The “Realism” of Augustine's “Political Realism”: Augustine and Machiavelli

Abstract

Arendt and Tocqueville both celebrate a participatory notion of political freedom, but they have a fundamental disagreement about the role that political education should play in fostering an active citizenry. I contrast Tocqueville's “educative” conception of politics with Arendt's “performative” conception, and I explore an important but little-noted difference between the two theorists: whereas Tocqueville argues that it is the task of statesmen “to educate democracy,” Arendt warns that those who seek to “educate” adults are inappropriately aspiring to be their “guardians.” I argue that although Arendt's warnings about the dangers of intertwining politics and education are at times salutary, Tocqueville is ultimately correct that education must be a key task of democratic leadership, and he is right to suggest that politics can itself be educative in crucial ways.     

Perspectives: On Political Science: Annual Index Volume 30, 2001

Abstract

Although Tocqueville called Jefferson “the greatest democrat, who has yet issued from within the American democracy,” a close reading of their works suggests that Tocqueville’s assessment of Jefferson was far more mixed than first appears. In the first section, I take up Jefferson’s understanding of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and offer arguments for why Tocqueville chose not to cite the Declaration in Democracy in America. Using those writings of Jefferson available to Tocqueville in French translation, I show that Tocqueville saw in Jefferson’s own understanding of those principles certain dangerous tendencies of the democratic mind. Yet there is one principle on which both agree: the natural right to political liberty and association. Section two compares their contrasting views of republican constitutionalism, taking into account Jefferson’s evolving views of republicanism as well as Tocqueville’s analysis of both the American constitution and his contributions to the committee that framed the French constitution in 1848. The concluding section analyzes their differing assessments of philosophical materialism and religion in preserving the political liberty both sought.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Two decades ago, in the summer of 1987, celebrations of the bicentennial of the United States Constitution were in high gear under the watchful eye of then recently retired Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who chaired the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution between 1985 and 1991. ¹ Numerous lectures, seminars, and conferences across the land made clear not only the role and value of what Chief Justice William Howard Taft once called “the ark of our covenant” ² in the life of the nation but also the central place the judiciary had long occupied in the political system, as state and national courts confronted vital questions of public policy perplexing and dividing the people. As that astute French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville first noted in 1835, the “American judge is dragged in spite of himself onto the political field . … There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” ³ With the “right to declare laws unconstitutional,” he explained, the judge “cannot compel the people to make laws, but at least he can constrain them to be faithful to their own laws and to remain in harmony with themselves.” ⁴     

Political Science in Mexico: Cold War and Post-Cold War Context

Abstract

Through a critical consideration of recent proposals urging the use of “citizen forums” or “mini-publics” on issues involving science, this article reflects on the challenge posed to democracy and democratic decision making by the intellectual authority of modern science. Though the danger of a descent into technocracy is real and pressing, arguably the most serious challenge to democracy today, these novel “deliberative democratic” institutions are unpromising as a corrective beyond the local level, and may actually exacerbate the problem. The article concludes with a consideration of alternatives.     

No Angst and All Play: Postmodernism and the Humanities

Abstract

There is widespread disagreement about Tocqueville's conception of human nature, some going so far as to say that Tocqueville possessed no unified conception of human nature at all. In this paper, I aim to provide the essential principles of Tocqueville's conception of human nature through an examination of the way in which he describes the power of human circumstances, such as physical environment, social state, and religion, to shape human character by extracting the principles underlying these transformations. There is no “natural man” or man “in the state of nature” but instead a set of psychic operations that reveal a picture of human nature in which human freedom, or the ability to initiate action in pursuit of important objects, lies at the heart of human life.     

Bibliography of articles and books dealing with seventeenth-century religious thought, 1975–1980

This essay examines Tocqueville's conception of the “social” against the background of debates over the relationship between the social and the political in France from the Revolution to mid-century. It focuses on three groups: those associated with the social philosophy of industrialisme, those concerned with the evils of pauperism from the standpoint of Catholic social reform, and those allied with the new Doctrinaire view of society and politics. It argues that Tocqueville consistently resisted the primacy of the “social” as articulated by these thinkers, even in the seductive form offered by François Guizot, whose influence on Tocqueville is examined in light of recent debates over this issue.     

James W. Ceaser's Contribution to Political Science Introduction

Abstract

A theme of interest in the process of democratic consolidation among comparative politics scholars is how political and nonpolitical variables, including economic and class issues, interrelate. Whereas the “transitions to democracy” literature conceptualizes the emergence of democratic regimes to be primarily an elite-driven political process, the actual consolidation of a democratic regime requires the active organization of civil sectors that then learn to live by and accept the outcomes of uncertain democratic governance. This “granting of stakes” in the new regime is perhaps best accomplished by the aggregation and articulation of interests among labor and business sectors in “civil society”—a term usefully defined by Alfred Stepan (1988) as manifold social movements from all classes organized to promote their interests. It is in this area that the interplay of political and economic interests is most clearly visible. Indeed, although elites can make decisions about the institutional, political, and economic future of a country in transition, they cannot guarantee that those decisions will be implemented or supported by the populace and that the incipient democratic system will stabilize. What is frequently neglected in elite-centered accounts of democratic transitions, then, is civil society and its links to elites through popular organizations.     

The Senzai Maru's visit to Shanghai and its understanding of China

ABSTRACT

The significance of the Senzai Maru’s 1862 journey to Shanghai was great. From this opportunity, Japan not only learned from its neighbor the danger of closing off one’s borders and refusing to change, but also the importance of expanding its horizons and “learning from the world.” From these lessons, Japan transitioned from “expelling barbarians” toward “enlightenment,” from conservative to “reformist.” After successfully overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan’s Meiji reforms thrived.     

Believing in the USA: Derrida,Melville and the Great American Charlatan

ABSTRACT

This essay considers the relationship between the prophet and the charlatan, particularly as they figure in the contemporary American political landscape. It argues that at moments of democratic political crisis these figures arise and reveal the vacancy of sovereignty within the democratic model. The essay treats Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man along with Jacques Derrida’s writings on democracy and the apocalyptic tone as resources in this endeavor. It considers as well why recent worries over the status of facts in the era of “fake news” have led to critiques of deconstruction.     

The Prophetic and the Limitation of Authority in Modernist Islam

ABSTRACT

The “prophetic”, as a central concept in modernist Islamic political philosophy, has been invoked to show that Islamic political philosophy takes into account the spiritual as well as the material world. However, this expansion of the prophetic had remained relatively silent as to the authority that is granted to experiencing individuals. This essay is a story of these reinterpretations the “prophetic” by three major Muslim thinkers – Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), Ali Shari‘ati (d. 1977), and Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945). Writing in different periods and trying to respond to different questions, these authors engaged with the question of politics by reference to prophetic experience. I will explain their intellectual context, according to their cosmologies and their notions of language (participation vs. representation). Then, I will see how in different intellectual context, the force of a democratic notion of the prophetic was undermined by different reinterpretations.     

The romance of the Inland Isle: Tocqueville's Democracy in America and the landscape of Providence

Nearly two centuries after its publication, Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1990a) remains among the most influential accounts of American political culture. This essay argues that the rhetorical foundation of the Democracy's enduring cultural power is its “imaginative geography” (Said 2000), about which I make two, interrelated claims. The first has to do with the Democracy's identification of the American land with divine Providence. I claim that the providential landscape is the chief means by which Tocqueville contains and organizes the account of the tension between achieved liberty and natural freedom that drives the Democracy. My second focus is on the romantic character of the providential landscape. Cosgrove (2005, p. 302) reflects upon the “tenacity of the island condition on the Western imagination” as frame and vessel of “imagination, desire, hopes and fears.” I argue that the Democracy's “Inland Isle,” as I call it, is a metaphorical island in this sense, and that its theoretical capacity and exhortative power derive from Tocqueville's use of an idiom expressive of a distinctively French tradition of landscape theorizing in which garden metaphor was used to construct meanings of equality and freedom, and voice and identity, in an emerging national, bourgeois order.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Some may be surprised to realize that nearly a half century has lapsed since publication of The American Supreme Court by Robert G. McCloskey. ¹ One reviewer praised the book as “unique,” one that could be read “profitably by layman, student, lawyer, and constitutional lawyer.” ² Readers familiar with that compact volume will recall the antinomy that the author put forward as the defining theme of American constitutional history: the tension between fundamental law and popular sovereignty. The latter suggests will and the former restraint. The antinomy is reflected in the founding documents of the Republic. The Declaration of Independence trumpets “inalienable rights” in the same paragraph that it emphasizes “government by the consent of the governed.” The Constitution, “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by “We the people,” insisted in Article VI that it “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” This conflict between equally valid principles lies at the heart of judicial review in the federal courts, where appointed and politically unaccountable judges sit in judgment on the actions of the politically accountable representatives of the people. In McCloskey's view, one principle “conjures up the vision of an active, positive state; the other emphasizes the negative, restrictive side of the political problem.” ³ Opposites though these principles are, Professor McCloskey emphasized that Americans have managed to cling simultaneously to both. “But like most successes in politics and elsewhere, this one had a price. The failure to resolve the conflict between popular sovereignty and fundamental law perhaps saved the latter principle, but by the same token it left the former intact. And this meant that fundamental law could be enforced only within delicately defined boundaries, that constitutional law, though not simply the creature of the popular will, nevertheless had always to reckon with it, that the mandates of the Supreme Court must be shaped with an eye not only to legal right and wrong, but with an eye to what popular opinion would tolerate.” ⁴     

Oppressive Rhyming: George Orwell on Poetry and Totalitarianism

In George Orwell’s 1984, the poet Ampleforth observes that “the whole history of English poetry has been determined by the fact that the English language lacks rhymes.” In this article I connect Ampleforth’s observation to Orwell’s many other writings on language and political control and then show how Orwell’s discussion of poetry’s resistance to political manipulation enhances Tocqueville’s and Burke’s accounts of totalitarianism. Specifically, Orwell illustrates how an easily “rhyming” polity is particularly vulnerable to totalitarian politics, while a society containing considerable disorder in its language and politics can be strongly resistant to such tyranny.     

Proceedings Of The Fourth Annual Meeting Of The European Association For The History Of Psychiatry (Eahp), The European Club For The History Of Neurology (Echn), And The International Society For The History Of The History Of The Neurosciences (Ishn)

Abstract

Osphresiology, though beginning with Aristotle, and the title of a classical monograph from 1819 by Cloquet, has, like the human sense of smell itself, played a relatively modest role, compared to other sensory functions. The anatomical and physiological connections of the nose to the brain proved to be more complex than those of sight, hearing and even touch, and were therefore poorly understood before the second half of the 19th century. Moreover, the close association between smell and taste gave rise to much controversy regarding the respective roles of the first and the fifth cranial nerves. Next, came the unfolding of the evolutionary influence of cerebral structure and function ‐ viz Broca's “limbic”; concept, and the “olfactory desert”; in the brains of “anosmatic”; animals. Jackson's “uncinate”; seizures featuring olfactory hallucinations brought the hippocampal formation into focus. Finally, there were the clinical manifestations of hyposmia and hyperosmia, from “coryza”;, the common cold, to injury or neoplasms causing hyposmia, as well as some endocrine alterations causing hyperosmia. (And let us not forget Charles Huysman's “Against the Grain”; and Marcel Proust's evocative fragrant madeleine.)     

The Picture of Artificial Intelligence and the Secularization of Thought

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critical interpretation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a philosophical notion which exemplifies a secular conception of thinking. One way in which AI notably differs from the conventional understanding of “thinking” is that, according to AI, “intelligence” or “thinking” does not necessarily require “life” as a precondition: that it is possible to have “thinking without life.” Building on Charles Taylor’s critical account of secularity as well as Hubert Dreyfus’ influential critique of AI, this article offers a theological analysis of AI’s “lifeless” picture of thinking in relation to the Augustinian conception of God as “Life itself.” Following this critical theological analysis, this article argues that AI’s notion of thinking promotes a societal privilege of certain rationalistic or calculative ways of thought over more existential or spiritual ways of thinking, and thereby fosters a secularization or de-spiritualization of thinking as an ethical human practice.     

The origin and evolution of the concept of mixin (superstition): A review of May Fourth scientific views

ABSTRACT

This article explores the evolving connotations of the concept of “superstition” up to the establishment of “superstition studies,” in an examination of the process of secularization experienced by early modern Chinese thought under the impact of Western science. In traditional texts, the Chinese term mixin (迷信, literally “delusional beliefs”), modernly translated as“superstition,” carries diverse and variable meanings: aside from referring to the proper or improper content of ideas and beliefs, mixin also has political connotations, broadly referring to beliefs or behaviors differing from the official rituals. On an ideological level, the traditional concept of mixin refers to a category of thought opposed to Confucian concepts such as the cosmology of Heaven, Earth, and Man, or the idea that “for a man to sacrifice to a spirit which does not belong to him is flattery.” In the late Qing Dynasty, as the idea of “superstition” as opposed to “science” was introduced via Japan, the traditional connotations of mixin evaporated, and it merged with other neologisms. From the late Qing to the early Republic, the parameters of “superstition” were expanded to encompass anything at odds with “reason.” This was also a reflection of China’s shift from the “Classical Age” to the “Age of Science,” as Confucian concepts and scientific ideas successively served as the criteria for judging “superstition.” As of the present, a consensus has yet to be reached on how to distinguish between “religion” and “superstition.” This paper shall seek to clarify the connotations of mixin or “superstition” in different contexts and their connection to the changing times, which may aid in understanding the complex facets of this issue.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

A persistent reality of constitutional government in the United States from practically the beginning of the Republic has been the close link between the Constitution itself and the Supreme Court. Oddly, this link derives more from the Constitution's impact on the American political system than from what the Constitution itself actually says or contains. True, Article III included cases “arising under this Constitution” in describing the proper reach of the federal judicial power, and Article VI specified that “[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land … ” ¹ But the document not only provided scant means for enforcing that supremacy, but also failed even to specify how this “supreme Law” should be interpreted. It soon became clear, however that the task of interpretation would fall upon the Supreme Court, as illustrated by Chisholm v. Georgia. ² In the face of assurances made by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and others during the ratification debates in 1787–1788 that a state could not, without its consent, be made a defendant in the federal courts by a citizen of another state, ³ the Justices in 1793 construed the language in Article III conferring the federal judicial power in suits “Between a State and Citizens of another State” to encompass a suit brought by a South Carolinian against the State of Georgia. The uproar that ensued prompted swift ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which reversed the Court's first excursion into the realm of constitutional interpretation. Despite this rebuke, it was only a short time before Chief Justice Marshall insisted that the judicial power encompassed the authority “to say what the law is.” ⁴ Thus, from the assumed role of expounding of the Constitution evolved the companion duty of guarding it as well.     

Anti-ism thinkers: The post-May Fourth schism in political thought

Abstract

This article is a continuation of “Advent of the Age of Isms,” which primarily discusses a period teeming with various “isms” (主義 zhuyi). During this time, there were in fact a number of figures who held overtly or covertly opposing attitudes, in both cases giving rise to a phenomenon of fragmentation and asystematicness. Whether consisting of negative responses to the new political theory of “isms,” this “remedy for all ills,” or of piecemeal, asystematic criticism, the phenomenon itself served as a foil to the colossal intellectual forces of the Age of “Ismization.” This article offers a preliminary discussion of this phenomenon.     

Kant and the Two Principles of Publicity

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to argue that the principle of “publicity” constitutes a fundamental idea in Kant’s political thought. Publicity provides a central insight that binds together various strands of Kant’s political writings (on issues as diverse as the question of Enlightenment, the right of revolution, historical teleology, reflective judgment, cosmopolitan citizenship, democratic peace, and republican government), and moreover, it offers a much-needed cornerstone for a systematic exposition of his nonexistent political philosophy. Apart from some eminent examples, publicity has been a rather neglected topic in the ever-expanding literature on Kant’s political ideas. Revisiting this notion will make us more attentive to his evocation of the “spirit of republicanism” over and above the letter of the law, and might prompt us to reconsider Kant’s reputation as a classical representative of liberal political thought. Indeed, it should inspire us to situate Kant’s appeal for the “public use of reason” in the vicinity of the republican ideal of political liberty.