Labor's reconciliation with federalism

Until the 1960s, the federal Labor party was formally pledged to the abolition of federalism and its replacement by a system in which the central government would have plenary powers and the states only delegated administrative responsibilities. This article examines how the ALP's platform was progressively changed during the 1960s and 1970s. The modification of Labor's commitment to abolish federalism and the Senate was due partly to a more realistic sense of what was feasible and partly to a more sophisticated approach towards working the existing system. But, as well, Labor's social and economic goals had been moderated to ones that were congenial to middle Australia and private enterprise. Progressive changes to Labor's platform were an important precondition for the Whitlam government's ‘new federalism’ in the 1970s, and the Hawke government's current initiative of ‘closer partnership with the states’ for reforming the practical working of the federal system.     

Intrastate federalism in Australia

The article applies a distinction often used in the study of Canadian federalism—intra‐versus interstate federalism—to the Australian federal system. The intrastate federalism model focuses on the representation of state, regional and local interests directly within central government institutions. On the surface the model appears to have little applicability to Australia. However, the examination of selected Commonwealth institutions and arenas, primarily the cabinet and party system, indicates that intrastate practices may in fact be much more pronounced in Australia than what is generally supposed. There are networks of influence at work outside the confines of standard intergovernmental arenas, networks that at times can be used to advantage by state governments or by state or local interests, at other times by the Commonwealth to enhance centralised control or even to undermine the status of state governments as legitimate actors within the Australian federal system.     

THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA: SOME REFLECTIONS

The Canadian Confederation has endured for more than a century, but the country retains extensive internal divisions. Indeed, the presence of a separatist provincial government in Quebec illustrates that Canada's fragmentations not only have persisted but may actually be deepening. This article comprises an examination of the relationship between federal and provincial governments from the Confederation period of the 1860s to the present. The objective is an appreciation of how the federation has developed into the current form of executive federalism. The historical discussion considers the successive and distinct intervals of federal-provincial relations which preceded executive federalism. They are the Confederation era, dual federalism, and cooperative federalism. Executive federalism entails a series of conferences between officials of federal and provincial governments in which national policy in fields of common interest is negotiated.

The article maintains that four themes firmly grounded in Confederation pervade the evolution of federal-provincial relations. They are: the absence of a sense of national allegiance throughout Canada; the constitution's explicit assignment of important responsibilities to the provinces; the disproportionate strength of Ontario and Quebec; and Quebec's relentless cultural individuality. Because these characteristics have, if anything, intensified in recent years, executive federalism is now necessary to accommodate conflicts between federal and provincial governments. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, both Canada's centrifugal character and executive federalism may be expected to continue indefinitely. The adversary nature of executive federalism, and the advantages which it offers to certain provinces, assure that a high level of federal-provincial tension also will be perpetuated.     

A continuing confusion? A comment on the appropriate dispersal of policy powers in the Australian federation

Dissatisfaction with Australia's federalist constitutional and administrative arrangements seems universal. The Labor Party has historically preferred a centralist thrust to the Australian federal compact. From the opposite, decentralist tack the Liberal‐National Coalition parties currently propose that the Commonwealth should hive‐off policy functions to the States. These attitudes are expressed in an intellectual climate that disparages the allocative efficiency of Australian federalism and debates these issues in terms of shifting power to or from the Commonwealth. A more sensible focus is on the usage that the citizenry has made of the federal system in obtaining satisfactory service delivery. Using this approach our federal system works efficiently (in a limited political‐administrative sense.

This is not an argument that Australia's federal system is good because it maximises fiscal efficiency or guarantees equity. It does not do the former'and varies in its attainment of the latter. The federal system is good because it maximises opportunities and avenues for citizens to obtain what they want from government. In that sense the Coalition parties are fundamentally confused both about their philosophy and that philosophy's relationship to the political nature of Australian federalism. Labor's slowly‐ebbing centralism equally ignores the political usage that citizens have made of the administrative and funding arenas provided by our federal system.     

Matching Rates and Mandates: Federalism and Children's Medicaid Enrollment

An important focus of the federalism literature has been on analyzing the responses of lower levels of government to the financial incentives of intergovernmental grant programs. But grant conditions and mandates are also important features of grant programs, and these have received considerably less attention in the literature. This article examines the implementation of federal Medicaid mandates during the 1980s and 1990s to explicitly compare the relative responses of the states to matching rate incentives and statutory mandates. Using individual-level information on program enrollment to measure policy implementation, the results indicate that the federal mandates led to large changes in children's Medicaid enrollment. In contrast, the effects of the federal matching rate were much more limited. Moreover, the statutory mandates not only raised the average level of enrollment but also reduced the degree of policy variation across the states. While the current pattern of federal Medicaid matching payments reduces policy variation to some extent, these effects are modest compared to the impacts of the mandates. Mandates are a more powerful instrument for national policymakers than the comparatively weak fiscal incentives provided by matching rates.     

Recognition or imposition? Federalism,national minorities,and the Supreme Court of Canada†

ABSTRACT. This paper makes two main arguments. First, federalism in Canada, properly conceived, is a system which evolves as a result of struggles over the norms of mutual recognition between territorially based groups. Second, if federalism is to work as a way of accommodating national minorities, the role of the judiciary in adjudicating this relationship must be taken into account, because it plays an integral role in the continuing contestation of the arrangement. I begin with the ‘problem’ of national minorities in the nation‐state system and why federalism is espoused as a solution for alleviating tensions, focusing on Canada. I then turn to review the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in adjudicating the federal arrangement. Finally, considering this jurisprudence, I reflect on why it is important to account for the role of the Court when promoting federalism to accommodate national minorities. I go on to argue that a dialogical approach to federalism, as opposed to a monological one, is best suited to do this.     

Australian Federalism and Domestic Violence Policy-Making

The influence of state architecture on gender policy and politics is an emergent strand of feminist research. This paper contributes to this research by undertaking a detailed case study of one specific gender policy area – domestic violence policy – in old federation Australia. Drawing on the experiences of the past decade, it confirms earlier research findings that demonstrate that under certain conditions, federal structures can influence the development of gender policy in positive ways, such as providing opportunities for ‘venue shopping’ and policy innovation. The paper engages, too, with recent research on Australian federalism and challenges the consensus about the centralised nature of the Australian federal system by demonstrating that in the area of gender policy, states and territories are more than just the implementation arms of the Commonwealth government. Sub-national governments continue to play an important and autonomous role in policy relating to women and therefore remain central sites for advancing gender equality.     

Both Too Much and Too Little: Sources of Federal Instability in Canada

Federalism is often praised for being able to accommodate diversity within the confines of a single state while preventing secession. Federalism, however, is fraught with tensions and instability. Federalism is typically adopted as a second-best alternative among actors whose first choice is either a more centralized state or a more decentralized state. These preferences persist over time. Instability in federation, then, comes from federal partners pushing in opposite directions at the same time. From this dynamic comes the much-examined propensity for secessionism to develop within federations. Largely unexamined in the literature on federalism, but equally problematic from the standpoint of stability, is the equal and opposite risk of consolidation (or centralization). This article examines sources of federal instability by exploring the origins and evolution of federalism. I use examples from Canada to demonstrate the extent to which my argument is applicable to real world federations. In conducting the exploration, we come to understand how federations can be both unstable and durable.     

One continent,two federalisms: rediscovering the original meanings of Australian federal ideas

Federalism is usually described in political science as a single body of ideas—in Australia's case arriving in the 1840s–50s and moving to constitutional reality in the 1890s. This article re‐examines the origins and diversity of federal ideas in Australia. It suggests that federal thought began influencing Australia's constitutional development significantly earlier than previously described. This first Australian federalism had a previously unappreciated level of support in British colonial policy and drew on Benjamin Franklin's American model of territorial change as a ‘commonwealth for increase’. The revised picture entrenches the notion of federalism's logic but also reveals a dynamic, decentralist style of federalism quite different from Australia's orthodox ‘classic’ or compact federal theory. In fact, Australian political thought contains two often‐conflicting ideas of federalism. The presence of these approaches helps explain longstanding dissent over the regional foundations of Australian constitutionalism.     

Rediscovering Australian federalism by resurrecting old ideas

The federal organisation of government in Australia is one of the least understood aspects of the Australian political system. Despite the durability of federal structures, federal theory in Australia remains largely underdeveloped. Aside from a few scholars who have persistently analysed the federal process, federalism in Australia has received attention as an outmoded system with little scope for distinguishing the benefits to be gained from understanding how government is organised. But where Australian federal theory has languished, American federal theory has flourished. This paper borrows some of the major ideas which have influenced analyses of government functions in the American ‘ system and posits them against analyses of Commonwealth and State government functions in Australia.     

High Court Review 2006: Australian Federalism—Implications of the WorkChoices Decision

This year's High Court Review focuses exclusively on the WorkChoices decision, in which the federal government's new industrial relations regime was upheld by the High Court as within the Commonwealth's powers under s. 51(xx) of the Constitution, the corporations power. The implications of the judgement are potentially momentous for Australian federalism. Thus, we begin with an overview of changes in Australian federalism over time, including its fortunes in the High Court of Australia. We then consider the WorkChoices decision itself, outlining the most important aspects of the decision. We argue that the decision is the most important High Court decision on the constitutional division of federal powers since 1983, especially in the context of the corporatisation of policy delivery in the past few decades. Moreover, it reinforces the dominance of an orthodoxy in constitutional interpretation, thus confirming the demise of ‘activist’ tendencies. Finally, the judgement demonstrates the Court's preparedness to confirm changes to the workings of Australian federalism that, the evidence suggests strongly, would not pass at referendum. However, this view of the centralist implications of the decision is mediated by a consideration of the workings of intergovernmental relations. An examination of the potential changes in this area reveals a more complicated outcome, one with important implications for the manner in which intergovernmental negotiations might be conducted in future.     

Getting the Job Done: Resolving State- Federal Conflicts in Superfund

The American system of federalism creates frequent opportunities for clashes between state and federal environmental regulators. State and federal environmental laws overlap but are not easily reconciled. Most federal environmental law provides no clear answer as to how to reconcile differing mandates of state and federal environmental regulators. In this article, we will examine these state-federal conflicts as they played out in 1994 in, the cleanup of contaminated sites in the state of Washington. This article describes the way a regional office of the Environmental Protection Agency and the state's Department of Ecology developed a novel approach to managing the essential tension between overlapping state and federal cleanup laws.     

The Ideational Dimension of Federalism: The ‘Australian Model’ and the Politics of Equalisation in Canada

This article examines the ideational dimension of federalism and its consequences for the analysis of policy development. With this objective in mind, the article offers an explanation for Canada's rejection of the two main aspects of the ‘Australian model’ of equalisation: the assessment of expenditure needs and the existence of an arms-length commission to determine payments. As argued, the ideological prevalence of provincial autonomy in Canada explains why federal officials opted to reject the ‘Australian model’ as they prepared to establish the country's program and why subsequent reforms never introduced a needs-assessment dimension or created an arms-length agency to administer equalisation. At the theoretical level, this article shows how ideational factors can shape policy outcomes.     

Federalism,constitutional recognition and Indigenous Peoples: how a new identity-based state can be established in Australia

ABSTRACT

The debate on constitutional recognition of Indigenous Peoples in Australia has highlighted the desire for meaningful responses to Indigenous Peoples’ claims to sovereignty and self-determination. One potential response is to apply federal principles and establish a new state, or states, for Indigenous Peoples in Australia. This proposal has been most prominently put by Tasmanian Aboriginal leader Michael Mansell. Others have followed. However, (at least) one fundamental problem with this federal idea has not been properly addressed, namely the dispersal and limited geographical concentration of Indigenous people in Australia. This paper asks whether and how federalism can be used to institutionalise the shared and self-rule of widely dispersed minorities, or more specifically, Indigenous Peoples in the settler-majority country of Australia. It demonstrates that a non-territorial approach can be applied to federalism in Australia, and that it may form one possible response to the Uluru Statement from the Heart.     

Performance Goal Achievement in Fiscal Federalism: The Influence of State Partisan Environments and Regulatory Regimes

With tight budgets and hyper‐partisan interactions within and between the states and federal government, attention is being paid to the implementation of federal programs. This is particularly important because, as the recently implemented American Recovery and Reinvestment Act suggests, state administrators are often the implementers of federal policy. This study integrates the fiscal federalism literature with that on implementation and bureaucratic response to examine the effect that within‐state factors have on the degree of performance goal achievement in federally funded, state implemented programs. The findings suggest that, when implementing federal programs, state administrators face conflicting political incentive structures and policy‐specific capacity and capability deficits that influence their motivation and ability to achieve performance goals.     

Policy Gridlock in Waste Management

Current federal hazardous and low-level radioactive waste management policies (under conjoint federalism) fail to balance national concerns for consistency with state concerns for equity, discretion, and adequate resources. Congress should expand conjoint federalism to permit states to charge differential fees on imported hazardous waste as it does for low-level radioactive waste. For low-level radioactive waste, clarification of the "take title" issue makes the present framework for state discretion implementable, given sufficient time.     

Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States

In this paper we address two aspects of regulatory federalism in U.S. environmental policy. First, we suggest that environmental quality in U.S. states responds positively to increases in income. Second, we provide evidence that environmental quality did not decline when President Reagan's policy of new federalism returned responsibility for many environmental regulations to the states. Thus, state environmental quality appears to reflect more than just the dictates of federal policy. Additionally, we find that a "race to the bottom" in environmental quality did not materialize in the 1980s.     

From laissez-faire to supranational planning: the economic debate within Federal Union (1938–1945)

This article focuses on the early years of Federal Union (FU), the leading British federalist association created in 1938. It sets out to demonstrate that FU members heavily disagreed about the economic powers of the future Federation and that these divisions weakened the appeal of the federalist cause. Archival evidence suggests the organisation shifted from economic neutrality, favoured by allegiance to nineteenth-century liberalism, which emphasized the benefits of free trade while keeping a minimum of centralized force in order to prevent interstate rivalries from boiling over into war, to a radical advocacy of supranational planning, aimed at enforcing social rights and welfare entitlements granted to all the citizens of the member-states. This swing to the Left had several implications, including abandoning the prospect of an Anglo-American union, developing a more sympathetic attitude towards the Soviet system, and breaking ties with influential members of the British establishment who had initially lent support to FU, such as Lionel Curtis and William Beveridge. By pointing at the tension between the models of ‘Federation Pure and Simple’ and ‘Federation Plus’, this article also highlights the supple and muddled nature of federalism as an ideology.     

Frustrated,reconciled or divided? The Australian labor party and federalism

The Australian Labor Party has always been, and remains, a complex entity which encompasses both centralist/national and decentralist/federal interests and values. The common interpretation that the party has been historically ‘frustrated’ by federalism but is now ‘reconciled’ with it thus exaggerates both the frustration and the reconciliation.     

Russian Fiscal Federalism under Stress: Federal Support of Regions during the Global Financial Crisis

A former high-ranking Russian Ministry of Finance official examines the consequences of financial support extended to regions by the Russian Federation government during the global financial crisis in 2008-2010, for the purpose of exploring its potential impact on the regions' financial health in 2011-2012. The paper is structured around an analysis of the three major dimensions of that support: (1) legal and administrative actions undertaken at the federal level to reduce financial pressure on the regions; (2) increased issuance of intergovernmental fiscal grants in 2009; and (3) loans granted to the regions from the federal budget. The author argues that the financial crisis has provided a "stress test" that is useful in assessing the efficiency and flexibility of the Russian system of fiscal federalism.