FIRM HETEROGENEITY,MULTIPLANT CHOICE,AND AGGLOMERATION

We examine the organization and location choice of heterogeneous firms in a two‐region economy. When some high‐productivity firms engage in multiplant production, a reduction in transport costs causes two changes in a small region: the closure of plants by high‐productivity multiplant firms and the relocation of low‐productivity single‐plant firms to the region. In the presence of high‐productivity multiplant firms, therefore, a decline in transport costs reinforces the spatial sorting of firms by productivity, enlarging the productivity gap between large and small regions. Conversely, reducing investment costs weakens the spatial sorting effects on regional productivity disparities.     

The Importance of the Distribution of Consumers in Horizontal Product Differentiation

This paper examines the importance of the distribution of consumers in Hotelling's circle on the comparison between the optimal and the market equilibrium levels of diversity. It finds that when most consumers are located very close to the firms, the result of Salop—that the equilibrium number of firms is larger than the optimal one (surplus maximizing)—can be reversed.     

Developing Countries and Environmental Protection: The Effects of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Contracting

In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that in order to protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed that would channel resources from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) that wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various DCs; instead, the SNGA must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex ante and ex post IEAs, which can be implemented by the SNGA in two different scenarios. The analysis suggests that IEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty. Further, desirable levels of pollution abatement can result in a number of contractual settings.     

GROWTH,FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,AND THE ENVIRONMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE CITIES

ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the relationship between economic growth and industrial pollution emissions in China using data for 112 major cities between 2001 and 2004. Using disaggregated data, we separate foreign direct investment inflows from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan from those of other foreign economies. We examine two industrial water pollution indicators (wastewater and petroleum‐like matter) and four industrial air pollution indicators (waste gas, sulfur dioxide, soot, and dust). Our results suggest that most air and water emissions rise with increases in economic growth at current income levels. The share of output of domestic‐ and foreign‐owned firms increases several pollutants in a statistically significant manner while output of firms from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan either reduces pollution or is statistically insignificant.     

ANTIAGGLOMERATION SUBSIDIES WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS*

ABSTRACT This paper studies antiagglomeration subsidies in a core–periphery setting when firms are heterogeneous in labor productivity, focusing on the effects of a relocation subsidy on firm location in various tax‐financing schemes (local vs. global). I discuss how a subsidy can enhance welfare and average productivity in the periphery. As a result, I find that a subsidy proportional to profits can induce the relocation of high‐productivity firms and thus increase welfare and average productivity in the periphery. Concerning tax‐financing schemes, a local tax‐financing scheme has an optimal level of subsidy.     

EXTERNALITIES AND PARTIAL TAX REFORM: DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO TAX ROAD FREIGHT (BUT NOT PASSENGER) TRANSPORT?*

ABSTRACT Externalities such as pollution and road congestion are jointly produced by the use of intermediate inputs by firms and the consumption of final goods by households. To cope with such externalities, policy proposals often suggest partial tax reforms. This paper uses a simple general equilibrium model to explore the effects of a reform of taxes on freight transport in a second‐best setting. The theoretical model shows that the welfare effect of higher freight taxes is positive, unless passenger transport is severely under‐taxed and the tax reform attracts substantially more passenger transport. Moreover, the optimal freight tax may be below or above marginal external cost. Budgetary neutral tax reform exercises with a numerical simulation model for the U.K. suggest that, under a wide variety of parameter values, higher freight transport taxes are indeed welfare increasing. The welfare gain of freight tax reform rises with the level of the passenger tax, but the optimal freight tax declines at higher taxes on passenger transport. Substantial net benefits of tax reform are obtained only under labor tax recycling of the revenues.     

PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY*

ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of preference heterogeneity between skilled and unskilled workers on agglomeration, and we identify a new source of dependence of equilibrium prices on the demand properties shaped by the inter‐regional distribution of workers. We find a new preference effect, and we show that when the intensity of skilled workers' preference for the modern good and its variety is strong enough, prices charged by firms may even increase when the mass of local firms increases, therefore acting as a new dispersion force when trade costs are low or as a new agglomeration force when trade costs are high.     

FIRM PRODUCTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN INDUSTRY

This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the determinants of differentials in firms’ productivity. We test the hypothesis that macro factors, especially the quality of local institutions, play a central role in explaining firm productivity in Italy. To this end, we construct measures of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for about 4,000 firms by means of different estimation techniques, and a province‐level index of institutional quality. Then, we estimate the relationship between institutional quality and firm‐level TFP. Our results show that the existence of better local institutions might help firms to become more productive.     

TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH‐UP AND GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY*

ABSTRACT This paper examines productivity catch‐up as a source of establishment productivity growth. We present evidence that, other things equal, establishments further behind the industry frontier experience faster rates of productivity growth. Geographic proximity to frontier firms makes catch‐up faster. Our econometric specification implies a long‐run relationship between productivity levels, where nonfrontier establishments lie a steady‐state distance behind the frontier such that their rate of productivity growth including catch‐up equals productivity growth at the frontier. We use our econometric estimates to quantify the implied contribution to productivity growth of catch‐up to both the national and regional productivity frontiers.     

Industrial clusters,organized crime,and productivity growth in Italian SMEs

We examine whether organized crime affects firms’ performance (defined using Total Factor Productivity growth) both directly and indirectly, by downsizing the positive externalities arising from the geographic concentration of (intra‐ and inter‐industry) market‐related firms. The analysis uses a large sample of Italian small‐ and medium‐sized manufacturing firms over the period 2010–2013. The results highlight the negative direct effects of organized crime on firms’ productivity growth. Any positive effect derived from industrial clustering is thoroughly debilitated by a strong presence of organized crime, and the negative moderation effect of organized crime on productivity growth is greater for smaller than for larger firms.     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION,PRICING POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM*

ABSTRACT. This paper studies the price-location equilibrium of duopolists supplying differentiated goods and competing in a spatial market with elastic demand. We show that a price-location equilibrium exists under all three pricing policies traditionally considered by the literature: f.o.b. mill, uniform delivered, and spatially discriminatory pricing. We also show that firms always cluster at the market center. The second part of the paper studies the endogenous choice of pricing policy. A surprising feature of the resulting equilibrium is asymmetry. The greater the extent to which the goods are substitutes, the more likely is it that one firm will choose f.o.b. pricing and the other price discrimination. Finally, the welfare consequences of the analysis show some interesting trade-offs.     

LOCATIONAL SIGNALING AND AGGLOMERATION

Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling effect: The location choice of workers signals their productivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at that location. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing is negatively correlated with their productivity, only the core‐periphery (partially stratified) equilibria are stable. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing and their productivity are positively correlated, there is no core‐periphery equilibrium. The urban wage premium is explained when there is a core‐periphery equilibrium. Furthermore, location can at best be an approximate rather than a precise sieve for high‐skill workers.     

PRICE AND LOCATION CONJECTURES IN MEDIUM- AND LONG-RUN SPATIAL COMPETITION MODELS*

ABSTRACT. This paper examines medium-run and long-run equilibria in unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one-dimensional multifirm markets. A price-location adjustment model is outlined that dows simulation of the spatial equilibrium when these firms anticipate reactions from their nearest spatial rivals. Thus, the market equilibrium is derived from the interdependent but atomistic decisions of the competing firms and is not imposed by some outside observer or agency. Ail conjectures are exogenous; the three well-known price conjectures (Greenhut-Ohta, Hotelling-Smithies, and Losch) are highlighted; and the relevant comparative statics are provided.     

SPATIAL PRICING IN INTERDEPENDENT MARHETS*

ABSTRACT. Conditions for spatial price equilibrium are derived for a set of firms in oligopolistic spatial competition, distributed at fixed locations in a heterogeneous region where consumer purchasing patterns are a probabilistic function of the price distribution rather than a deterministic function of proximity to firms. The resulting prices vary with accessibility to consumers or with the degree of local spatial monopoly, and result in non-zero profits for firms. Conditions describing the existence and stability properties of this spatial price equilibrium are defined, and are shown to be equivalent for two different hypotheses concerning disequilibrium pricing behavior: a partial price adjustment model and a Bertrand game. For two different profit goals, total profit maximization and profit rate maximization, it is shown that a spatial price equilibrium exists and is at least locally quasi-stable.     

LOCATION AND MARKET POWER HOTELLING REVISITED*

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the determination of industry structure in a product market, given a monopolistic factor market. The characteristics of industry structure examined include the number of firms, their pricing and locational pattern. It is shown how a monopolistic factor owner–a landowner–structures the product market in order to extract maximum rent. Asymmetry characterizes the resulting locational pattern. All the product market firms charge different prices in equilibrium. No matter how large the number of firms competing in the product market, the landowner can always guarantee himself positive profits. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible applications and tests of the theory.     

Hotelling Games with Three,Four, and More Players*

Abstract. This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n‐player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation—as in the duopoly model—nor minimize differentiation—as in the multi‐firm game with linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players are characterized by a U‐shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations. Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentiation from the social perspective if n ≤ 3, while adding firms leads to a level of differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.     

CAPITALIZATION OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL ATTRIBUTES INTO WAGES AND RENTS: DIFFERENCES ACROSS RESIDENTIAL,COMMERCIAL AND MIXED-USE COMMUNITIES*

ABSTRACT. The extent to which the value of locational attributes is capitalized into wages rather than rents is analyzed in a general equilibrium framework. This paper differs from earlier work by taking into account local and regional attributes and makes distinctions among residential, commercial, and mixed-use communities. The theory implies that in localities with both individuals and firms, wages and rents are simultaneously determined, while in exclusively residential localities the model is recursive. The major theoretical insights are consistent with estimations of the model using data from the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics.     

REGIONAL GROWTH,INNOVATION, AND LATENT NONLINEAR EFFECTS

This paper studies the link between knowledge, innovation, and growth in European regions using nonparametric methods. Our findings suggest that knowledge inputs and the share of innovative firms have a heterogeneous and nonlinear relationship with growth. This evidence has been exploited to examine the consequences of alternative policies using a counterfactual estimation setup, the results of which imply that increasing the formal knowledge base may be optimal in most regions. Less knowledge and innovation intensive regions will also benefit from a higher innovation potential and from a trustworthy and entrepreneurial economic environment.     

LOCAL FOOD,URBANIZATION, AND TRANSPORT‐RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

We argue that “buying local” does not necessarily reduce transport‐related greenhouse gas emissions, even if production technologies and yields are homogeneous in space. We develop a partial‐equilibrium model of rural‐urban systems where the spatial distribution of food production within and between regions is endogenous. We exhibit cases where locating some food production in the least‐urbanized regions results in lower emissions and higher welfare than if all regions are self‐sufficient. The optimal spatial allocation of food production does not exclude the possibility that some regions should be self‐sufficient, provided that their urban population sizes are neither too large nor too small.     

Place‐based policies,firm productivity,and displacement effects: Evidence from Shenzhen,China

Developing and transitional countries devote considerable funds to selected areas to stimulate local growth and firm productivity. We examine the impact of place‐based interventions due to the opening of science parks in Shenzhen, China, on firm productivity and factor use. Our identification strategy, exploiting spatial and temporal differencing in firm‐level data, addresses the issues that (a) the selection of science park locations is not random and (b) high‐productivity firms sort themselves into science parks. Firm productivity is approximately 15–25% higher due to the science park policy. The policy also increases local wages and leads to distortions due to job displacement.