试论民国时期英国对中国西藏的武器供应

民国时期,英国以赠送、出售方式向中国西藏提供了大批武器,对于英国控制西藏,攫取更多权益,将西藏纳入其缓冲地带战略轨道发挥了重要作用。英国对藏武器供应成为撬动英国与中国西藏之间关系的重要杠杆。本文利用英国印度事务部档案及其他史料,对这一时期英国向中国西藏武器供应的时间、种类和数量做了澄清,并论述了其性质。     

PROCESS ISSUES IN AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING COORDINATING ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIES

This study examines some apparent dilemmas and possible contradictions in U.S. policies spanning several of the most important arms control domains. The analysis is centered on the triangular relationship connecting nuclear non-proliferation, SALT, and conventional arms transfers (CAT), with each analyzed as dependent and independent variables in relation to the others. Further such linkages are examined involving the Comprehensive Test Ban, Indian Ocean de-militarization, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The study questions, in particular, whether or not U.S. policies on SALT and CAT may prove counterproductive for efforts to halt nuclear proliferation. The linkage of American overseas basing access to several areas of arms control endeavor is also highlighted.     

The UN Arms Trade Treaty: arms export controls,the human security agenda and the lessons of history

The UN conference to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) concluded on 27 July 2012 without reaching consensus on the text of a draft treaty and saw both the US and Russia calling for more time to negotiate. The ATT process marks the latest in a series of attempts to insert human security concerns into arms export controls. The setback in July raises questions about the current level of international support for the human security agenda, as well as the relative power of different actors to shape global governance structures. This article locates the ATT negotiations in the broader history of multilateral efforts to regulate the international arms trade, from the 1890 Brussels Act to post‐Cold War initiatives. The historical record shows that such efforts are more likely to succeed if they are negotiated or imposed by major arms exporters. The introduction of human security concerns, as well as the merging of export control and arms control agendas, went some way towards reversing this trend. In particular, it created a broad international coalition of supportive states and NGOs from the global North and South. Yet disagreements over the purpose of an ATT remained. The draft ATT included human security provisions, but China, Russia, the US and a number of emerging powers ensured that state security considerations remained paramount in decision‐making on arms exports. The US was the first major actor to announce its unwillingness to sign the draft ATT in July 2012 and two alternative interpretations of US actions are considered. The article concludes by considering the options available to supporters of the ATT process following the 2012 conference and examines the notion that the ATT campaign has become an initiative ‘out of its time’, one that might have had success in the 1990s but not in current circumstances.     

Arms control in Asia: yesterday's concept for today's region?

Even if the international mood in favour of steep US and Russian nuclear cuts was to last, it is unlikely to spread to Asia, where nuclear arsenals remain comparatively modest and where regional allies rely on Washington for extended deterrence. This does not render nuclear arms control irrelevant in Asia, where there is a modest but significant tradition based on informal and unilateral restraint rather than formal agreement. But as more of Asia's nuclear programs have come out of the closet and as great power relationships intensify, the region needs to look nuclear arms control more squarely in the eye. For arms control to have real purchase in tomorrow's Asia, China and the USA will need to look beyond their currently asymmetrical relationship and find an understanding based on increased nuclear transparency which also restrains their potentially escalatory competition in advanced conventional war-fighting abilities.     

Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO

Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence'— that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.     

Enlightenment and nuclear order

Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non‐proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control—despite its many successes and merits—has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non‐proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the ‘grand bargain’ as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have‐nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that—in order to gain support for the NPT—the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non‐proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non‐proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non‐proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.     

The Military Factor in Scientific Research

Abstract

The role of the military imperative in science is here examined. The historical drives of nation states to defend themselves, or to transmute defence into offence, have been a consistently compulsive and political factor since at least the European Renaissance. Here the manifold aspects of the military factor are reviewed, including the rare occasions when improved weapons technology was spurned, the drive for mass production of arms, chemical warfare, the economic and political power of the arms bazaar, export control of arms and finally the efforts to achieve disarmament.     

中国国际军备控制政策演变论析

近60年来,中国国际军备控制政策的发展经历了三个阶段:改革开放前坚持立场、独树一帜,长期处于国际军备控制体制之外;改革开放后选择参与、逐步深入;冷战结束后主动融入、广泛参与。近年来军备控制政策的变化及趋向,彰显了中国作为一个负责任的大国建设和谐世界的决心和诚意。     

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND CONGRESS' ROLE IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

In 1975 Congress required that budgetary requests for selected defense programs be accompanied by a statement assessing their arms control effects. Implementation of this requirement has fallen far short of unqualified success, and several proposals for remedying its failures are now being discussed. If remedies are based on incomplete or faulty diagnoses of the requirement's failures, however, they could exacerbate its dysfunctional aspects. This article suggests that the requirement has been unsuccessful because of an inadequate appreciation both of the political dynamics of the bureaucratic process involved and of the objective problems of these arms control issues. The analysis presented here concentrates on the former and suggests that further legislative modifications to the requirement are unlikely to be fruitful.     

International Nuclear Relations After the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions

India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have dismayed the international community. However, they can be seen as a culmination of the deterioration of international nuclear relations that has taken place since the mid-1990s. The author examines the reasons for this deterioration which he finds in US–Russian relations, the Middle East and South Asia, in disputes over arms control objectives, and in normative and procedural dilemmas that emerged as the number of countries with nuclear weapon programmes was reduced to a 'hard core' of eight states. This discussion provides the background for an assessment of the consequences of the actions of India and Pakistan. Despite the dangers, the author stresses the opportunities that could lie ahead. If key states act positively and cooperatively, the climate and processes of nuclear arms control could be transformed.     

‘The essential weaknesses of the December 1979 “Agreement”’: the White House and the implementing of the dual-track decision

Very few NATO decisions may have entailed for the Alliance as much a laborious political and diplomatic process as that taken in December 1979. After its adoption, under Carter, the dual-track decision had to be implemented over the early years of the Reagan administration, when the US President’s abhorrence of détente was so deep and vocal to jeopardise the arms control progress upon which the fulfilment of the negotiating track of that NATO decision depended. The analysis carried out in this article focuses on the US government’s deliberations and choices. Its aim is to discuss how and to what extent the US Cold War security priorities did need to be complemented with those singled out by European NATO allies, especially when those allies were able to convey to Washington the message that arms control remained a political necessity for them.     

Enlightenment in the second nuclear age

The debate on nuclear proliferation has become increasingly polarized. While there is widespread agreement on the perilous state of the traditional non‐proliferation regime, the analyses of the causes differ widely. The liberal arms control community has sought to salvage the eroding non‐proliferation regime both by overplaying its importance (nuclear enlightenment') as well as by blaming the policies of the nuclear weapons states, notably the United States. However, this view rests on several assumptions that have been increasingly revealed as myths: the myth of a universal non‐proliferation norm generated largely by the Non‐proliferation Treaty; the myth of a direct relationship between nuclear reductions and proliferation; and the myth of US policy being a cause of, rather than a reaction to, the non‐proliferation crisis. Clinging to these myths is counterproductive, as it seeks to perpetuate old policies at the expense of new approaches. However, new approaches to non‐proliferation are bound to gain in importance, even if they run counter to established arms control dogmas.     

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION DIMENSIONS OF ARMS CONTROL

More than a decade of emphasis on arms control through agreed numerical ceilings on weapons by type has failed to create a safer world or slowed the trend toward the increasing number, sophistication, and proliferation of destructive capacities. Accordingly, it is past time for renewed and major attention to arms control through communication and information regimes–to C³/I, i.e., communications, command and control, and intelligence. Priorities and possibilities in three areas merit pursuit: within U.S. and allied forces; between adversaries; and for potential third party sources of guarantees, sanctions, and mediation.     

A Chronicle of Failure Foretold: The UK,Israel and Arms Sales to Argentina in the Era of the Falklands War

In spite of fierce British protests, Israel supplied Argentina with arms both during the Falklands war and with greater intensity after the fighting. While the weapons sales were vital for Israel's economy and its arms industry, recently declassified papers suggest that the Begin government viewed the arms supplies to Argentina as a bargaining chip to exert pressure on Britain to halt its own sale of weapons to Israel's Arab adversaries and to end London's arms embargo against the Jewish State. Britain's restrictions on arms sales had long cast a shadow over Anglo-Israeli ties, and Israeli resentment towards Britain was exacerbated by anger over London's strong condemnation of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its leading involvement in the EEC Venice Declaration of June 1980 which recognized Palestinian self-determination and a role for the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Israelis also perceived the arms supplies as a means to influence the junta in its treatment of Argentina's Jews. Yet, there was actually a rise in the level of anti-Semitism in Argentina during the period in question. At the same time, Britain's approach in attempting to dissuade its allies from selling arms to Argentina was riddled with inconsistencies and ultimately misconceived.     

Preserving the Global Nuclear Order: The Trident Agreements and the Arms Control Debate, 1977–1982

ABSTRACT

The Trident negotiations were a pivotal moment in establishing the US–UK nuclear relationship as an accepted element of the global nuclear order. The Trident agreements marked the first supply of a US delivery system to the UK since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the development of Superpower arms control. In turn, the development of these agendas in the international sphere influenced Anglo-American discussions on the replacement to Polaris. The Carter White House procrastinated on the provision of Trident due in part to their concerns over the political ramifications for their wider non-proliferation and arms control goals. However, fortuitously for the UK's nuclear programme, US–UK discussions on the replacement to Polaris coalesced with the reorientation of US foreign policy towards containment of the Soviet Union under Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan – enabling the finalisation of the sale of Trident to the UK. As such, the status of the US–UK nuclear relationship as a broadly accepted element of the global nuclear order is a legacy of the ‘long 1970s’ alongside the early Cold War.     

The Cold War: the golden age of arms control

For anyone of a squeamish disposition the Cold War, with its intermittent crises and its underlying spectre of nuclear confrontation, was a dispiriting experience. But for those of us in the arms control business, this really was the golden age.     

ASSESSING ARMS CONTROL MEASURES: THE HISTORICAL SETTING

The U.S. has since World War II followed a defense policy and strategy that combined traditional national approaches with features especially typical of American attitudes toward war and peace as well as force and power. The deep dilemmas of nuclear deterrence confront the U.S. with an inescapable dilemma, which in turn motivates an increasingly serious arms control policy.     

Combating light weapons proliferation in West Africa

Light weapons proliferation is a serious problem in West Africa. A regional moratorium on imports of small arms and light weapons has not worked and UN arms embargoes on Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire have had limited impact. The Economic Community of West African States is currently drafting a new binding legal instrument aimed at controlling flows in West Africa but this will only succeed if the heads of state and government seriously adopt it. This needs to include greater compliance of UN sanctions, international reform of the End User Certificate system, mapping the spread of artisan production and an examination of ammunition imports to West Africa. Better control of ammunition imports in particular may assist the combat of light weapons proliferation as well as the comprehensive destruction of weapons from disarmament efforts. The illicit weapons trade in West Africa is increasingly transnational and it requires regional and international cooperation and support to combat it.     

Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces

Several factors explain the high level of support for non-strategic nuclear forces(NSNF) in Russia and the correspondingly limited interest in NSNF arms control. These include Russia's conventional military weakness, NATO's conventional military superiority, political assessments that portray NATO as threatening to Russia, and the several important functions assigned to Russia's nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular by Russian military doctrine and policy. The Russians have made it clear that they attach great importance to NSNF in a number of ways: in their preoccupations during the NATO-Russia Founding Act negotiations in 1996-7; in their recent military exercises; in their decisions regarding NSNF modernization; in their lack of transparency in implementing their 1991-2 commitments to reduce and eliminate certain types of NSNF; and in their discussions about possibly abandoning certain nuclear arms control commitments. Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced non-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to 'de-escalate' regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by the course of action some observers have advocated–a unilateral withdrawal of US NSNF from Europe. Such a withdrawal would, however, damage the Western alliance's security interests. NATO has adopted the most practical objective currently available: pursuing greater transparency regarding NSNF in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.     

English Clay Tobacco Pipes bearing the Royal Arms from Williamsburg,Virginia

Abstract

The heraldic changes in the royal coat of arms between 1688 and 1801 are noted. Tobacco pipes from Williamsburg bearing these arms during the early Hanoverian period are described. They are principally found on tavern sites, but the reason for this is uncertain. The pipes are of British manufacture and possible pipe-makers are discussed. A photographic technique using a rotating stand enables all the pipe bowl to be illustrated on one photograph.