中日早期招商局借款考

1877年前后,中日之间曾经有过一次鲜为人知的轮船招商局借款交涉。为筹集收购旗昌轮船公司的款项,招商局会办朱其诏曾经向日本探询借款之事,日本也派人到上海与其谈判。双方虽然有过几次会谈,但在抵押品、利息等问题上存在分歧。此议最终由于种种原因而不了了之。然而这次短暂的谈判却非常特殊,它不仅是招商局的首次对外借款交涉,还是近代中国的首批实业借款交涉之一,在近代中日经济关系史上也具有重要意义。     

衰落期的炮舰与外交——“紫石英”号事件中一些问题的再探讨

发生在中国人民解放军渡江前夕的“紫石英”号事件,可被视为英国炮舰外交在中国的彻底终结。但是,这一事件却未必是炮舰外交的产物。英国此时既无在中国推行炮舰外交的实力,也无推行炮舰外交的故意。事件发生后,经过数日的观察分析,中英双方都得出了这是一个偶然事件的正确判断。尽管如此,双方的谈判却历尽艰难。一开始双方在谈判级别和谈判内容上便分歧严重,纠缠了很长时间。究其原因,要害乃在于英方是否准备对事件做出道歉。6月下旬,中共做出一定让步,谈判出现一丝曙光,但这一曙光转瞬即逝。尽管英方曾为谈判解决事件继续做出一些努力和尝试,但由于它拒绝认错,谈判再次陷入僵局。无奈之中,英国人选择了乘黑夜逃遁的下策。以往的研究中存在一些史实讹误,需加以订正。从史料来看,英国政府绝无在谈判中正式认错道歉的可能,英舰的逃跑倒是为僵持不下的谈判做出了另类的了结。     

一杯咖啡智取日本绝密情报

1936年9月,因为“成都事件”（1936年8月,成都人民为反对日本在成都强行设领事馆,而自发殴毙两个日本人）,中日双方重开外交谈判。日本企图借此机会压迫南京接受“广田三原则”（由日本外相广田弘毅在1935年10月提出,其实质就是要求中国停止抗日活动,     

全面抗战爆发前后中英广梅铁路借款交涉

1937年1月初起,中英之间就广梅铁路借款进行了半年左右的谈判交涉,在中国的坚持和英方的努力下,英国突破了新四国银行团关于对华借款问题的限制,得以单独对华贷款,但在中国把中央银行改组为中央准备银行和提供盐余担保等问题上,双方一度僵持。全面抗战爆发后,中英双方均以更积极的态度推进谈判,对借款基本条件互相做出妥协,最终在7月30日签订了借款合同。广梅铁路借款虽因中日战事扩大未能在伦敦公开发行,但有关谈判交涉促进了战时中英财经合作的步伐。     

中日关于济案的交涉及其“解决”

济南惨案发生后 ,国民政府迫使日本将济案转入外交交涉 ,中日两国先后在南京、上海进行了近十次谈判 ,最终在秘密谈判中达成了“解决”的协议。中方以诸多的保证措施、甚至以承认北京政府时期日本在山东的权益和不平等条约为条件 ,换取了日本的撤兵 ,济案本质上并未“解决”。国民政府在济案交涉中的妥协 ,使其“革命外交”黯然失色 ,从一定意义上说 ,九一八以后的对日政策 ,实即肇端于济案交涉。     

“一·二八”战役中日停战谈判纪录(上)

1932年“一·二八刀淞沪战役后召开了由中日双方军事代表及中立国英、美、法、意驻华武官参加的军事停战谈判会议,就停战区域,中日双方驻兵区域及毗连地区之划分等问题进行了紧张激烈的谈判。虽然谈判结果是以中国方面的妥协退让而告结束,但中方谈判代表依然在交涉中对日方所提的许多无理要求进行了坚决的抗争。关于这次停战谈判的纪录对研究“一二八”之役及当时中日关系与各“中立国”对事变的态度均具价值,特自本馆所藏“军事委员会战时新闻检查局”档案全宗中选编此组史料刊布,以飨读者。文中所有英文注释均为钱金保所译,各件标题亦为原件所有,特此说明。     

争与让的变奏:民初昌黎事件之中日交涉

昌黎事件是指1913年9月11日京奉铁路昌黎车站日军驻兵残杀5名中国铁路巡警的事件。事件发生后,中日双方围绕责任问题展开反复的争辩和较量,最终彼此退让,以日方抚恤、道歉及惩兵的方式了结。这场中日之间的交涉,是在中日关系紧张复杂的形势下双方多层力量的交织博弈。中方因缺乏武力作外交支援,对日交涉在争与让之间变奏,最终未能使昌黎事件得到法律上的正当解决。日方则以武力威胁为辅对中方频施外交压力,在交涉中常居主动,最后虽做出让步,但免却了对凶手的法律追究,拒绝承担主要责任。昌黎事件实际上演变成中日双方争夺与退让变奏下的交涉事件,是民初中国外交的一个缩影。它表明,在强权政治时代,没有强大国力做依傍的外交话语是软弱的。     

顾维钧与美台关于沿海岛屿的交涉 (1954.12～1955.2)

《共同防御条约》签署后,台湾当局与美国围绕如何处置大陈及金门、马祖等岛屿展开了新一轮交涉,由于立场不同双方出现了分歧和矛盾。顾维钧在这一交涉中扮演了重要角色,他与蒋介石等对沿海岛屿可能导致“两个中国”问题的警觉,为台美之间最后达成关于沿海岛屿的协议设定了一个底线。     

1919年中英关于西藏问题的交涉

1919年中英就西藏问题进行了交涉。北京政府提出解决西藏问题的新建议。英国希望迅速解决西藏问题 ,交涉时在西藏与中国内地分界线问题上表现出灵活的立场 ,但北京政府突然中断谈判使其感觉受到了愚弄 ,并在外交上对中国进行了报复。日本干预西藏问题的谈判 ,遭到英国的强烈反对。北京政府采取“拖延”谈判的策略 ,对英交涉的立场也越来越强硬 ,最终挫败了英国迅速解决西藏问题、侵犯中国主权的图谋。     

从"满蒙交涉"看张作霖对日谋略

1915年日本逼迫袁世凯签订“二十一条”后,中日双方围绕“二十一条”中有关“南满洲及东部内蒙古”部分展开了长时间的交涉,史称“满蒙交涉”。交涉过程中,张作霖坚持抵制态度,并采取了为中央政府出谋划策、明应暗抗、以夷制夷和发展地方经济等具体措施,终使日本长期要求解决的“满蒙悬案”,一直“悬”到张作霖被炸。     

"周鸿庆事件"与美日台三角关系

1963年末发生的"周鸿庆事件"引发了台日关系的危机.在这场事件中,日本不顾台湾当局的压力,坚持允许周鸿庆返回大陆.在台湾看来,这是日本亲大陆的严重过失行为,因此对日采取了激烈的报复措施,台日矛盾激化,一度濒临"断交"的边缘.作为台日双方的盟友,美国利用驻台"大使馆"向台湾当局斡旋,不断对其施加压力.美国国务卿腊斯克也亲自访日、访台,为解决双方矛盾不遗余力.最终,在美国的调节下,台日双方各让一步,就此渡过了这场"外交"危机.在解决整个事件的过程中,美国的重要作用不可低估,同时,美国在远东的战略意图也反映得淋漓尽致.     

1962年《日英通商航海条约》谈判析论

1955年9月,日本正式加入关税与贸易总协定。以英国为首的14国对日援引关贸总协定第35条,拒绝给予日本最惠国待遇。为同英国签署通商航海条约,获得最惠国待遇,日本与英国展开了长期艰苦的谈判。谈判迁延日久,英国缺乏尽快缔约的动力,日本则缺乏推动缔约的筹码。1950年代末日本政府推动贸易自由化的决定直接推动了谈判进程。为与英国达成协议,换取英国最惠国待遇及其撤销对日援引第35条的承诺,日本不得不在保护条款与敏感清单这两大问题上做出让步。1962年《日英通商航海条约》构建了日英经贸关系的稳定框架,扫清了战后日英关系发展道路上的最大障碍,日英关系进入一个新阶段。该条约提升了日本的国际地位,但却是在日本做出重大让步的前提下缔结的,日本经济外交在收获了重大胜利的同时,也显露了自身的局限。     

执政府与沪案交涉的失败

沪案交涉是由执政府担当的,但执政府为延长其政治生命,只知利用五卅运动中的"民气"以对内,并没有真正谋划沪案交涉,导致交涉主张不统一,交涉策略不明朗,交涉步骤不一致;同时,各外交官员在开展外交时也进行"内争",相互推诿卸责,导致沪案交涉延宕;江苏地方官员和各派军阀也以外交之名,与中央一起争夺上海地盘;此外,沪案发生时,上海无军政大员负责的现状也影响到了沪案交涉的开局.这些才是沪案交涉无功而终的主要原因.     

Anglo-Iranian Treaty Negotiations: Reza Shah,Teymurtash and the British Government, 1927–32

From 1927 to 1932, wide-reaching negotiations took place between Reza Shah's court minister, ‘Abdolhossein Khan Teymurtash, and the British Legation in Tehran, the aim of which was to resolve all outstanding issues and to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of a general treaty. This article examines these Anglo-Iranian negotiations with a particular focus on the thorniest issues—Iran's territorial claims in the Persian Gulf, particularly its claims to sovereignty over Bahrain, Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. Though an agreement was never reached, an examination of the content and conduct of these negotiations offers some valuable insights into the unique features of Iranian nationalism and Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf during the Reza Shah period.     

Diplomatic compromises between the United States and Japan during the Nanjing Massacre

ABSTRACT

During its assault on Nanjing, the Japanese Army bombarded and sank the USS Panay, an American gunship, straining the relations between Japan and the United States. During the Nanjing Massacre, to ease tensions with the United States, Japan allowed the staff of the American embassy in Nanjing to make an early return to the city. While investigating allegations that Japanese troops had trespassed on American property and kidnapped and raped a Chinese woman, the American diplomat John M. Allison was struck in the face by a Japanese soldier. The U.S. government exerted pressure on Japan over what was referred to as the “Allison Incident”: under orders from Tokyo, the Japanese occupying force in Nanjing apologized to Allison and placed the officers and soldiers involved in the incident under court-martial. The incident was thereby resolved. However, amidst the furor of the “Allison Incident,” the Chinese woman who had been assaulted was forgotten by both the American and Japanese governments as well as by public opinion. The Japanese soldiers were placed under court-martial not for raping the Chinese woman, but rather for striking an American diplomat. The U.S. government received a great many reports on the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, but in policy and deed, the American response was limited to safeguarding its national interests in China.     

鸠山内阁时期中日、苏日关系比较研究

鸠山内阁时期,同属社会主义阵营的中苏两国都积极主张与日恢复邦交,苏日两国很快实现,而中日两国仍停留于民间交往。其原因是复杂的,文章着重从三个方面分析：1、在鸠山内阁外交战略中,日苏关系先于日中关系;2、中苏两国对日外交方式不同,苏联选择政府间的非正式外交方式,中国选择非政府间的民间交往方式;3、中苏两国对解决日俘、渔业等问题的认识不同,苏联将其视为邦交的资本,中国将其视为邦交的前提。     

Assessing the delimitation negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia1

The negotiations between Norway and Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, in the maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea have been going on for more than 30 years. Despite a declared will on both sides to reach an agreement, the prospect of an early settlement seems remote. Formally the delimitation problem concerns the distribution of the important economic resources in the area, i.e. petroleum and fish. In practice, however, the strategic importance of the area and the impact of the international context on the bilateral relationship have played an important role in the negotiations. As a result, the parties clearly have different preferences for a solution. Because there is no practical need for a solution and because the parties do not see the boundary dispute as a strain on their mutual relations, the prospect of an early settlement is dependent on the political will of both sides to bring this long-standing conflict to and end.     

Overcoming legacies of foreign policy (dis)interests in the negotiation of the European Union–Australia free trade agreement*

ABSTRACT

Despite a troubled trade history dominated by disputes over agriculture, the negotiation of a European Union (EU)–Australia free trade agreement (FTA) was initiated in 2015. The initiation of these negotiations was made possible because of the shift in EU trade policy towards the negotiation of what the EU terms ‘new generation free trade agreements’. The EU has concluded FTA negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada, and is negotiating other FTAs— notably with Japan and the USA . The EU faces many commercial challenges to its FTA negotiations that go beyond tariff reduction, including the protection of its geographical indicators, public procurement and investor–state dispute settlement. These issues are likely to be substantial features of any EU FTA with Australia. In addition to these challenges, the promotion of sustainable development interests and human rights through FTA negotiations is an important component of the EU’s approach. The EU’s position on the trade-related aspects of sustainable development and the negotiation of human rights conditionality has presented significant challenges to the EU’s trade agenda, particularly in negotiations with Canada and Singapore. This article draws lessons from the EU’s new generation trade agreement negotiations to date. It compares these negotiations with Australia’s approach to FTA negotiations, and analyses potential stumbling blocks for an EU–Australia FTA in light of past tensions in the relationship. The article argues that shifts in both EU and Australian trade policies and positive developments in the relationship mitigate past obstacles to a negotiated agreement. However, EU– Australia relations still suffer from the tyranny of distance. The resulting deficit in foreign policy salience between the EU and Australia broadens the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.     

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段是在1972年2月21～28日美国总统尼克松访华期间。谈判前夕,黑格访华,其名义上是为尼克松访华做技术上的准备,实际上是以苏联的军事威胁来吓唬中方,迫使中方在《上海公报》台湾问题上让步,但中方不为所动。《上海公报》谈判第二阶段共进行了六次谈判,双方在台湾问题、"人民要革命"以及双方都"不在亚太地区谋求霸权"的措辞上进行了争论。《上海公报》谈判最终取得了成功,其主要经验和启示是:应当从战略高度和长远角度来看待和处理中美关系;妥善处理台湾问题;认识和尊重差异,寻求和发展共同点。     

论中国对越美和谈态度的转变及其对中越关系的影响(1968～1971年)

中国领导人对越南战争的态度在1968～1971年间发生了转变,即1968年初至1969年上半年,坚决反对越南与美国谈判;1969年下半年至1970年8月,从不干涉越美和谈转变为支持越南谈判;1970年9月后,态度鲜明地支持和谈。中国前后两种立场都引起越南的强烈不满。虽然中国没有以牺牲越南的利益来换得中美关系的缓和,而且在自己并不富裕的条件下,仍给予了越南大量的无偿援助,但这些努力都没有改变越南对中国的不满、疑虑与不安。在中美缓和与越美谈判的进程中,中越关系却不断恶化,这为后来双方的冲突埋下了隐患。