ON LAWFULNESS IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is—or should be—is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward's notion of “invariance,” is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called “pragmatic laws” and “invariance” do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples—from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion—have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.     

Does Culture Evolve?

The drive to describe cultural history as an evolutionary process has two sources. One from within social theory is part of the impetus to convert social studies into "social sciences" providing them with the status accorded to the natural sciences. The other comes from within biology and biological anthropology in the belief that the theory of evolution must be universal in its application to all functions of all living organisms. The social--scientific theory of cultura evolution is pre-Darwinian, employing a developmental model of unfolding characterized by intrinsic directionality, by definable stages that succeed each other, and by some criterion of progress. It is arbitrary in its definitions of progress, and has had the political problem that a diachronic claim of cultural progress implies a synchronic differential valuation of present-day cultures. The biological scheme creates an isomorphism between the Darwinian mechanism of evolution and cultural history, postulating rules of cultural "mutation," cultural inheritance and some mechanism of natural selection among cultural alternatives. It uses simplistic ad hoc notions of individual acculturation and of the differential survival and reproduction of cultural elements. It is unclear what useful work is done by substituting the metaphor of evolution for history.     

Ivory towers? The commercial activity of British professors of engineering and physics, 1880–1914

Abstract

The involvement of British academic scientists in commercial work has been often discussed by historians of science and technology. However a systematic study of this activity is still lacking. Focussing on the period 1880 to 1914, I examine the engagement in consulting, patenting and entrepreneurial initiatives of a segment of that community, namely engineering and physics professors. I discuss the institutional context in which it occurred and their motivations. The survey highlights that the majority of the engineering professors examined were involved in consulting and patenting, and a significant number of them pursued also entrepreneurial activities. As for the physics professors, only a few followed the example of their engineering colleagues, but did so vigorously. I argue that far from being reluctantly brought into the market for knowledge, the engineering as well as the physics professors who engaged these extra-academic activities eagerly sought to partake in the commercialization of the products of their scientific work.     

Engineering as a Source of Scientific Ideas

Abstract

Engineering has discovered some laws of nature as limits to what can be done, from which have developed the sciences of thermodynamics, information theory and cybernetics. Considered as a science, engineering lies between physics and biology, because its machines have physical structures and properties but biological organizations and functions. The old idea of the living body as an engine retains its power in modern biology; and the reconsideration of various natural non-biological processes in terms of engineering and biological concept reveals inadequacies in modern physical theory.     

Le scepticisme et les hypothèses de la physique

The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century?     

An Apologia for Theoretical History

Karl Popper's critique of theoretical history remains formidable but contains serious flaws. Popper held erroneous views about the practice of the natural sciences and created overly severe strictures for theoretical statements in the social sciences. General theory and general theoretical statements play a legitimate role in the social sciences. Merton has promoted middle-range theories and models and Lakatos multiple ontologies. One can answer Popper's criticisms of either the impossibility or triviality of long-term historical laws by searching for stable constellations of local or middle-range laws rather than a universal law. Moreover, the successful use in the social sciences of various types of scales of measurement rather than an absolute scale shows that quantitative analysis is possible in history. Investigators need to find the boundaries, the frameworks of feasibility, in which historical trends and laws operate. Popper's maximalism plays into the irrationalist trends that he himself deplored. If historical investigators and theoreticians set appropriate goals for theoretical history, they can practice their discipline responsibly and find meanings, if not a single meaning, in history.     

Theology,Idolatry and Science: John Williams’ Missionary Ethnography and Natural History of the South Pacific

This article contributes to the recent scholarly efforts toward a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between Protestant missionaries and the practice of natural history and ethnography in the early nineteenth century. Exploring John Williams’ work in the South Pacific, I argue that not only was Williams practicing science in the form of ethnography and natural history, but that his theology was, in fact, central to his scientific work. Through a careful exploration of Williams’ account of his missionary activities in the South Pacific, I contend that Williams’ conception of idolatry served as an explanatory tool that shaped the practice of his ethnography. In the minds of missionaries like Williams, whereas Christianity’s truth was universal, idolatry was the worship of a false god: false because it was just a deification of a particular desire rather than worship of the universal God. This conception of idolatry shaped Williams’ contention, central to his ethnography, that the islanders’ religion was a product of their particular cultural needs. In this way, I argue, Williams used a theological concept to perform explanatory scientific work, contributing to the idea that religion is a product of culture, a notion that became central to nineteenth century studies of religion.     

An Approach to the Substantiation of Stochastic Conceptions in Geography

The penetration of stochastic-statistical conceptions into geography is viewed as a natural process in the history of development of science, as is seen from the history of physics and biology. Without denying the importance and the need for theoretical models constructed in geography on the basis of strict determinism, the authors stress the heuristic value that the stochastic-statistical methods have for an explanation of geographical phenomena. The authors suggest that Soviet geographers still have a preference for deterministic models based on the classic mathematical notions of exactly predictable relationships.     

HISTORY/PHILOSOPHY/SCIENCE: SOME LESSONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Rheinberger's brief history brings into sharp profile the importance of history of science for a philosophical understanding of historical practice. Rheinberger presents thought about the nature of science by leading scientists and their interpreters over the course of the twentieth century as emphasizing increasingly the local and developmental character of their learning practices, thus making the conception of knowledge dependent upon historical experience, “historicizing epistemology.” Linking his account of thought about science to his own work on “experimental systems,” I draw extensive parallels with other work in the local history of science (the ideas of Latour, Pickering, Rouse, and others) and consider the epistemological implications both for the relation between history and philosophy of science and between history and theory more broadly. In doing so, I suggest that the long‐standing gap between the natural sciences and history as a “human science” has been significantly bridged by the insistence upon the local, mediated, indeed “historicized epistemology” of actual science.     

Composing Einstein: exploring the kinship of art and science

Abstract

The work Albert Einstein published in 1905 led to a revolution in physics and the way nature is explained. At the same time, his physics touches on profound existential questions which are also dwelt upon in the arts. This article addresses the relatedness of music and physics, art and science. The point of departure is my composition The Einstein Resoundings, and how writing it refined my sensitivity to the deeper layers of creative effort. I discuss points of contact between the spheres of music and physics: the phenomenon of quantum leaps, continuous and discontinuous structures in tone and atom, and the role of continuity and discontinuity in the act of creation. My reflection on the kinship of art and science is based on the notion of complementarities. This allows a double perspective on art and science as different in regard to activity and language, but similar in regard to their mutually complementing characters.     

Surviving Between the Trenches: Planning Research,Methodology and Theory of Science

Planning research-understood as research aiming to improve the body of knowledge on which spatial planning is based-includes issues rooted both in the social sciences, natural science and the humanities. Spatial planners need knowledge about the likely consequences of different alternatives of action, as well as understanding of the role of plans and planning processes in the development of society. This is reflected in the two-fold focus of planning research on both substantive and procedural issues. Whereas research on the role of plans and planning processes takes place mainly within a non-positivist social science paradigm, the research aiming to provide planners with the knowledge needed in order to make good plans is often situated in the battlefield between opposing positions within theory of science. Because planning research has both society and the physical as its subject of inquiry, a reflective opinion about the interaction between the physical environment and human actions is crucial. Traditionally, many spatial planners have conceived of this in a quite näive way, assuming that human behaviour can to a high extent be shaped or controlled by manipulating the physical environment. During recent decades, this view has been sharply criticized by anti-positivist scholars, and some theorists point out the great uncertainty, close to impossibility, in predicting human actions, even at an aggregate scale. The latter position has dramatic implications to spatial planning, as it would then be impossible to assess whether a certain physical solution is likely to have positive or negative social and related environmental consequences, e.g. in terms of travelling distances and modal split. Our own position is that the physical environment, along with a number of individual and non-physical structural factors, influences human activities and quality of life. To some extent, this influence can be predicted at an aggregate scale, but not for a particular individual (except those actions rendered impossible by the laws of physics). How strong influence the physical environment exerts, is a question requiring empirical research in order to be answered.     

Populations and Climatic Evolution in North Tropical Africa from the End of the Neolithic to the Dawn of the Modern Era

At the end of the Neolithic Era, during the third millennium BCE, there were fewer humid periods, and the sub-Saharan and Sahelian zones from the Atlantic to Lake Chad assumed their current geographical form. Since then, the climate has continued undergoing major variations. The succession of climatic episodes, humid or dry, is pointed out along with the episodes’ complex interactions. These variations are placed in parallel to cultural phases of evolution in archaeology and history. Climate-related events have always had heavy consequences on the peopling of this vast region, often subject to extreme natural conditions. The relative synchronism between the principal cultural trends from west to east across the Sahel seems to have often been subject to swings in the climate and the resulting environmental changes.     

From universal history to globalism: What are and for what purposes do we study European ideas?

Globalism is probably the most frequently used term describing our current age. Found in many contexts, it is often a vague concept referring to a host of different figurations of post-industrial society. European expansion, the growth of the global economy, mass immigration and the planetary expansion of international relations are merely some of the phenomena associated with globalism. Yet globalism taken in its most neutral form of global history is not merely a trendy catch-all phrase for the challenges of our age but has its origins in the efforts of the enlightenment—to rewrite the theological universal histories of the Middle Ages. There is a close relationship between the historiography of universal history and the current ideology of globalism. By juxtaposing the two main strands of universal history (the universal history of mankind vs. the cyclical history of individual peoples) to the problem of European identity, I show that the theoretical problems which caused the demise of universal history continue to plague globalism. Such an analysis of the ideological foundations of globalism is central not only to the current debate on the (re-) construction of European history, but also in the discussion on what constitutes European ideas.     

On the Significance of Lenin's Ideas for Soviet Geography

The president of the Geographical Society USSR reviews the present state of Soviet geographic theory in the light of Leninist philosophy. The objective existence of natural regions with definite boundaries is affirmed. The approach of “social physics,” applying natural laws to social phenomena, is rejected. The use of mathematical techniques is welcomed, but not to the extent of giving rise to a separate discipline of “theoretical geography” that would deal with whatever is common to both physical and economic geography. The geographical environment is defined as that part of the earth's natural environment in which nature and society are in direct interaction. Both geographical determinism and social determinism (geographical nihilism) are rejected. The definition of geography as a system of scientific disciplines is affirmed, and a proposed redefinition of geography as dealing with the evolution and control of dynamic spatial systems is rejected.     

Erfahrung und Vorurteil im naturwissenschaftlichen Denken Johannes Keplers

The change from ancient and medieval to modern natural science, called Wende (instead of ‘revolution’), must be associated with the work of Johannes Kepler and not that of Nicolaus Copernicus. Copernicus merely showed the way, introducing heliocentricity as the order of the planets. This Wende resulted from the synthesis of several disciplines formerly isolated from each other, namely mathematical (i.e. hypothetical) astronomy, new physics, mathematical harmony, astrology, new physical optics, and natural theology. Whereas Copernicus united mathematical astronomy and peripatetic (Aristotelian) physics, Kepler was first to see the necessity for providing a physical explanation and an ontological foundation to the heliocentric system. He was the first to consider and measure the movement of the planets in depth. The elements for his new physics Kepler obtained not from newly observed data, but from a harmonic archetypus of the regular polyhedra fitted in between excentric planetary spheres. On the basis of this archetypus (which he considered to be God's model in creating the universe) he accepted the new heliocentric planetary system as a physical reality. That is why astronomy, by way of taking into account stereometric quantities, is, in Kepler's eyes, a kind of divine worship. Later, the best empirical data had also to be taken into consideration as a means of proving this a priori archetypus (Vorurteil, preconception). The result was, on the one hand, a universal natural science able to explain natural processes in grater abundance than ever before or since in the history of science. Although accepted only in parts, it resulted in founding a new natural science with adherent mathematical and empirical methods. It also led Kepler to establish, step by step, the elliptical path of the planets, thereby overcoming, for the first time, the two axioms of ancient astronomy, requiring uniform and circular planetary motion. It has been shown that this Keplerian Wende was possible only within the Historischen Erfahrungsraum (‘historical field of experience’) of Renaissance Humanism (cf. this Journal 9/1986, p. 201), which came about itself as the result of reactivating the scientific and philosophical thinking of the ancient Greeks and was accomplished by three steps (phases) relating to the revival of (1) original ancient writings, (2) the ancient knowledge of natural facts and data, and (3) the ancient scientific and philosophical ideas and mentalities (Drei-Phasen-Modell).     

In Praise of Interdisciplinary Archaeology

Abstract

The study of instabilities has long been a central aspect of physical theories and experimental investigation. Chaotic behaviour is a more recently recognized general feature of physical systems, expecially hard-driven dynamical systems. This review describes physical models illustrating these phenomena and seeks to indicate their application to understanding a variety of problems outside physics. Thus, the occurrence of instabilities is advanced as the reason why different sciences have developed independently, and why their results cannot be regarded as deducible from the fundamental laws of physics. In particular, sociology and political science are seen as attempting to deal with extreme cases of chaotic behaviour resulting from widespread instability. Finally, a simple physical model of stop-go oscillations is described, and interpreted as a warning against over-optimistic expectations that modern attempts at participatory democracy are compatible with a stable society.     

Making History, Talking about History

Making history—in the sense of writing it—is often set against talking about it, with most historians considering writing history to be better than talking about it. My aim in this article is to analyze the topic of making history versus talking about history in order to understand most historians' evident decision to ignore talking about history. Ultimately my goal is to determine whether it is possible to talk about history with any sense.
To this end, I will establish a typology of the different forms of talking practiced by historians, using a chronological approach, from the Greek andRoman emphasis on the visual witness to present-day narrativism and textual analysis. Having recognized the peculiar textual character of the historiographical work, I will then discuss whether one can speak of a method for analyzing historiographical works. After considering two possible approaches—the philosophy of science and literary criticism—I offer my own proposal. This involves breaking the dichotomy between making and talking about history, adopting a fuzzy method that overcomes the isolation of self-named scientific communities, and that destroys the barriers among disciplines that work with the same texts but often from mutually excluding perspectives. Talking about history is only possible if one knows about history and about its sources and methods, but also about the foundations of the other social sciences and about the continuing importance of traditional philosophical problems of Western thought in the fields of history and the human sciences.     

The search for historical experience

In the first part of my paper I will try to reconstruct a series of attempts at dialogue between history and the social sciences made by historians connected with the “Annales” (Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Giovanni Levi, Bernard Lepetit). What these attempts have in common is the idea that in history, as in the natural sciences, it is to some extent possible to carry out forms of experimentation on the sources, and that the inclusion of history among the human sciences, and even the scientific future of the discipline itself, ultimately depend on the adoption of this method. In the second part I will discuss the relationship that links historical experimentation with lived experience, and I will conclude by discussing the possible meaning of the idea of experimenting with the sources of history.     

Über Georges Canguilhems Was heißt eine wissenschaftliche Ideologie? und über deutsch‐französische Beiträge zum Thema Wissenschaft und Ideologie aus den letzten vierzig Jahren

On Georges Canguilhem's What does a Scientific Ideology mean? and on French‐German Contributions on Science and Ideology in the Last Fourty Years. This paper is based on Canguilhem's text on the concept of scientific ideology, which he introduced in 1969. We describe Canguilhem's attempts at designing a methodological framework for the history of science including the status of kinds of knowledge related to science, like scientific ideologies preceding particular scientific domains (like ideologies about inheritance before Mendel, or Spencer's universal evolutionary laws preceding Darwin). This attempt at picturing the relationships between science and ideology is compared with Jürgen Habermas's book Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’ in 1968. The philosphical issue of human normativity provides the framework of this discussion.     

What Is and Isn't in a Name

Although I remain sympathetic to the narrative behind the notion of “History of Knowledge,” I argue against redrawing the disciplinary boundaries around “knowledge,” as opposed to retaining the term “science.” This is not because I think there is no place for a “history of knowledge,” and not because I am concerned that such a redrawing of disciplinary boundaries would open the floodgates of “anything goes.” Rather, I am doubtful that problems of demarcation and exclusion can be resolved solely by changing a name. I draw on my personal experience as an East Asianist to suggest that the challenges I faced trying to fit into the community of historians of science and technology would not have been solved by renaming the discipline. At the same time, I also argue that changes can and do happen without a change of name. And finally, I maintain that the word “science” has important connotations that we do not want to give up.