that the Lockean perspective does not.     

Presidential Unilateral Actions: Constitutional and Political Checks

Throughout history, presidents have invoked a broad array of powers. Some are legitimate and well grounded; others exceed constitutional boundaries and have met defeat in Congress, the courts, and the public. Still others originate from historical errors by the Supreme Court, particularly in the field of external affairs. The powers analyzed in this article begin with these: enumerated, implied, inherent, prerogative, ministerial, and discretionary. Presidential instruments of power include executive orders and proclamations. The erroneous “sole organ” doctrine, first appearing in the Curtiss-Wright case of 1936, was at issue in the Jerusalem passport case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry. The scope of unilateral executive authority is being tested in initiatives by the Obama administration in the field of immigration policy.     

Volcanic politics: Executive–legislative relations in Britain, 1997–2005

The parliamentary decline thesis overstates the dominance of the executive. The relationship between the executive and legislature is actually far more complex and balanced than is commonly recognised. After exploring recent developments in Australia and New Zealand, this article draws upon an audit of parliamentary modernisation in Britain since the election of New Labour in 1997 and suggests that a reforming parliament occurred during 2001–05 in which an executive with a majority of 166 was forced to acquiesce in the introduction of a raft of reform measures in the House of Commons that were designed to shift the balance of power. At the same time, the ‘transitional’ House of Lords displayed a new-found zeal and activism in a way that further frustrated the executive's control of parliament. This is not to overstate the degree of change: party loyalty remains the primary glue in the executive–legislative relationship and the executive remains dominant. However, it does suggest that in the British context the executive must still work within the limits and constraints of the parliamentary framework.     

20世纪后期美国与澳大利亚移民政策差异性的政治理论分析

论文利用移民政治理论对20世纪后期美国与澳大利亚的移民政策进行比较,并对其差异性进行了分析。认为这两个主要的移民国家都推行了限制性移民政策,但因其移民政治中的"利益导向",受"权利"的制约程度以及移民政策制定程序的不同,从而导致两国的移民政策无论在内容上还是在实际收效上都出现了巨大的差别。据此可以预测两国未来移民政策的趋势:美国将继续在自由主义的道路上前行,而澳大利亚却可以根据国内外政治经济形势的变化灵活地调整移民政策。     

Stiffening Abe: William Pitt Fessenden and the Role of the Broker Politician in the Civil War Congress

The difficult but by no means dysfunctional relationship between President Abraham Lincoln and Congress remains an understudied aspect of Civil War history. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at a comprehensive or convincing explanation for Union victory until that relationship is limned more precisely. This article contends that U.S. Senator William Pitt Fessenden (1806–69) played a critical mediating role in the wartime Congress. He did so firstly in his capacities as chair of the Senate finance committee and close associate of U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase and secondly as a public supporter of executive war powers. Although the influential Maine Republican had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Lincoln administration, his determination to quash the southern rebellion and considerable powers of self‐restraint enabled him to act as an important and constructive broker between the White House and the fractious Republicans on Capitol Hill.