十九世纪后半叶西方列强在“非洲之角”的角逐和索马里的被分割

“非洲之角”主要指的是今日的埃塞俄比亚、索马里和吉布堤等三个国家。埃塞俄比亚是一个有悠久历史的文明古国。可是从十八世纪末叶起,由于各公国之间争夺王位的斗争连绵不断,因此,长期处于封建割据状态,只是到十九世纪五、六十年代以后,才逐渐成为一个统一的中央集权国家。在索马里这块辽阔的土地上,居住着属于含族的索马里人,人们以畜牧为生,逐水草而居。直到十九世纪,索马里还处于部落社会阶段,各地部落酋长是当地的最高统治者,在这里还未形成一个真正的统一的国家。最早与“非洲之角”发生关系的是埃及人和来自阿拉伯半岛的阿拉伯商人。公元七世纪,伊斯兰     

持久的不均衡:战后美日、美韩联盟比较研究

美日、美韩联盟自其在冷战中形成以来,便在美国的亚太联盟战略考量中具有不均衡的地位。美日联盟长期以来是美国亚太战略的核心,具有更高的战略和政治价值,而美韩联盟则更多的是一种军事联盟,主要目的是为了对付直接的军事威胁。缘此,在后冷战时代,美日、美韩联盟继续呈现出不同的演变方式,美日联盟继续深化扩展,而美韩联盟则表现出越来越漂移不定的状态。     

美国对印度第一个五年国防计划的援助和限制(1962—1965)北大核心

1962年中印边界发生冲突,为美国与印度形成遏制中国的战略共识及较为密切的军事关系提供了契机。印度尼赫鲁政府对国防政策进行全面反思与整顿,制定出以中国为主要军事防范对象的长期国防计划,并寻求美国和苏联等大国对其国防建设的支持。出于拉拢印度、遏制中国的冷战目标,约翰逊政府延续肯尼迪时期的基本政策,继续向印度提供较大规模的军事援助,不仅以此为筹码要求印度修改国防计划,而且试图索要更多的政治回报。围绕对“中国威胁”的判断和应对方式、国防建设的目标和手段等诸多核心问题,美印存在明显分歧。这些分歧反映的是美国在亚洲遏制中国的冷战目标与印度加快军事现代化进程的国家利益之间的抵牾,决定了美印关系发展的限度。无论是冷战时期还是今天,遏制中国的战略共识虽然能促成美印关系迅速升温,但不足以弥合二者国家利益的根本差异。     

论里根政府时期的中美战略关系

里根上台执政后决定与中国建立战略联系,以共同应对苏联的威胁。20世纪80年代中后期,中美两国实现了高层互访以及武器出售、高技术转让等军事交流,形成了联合抵制苏联扩张的合作关系。但由于1989年东欧剧变、苏联威胁逐渐消失等冷战形势的变化,加之中美间固有的台湾问题、意识形态等矛盾,导致两国战略联系在1989年因为一个政治导火索而走向终结,中美关系跌入低谷。     

浅析20世纪50～60年代美国对台湾的援助政策

20世纪50到60年代,美国对台湾提供了大量的军事援助和经济援助。对台湾的经济援助主要是为了军事援助而服务的。这些援助帮助国民党政府稳定了统治,增强了其军事实力,使其有能力与中共进行长期相抗衡。同时,这些援助政策使得美国获得了台湾这个远东军事基地,使得台湾在未来的经济、外交等对美国的依赖性大大增加。     

冷战与大西洋联盟的变迁

在近半个世纪的冷战中,出于共同的政治军事需要一对抗共产主义意识形态和苏联,美国与欧洲,当时是西欧,结戍了跨大西洋军事政治联盟,北约成为这种同盟关系的标志与纽带。虽时有矛盾与摩擦,但在冷战框架中还不足以动摇两岸的联盟关系。冷战的结束使这种同盟关系失去了赖以存在的最坚实的军事政治基础,因而也必然使大西洋联盟的延续受到质疑。然而,后冷战时期依然存在的共同的战略利益使继续保持传统的大西洋联盟成为双方的战略共识,合作构成美欧关系的主导方向。不过,这种同盟的战略目标,双方合作的领域与地域以及在联盟关系中的相互位置都与冷战时期有所不同。     

凭海制陆：美国印度洋战略的起源(1963—1966)

从美国印度洋战略的起源来看,国际格局和亚太地缘形势的演变在其中发挥着深刻的作用。20世纪50年代中期,美国军方提出“战略岛屿概念”并试图循着这一思路在印度洋构建起可靠的战略支点,但美国高层未能形成共识。中印边境战争及其结果强化了美国的“中国威胁”认知,其间美国又因在印度洋缺乏可靠军事存在而在对印度提供军事援助时颇感压力。在原有的南亚政策难以为继后,为遏制社会主义国家对南亚的渗透和保障自身地缘战略地位,美国决定在印度洋建立起实质性且具威慑力的军事存在。在1963年至1966年,美国筹划并实施印度洋航母特遣队计划,于1964年4月派遣“协和中队”首次巡航印度洋;同时启动印度洋战略岛屿开发计划,于1965年、1966年相继取得关键进展。总之,1963年至1966年是美国印度洋战略的奠基时期,印度洋航母特遣队计划和印度洋战略岛屿开发计划是其核心内容,一体两面。美国自此逐步进入全面战略布局印度洋的新阶段,印度洋渐从美国全球战略的边缘移向中心。     

冷战初期美国对拉美外交政策的转变

冷战初期,杜鲁门政府通过组建美洲政治军事集团、提供军事援助完成了战后美国对拉美政策的第一次转变,即由反法西斯的外部入侵向抵御共产主义的外部影响,同时奠定了冷战时期美国对拉美政策的基调——战略利益是防止共产主义在拉美扩大影响,经济利益是促进美国在拉美的自由贸易和投资。第一届艾森豪威尔政府的拉美政策基本遵循了这一原则。20世纪50年代中后期,美国的战略优势地位不断下降,第二届艾森豪威尔政府通过对拉美政策的两次调整实现了第二次转变:战略目光由重点关注冷战前线地区演变为前线和后方兼顾,开始更多地关注拉美等第三世界国家和地区的冷战形势;战略手法由强调军事援助,逐渐演变为突出经济援助和经济建设,以遏制共产主义在拉美的发展。     

1965年印巴战争与美国的反应和政策

1965年印巴战争不仅是印度和巴基斯坦在克什米尔问题上矛盾和冲突发展的结果,更为重要的是,这还是1962年中印边界冲突后大国关系在南亚地区变化的直接结果。1962年中印边界冲突之后,美国决策者把遏制中国作为其南亚地区政策的核心,同时以军事援助和经济援助作为实现其南亚政策目标的主要手段。但是,美国的政策中存在着援助印度对抗中国与同时发展同巴基斯坦的同盟关系之间不可调和的矛盾。美国对1965年印巴战争的反应和政策,就是以不介入及以停止援助作为迫使印巴接受停火的压力,而这在很大程度上是对巴基斯坦发展同中国关系的惩罚。美国的政策实际上丧失了对印巴两国施加影响的渠道,这不仅使得苏联在调停印巴关系中发挥了主导作用,而且也导致苏联在1965年印巴战争后大力援助印度并发展同巴基斯坦的关系以及巴基斯坦发展和密切同苏联及中国的关系,美国在南亚地区的影响迅速减退。美国对1965年印巴战争的反应和政策表明,以对外援助作为实现美国在第三世界的战略目标的主要手段,其作用和影响力是极其有限的。     

《世界遗产评论》总第51期

本期《世界遗产评论》聚焦保护圣地：世界遗产面临的巨大挑战、世界精神遗产之峰和在乌奴奴和卡他茱达国家公园的澳大利亚沙漠腹地的世界遗产。特别报道介绍了重竖埃塞俄比亚阿克苏姆方尖碑,以及古代埃塞俄比亚首都的历史与考古、在埃塞俄比亚阿克苏姆世界遗产遗址进行的考古发掘等相关工程项目。     

1962年中印边界冲突与美巴关系

本文认为1962年中印边界冲突前,随着美国南亚政策的调整,美巴的盟友关系出现了潜在的裂缝.中印边界冲突发生后,美国在未同巴基斯坦磋商的情况下向印度提供军事援助,导致美巴关系fla～T危机.冲突停止后,美巴关系继续恶化,1965年印巴战争爆发后降到了历史的最低点.本文也认为美巴关系发生剧变有非常复杂的原因.     

The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic

The relative alacrity with which the United States accepted the collapse of the Fourth Republic in France in May 1958 stands in marked contrast to the obsessive concern with French internal stability that characterized the earlier postwar period of U.S.-French relations. Indeed, the Americans appear to have played a considerable role in undermining the very stability of the regime they had done so much since 1947 to help preserve. Much had changed in the intervening period that helps explain the revised American attitude. The French economy, precarious and dependent on American assistance in the years 1947 to 1952, was now robust and growing, and the threat of the French Communist party, which the Americans believed strong enough to seize power virtually at will in 1947, was now much reduced. The French army had been built by Washington into a powerful military force, meant to be the linchpin of European defense against a Soviet invasion, but it was now heavily embroiled in Algeria, and its role was on the way to being assumed by a restored German army, negotiated on the heels of the failure to construct a European Defense Community in 1954.¹ Finally, in the immediate postwar period, Paris and Washington had acted as allies, the United States offering military assistance and almost fully financing the Indochina War by 1953, although the French goal, to preserve their crumbling empire, became obscured by the American obsession with the possible expansion of Soviet power. In Algeria, in contrast, the conflict began in November 1954, following the humiliating French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and withdrawal from Indochina. In the absence of communism as a salient issue, American anticolonial attitudes came into play, and frustration grew with the French inability to bring a conclusion to a war that, as viewed in Washington, increasingly appeared to play into the hands of Soviet ambitions.     

杜勒斯与美国的琉球政策(1950-1951)

如何处理琉球群岛,是美国战后对日和约中需要解决的主要问题之一。1950年4月,杜勒斯被杜鲁门总统任命为国务卿顾问,负责对日和约问题。当时,美国政府内部特别是军方和国务院之间对此存在争论和分歧。杜勒斯因应美国遏制共产主义发展的亚洲政策主要目标,与美国政府内部各方、美国各盟国、苏联、日本等折冲博弈,基本上界定了琉球政策的框架。为满足各方需求,杜勒斯创造了“剩余主权”这一全新概念,通过《旧金山和约》确保了在联合国托管的名义下,美国对北纬29度以南的琉球群岛进行排他性战略控制。同时,杜勒斯主导了《美日安保条约》《美澳新安全条约》《美菲共同防御条约》的形成,初步构建了美国在亚太地区以琉球群岛军事基地为核心的防卫体系。     

The Alliance for Progress and President João Goulart’s Three-Year Plan: the deterioration of U.S.-Brazilian Relations in Cold War Brazil (1962)

This paper analyses U.S.-Brazilian relations during the elaboration of João Goulart’s Three-Year Plan in late 1962, which sought to tackle Brazil’s severe economic imbalances without compromising growth and through the implementation of distributive reforms. Although the plan followed the principles of John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, Washington did not offer adequate assistance because of Goulart’s threats to increase links with the Soviet bloc. The United States hardened its position, seeking to change the orientation of the Brazilian government. This led to the abandonment of the Three-Year Plan, and contributed to social and political destabilisation that resulted in Brazil’s March 1964 military coup.     

试析美苏建交的历史背景及原因

1929-1933年世界性经济危机使美苏关系发生了深刻变化.身受经济危机困扰的美国迫切需要将苏联作为重要的商品销售市场和原料供应地.伴随着经济危机的加深,日德法西斯势力开始了疯狂的侵略扩张活动,严重影响了美苏自身的安全和世界和平.在不断变化的国际政治现实面前,奉行现实主义外交政策的罗斯福总统终于打开了与苏联建立外交关系的大门.     

The Resilience of a Frontier: Ottoman and Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, 1871–1990

With the advent of independence, Pakistan almost immediately became embroiled in the hegemonic struggle of the cold war. Courted by the United States for its strategic North-West Frontier, Pakistan quickly became a Western ally. Fears of tribal unrest in the region and conflicting Pakistani and Afghan claims to the frontier, however, soon complicated the United States’ broader strategic vision. As Afghanistan continued to call for the establishment of an autonomous ‘Pakhtunistan’ comprising the North-West Frontier settled districts and tribal zone - and threatened to turn to the Soviet Union if US policy-makers did not support the Afghan position - US officials were torn between their official alliance with Pakistan and their desire to prevent a Soviet–Afghan understanding. Mirroring circumstances elsewhere in the Third World, local conflicts on the North-West Frontier mired US strategists’ wider plans for spreading Western influence. Officials ultimately opted for a flawed neutral position, angering the Pakistan government and alienating the Afghans. The US position towards the North-West Frontier - or lack thereof - eventually resulted in failure and a continued impasse in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.     

试论1949～1959年中苏关系中的美国因素

1949～1959年的中苏关系,经历了从走向结盟到蜜月合作再到出现公开分歧的发展历程。美国作为影响中苏关系的一个外部因素,其制定的分裂中苏关系的楔子战略也经历了三个不同的发展阶段:从第一阶段以中国作为主要突破口,通过所谓灵活政策来阻止中苏结盟;到第二阶段仍以中国为主要突破口,通过强硬政策致力于分裂中苏的长远目标;再到第三阶段以苏联为主要突破口,通过软硬分施的策略来推动中苏同盟走向分裂。楔子战略的侧重点和实施手段不尽相同,效果也前后有别。     

British Policy Towards Military Cooperation with the Republic of South Africa, 1961–1975

The early 1960s were a turbulent time in South Africa; the Sharpeville Massacre provoked condemnation from the international community, which, with the acceleration of decolonisation, was turning increasingly against Pretoria. The decision to withdraw its re-application to the Commonwealth in October 1960 further isolated South Africa. Despite this, UK–South African military cooperation remained largely unaffected until the pivotal Simonstown Agreement's termination in 1975. This article explores this relationship and explains why British policy-makers consistently maintained links with an overtly racist regime. UK–South African military cooperation was persistently controversial and engendered frequent criticism from African members of the Commonwealth and from campaigning groups such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, whose membership included Labour ministers. Concurrently, Pretoria was viewed as an important Cold War ally, particularly in the context of the build-up of Soviet naval incursions into the Indian Ocean from 1968 onwards. This article will analyse how British officials attempted to navigate its military relations with South Africa under such heated circumstances.     

Filling the Void?: Anglo-American Strategic Relations,Philippine Independence,and the Containment of Japan, 1932–1937

The declaration in 1932 of the United States to allow Philippine independence in March 1934 was an act that had a number of unintended consequences for the stability of the Far Eastern balance of power system. Given the state of tension existing in the international system between the major actors in the region: Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, any movement in the existing boundaries of the international spheres of influence between them could generate a significant destabilizing reaction. The American proposal to allow Philippine independence was such an act. If America surrendered its position and interests in the Philippines, who would replace it? What would happen if it was not replaced? Was it realistic, given the nature of the international competition for resources and strategic position, all linked to the creation and use of maritime power, that the Philippines could exist ‘on its own..’. This essay will analyse how the United States and Great Britain dealt with this instability, as well as how those interactions allowed a closer and more harmonious Anglo-American informal strategic relationship to be developed. That relationship would thereafter evolve into a collaborative alliance aimed at deterring further Japanese expansion.     

中国核武器的发展与中苏关系的破裂(1954-1962)(连载一)

近年来中国发展核武器的问题在中苏关系的演进中,特别是在中苏关系破裂中的作用引起学术界的重视.作者根据陆续出版和解密的中国和苏联方面的相关文献档案,对中国发展核武器的基本战略考虑、中国核武器的发展与中苏关系演进的互动关系、苏联政策的变化的动因以及此种变化对中苏关系破裂的影响进行深入分析:认为中国核武器的发展与中苏关系的破裂是一个互动的过程.中国发展核武器在当时背景下,只能争取苏联的援助,苏联向中国提供发展核武器的技术,有其特殊历史背景.1958年下半年后,随着两国在意识形态、对时代和国际形势以及核武器的态度等问题产生重大分歧,这些事件直接或间接促使苏联停止援助中国发展核武器.这成为中苏关系破裂的重要标志,也成为日后中苏论战的一个重要论题.