“黑色大西洋”:近年来国外学界有关非洲在大西洋史中的地位与作用的研究

大西洋史研究主要关注15世纪末至19世纪上半叶欧洲、美洲与非洲之间的跨大西洋联系。自20世纪90年代以来,一些非洲史学家以及关注美洲与非洲之间历史联系的美洲史学家对以往大西洋史研究存在的“欧洲中心论”提出质疑,他们倡导“黑色大西洋”的概念。这些研究在强调大西洋世界形成过程对于非洲造成严重暴力与剥削的前提下,尤其关注非洲社会在跨大西洋联系形成过程中的能动作用。相关研究涉及非洲奴隶贸易与大西洋世界的形成、与非洲联系对美洲文明的影响、非洲裔美洲移民文化的起源、大西洋联系对于非洲社会的影响等重要论题。这些研究关注的是跨越殖民地或者民族国家地理范畴的历史动力,在很大程度上纠正了大西洋史研究中存在的严重缺陷,并且也极大地拓展了非洲史的研究领域,有助于深入认识非洲在世界历史进程中的贡献。     

新中国打破美国封锁禁运的重要桥梁——莫斯科国际经济会议

第二次世界大战结束后,东西方之间陷入冷战局面,以美国为首的西方阵营开始对以苏联为首的东方阵营实施封锁禁运,东西方经济联系被人为地割裂开来。为了打破美国的封锁禁运,促进东西方经济合作,在苏联政府的支持下,由东西方国家的一些民间组织和进步人士发起,于1952年4月在莫斯科召开了国际经济会议。新中国派代表参加了这次会议,并在会议上极大地拓展了对西方国家的贸易渠道。     

冷战与大西洋联盟的变迁

在近半个世纪的冷战中,出于共同的政治军事需要一对抗共产主义意识形态和苏联,美国与欧洲,当时是西欧,结戍了跨大西洋军事政治联盟,北约成为这种同盟关系的标志与纽带。虽时有矛盾与摩擦,但在冷战框架中还不足以动摇两岸的联盟关系。冷战的结束使这种同盟关系失去了赖以存在的最坚实的军事政治基础,因而也必然使大西洋联盟的延续受到质疑。然而,后冷战时期依然存在的共同的战略利益使继续保持传统的大西洋联盟成为双方的战略共识,合作构成美欧关系的主导方向。不过,这种同盟的战略目标,双方合作的领域与地域以及在联盟关系中的相互位置都与冷战时期有所不同。     

方兴未艾的大西洋史

第二次世界大战之后,"大西洋共同体"和"大西洋世界"等概念出现于欧美的政治和学术研究中,并逐渐发展成为一个热门研究领域,吸引了世界各地优秀学者的研究兴趣。本文从学理出发,综述了西方史学界对大西洋史的定义;在介绍大西洋史在西方兴起的背景时,重点分析了冷战时期的国际局势及史学研究等因素对大西洋史发展的推动作用;在综述大西洋史研究成果的同时,将欧美研究大西洋史的学者及其论著大致归为三类,并在肯定其成就的基础上,指出了这些研究的不足与缺陷。目前大西洋史研究的重要缺点之一是表现出强烈的"欧洲中心论"色彩,非洲及大西洋沿岸的非洲人没有得到应有的重视,大西洋史家也很少关注美洲印第安各族。这样的大西洋史将是不完善的。     

北约组织对苏联能源设备禁运政策的缘起与影响

在推动北约组织对苏联禁运能源设备的过程中,美国最初要求日本和西欧国家限制向苏联出口油轮,其后转向推动北约组织建立关于苏联石油问题的特别研究机构,提议对苏联禁运能源设备,与北约成员国以及日本进行外交交涉。北约组织对苏联禁运能源设备,开创了美国利用国际防务机制推行对苏经济遏制战略的先例,也是冷战时期东西方贸易管制政策史上的特例。此后,美国重新利用巴黎统筹委员会推进对苏经济遏制战略。这种差异在很大程度上反映了美国政府汲取了北约组织对苏联禁运能源设备政策的教训,超越了北约组织对苏联禁运能源设备政策的框架。     

中世纪东西方社会与现代转型——中国世界中世纪史学会第八次代表大会暨学术研讨会综述

<正>2015年9月18日至21日,由中国世界古代中世纪史研究会世界中世纪史专业委员会主办、江苏师范大学历史文化与旅游学院承办,中国世界中世纪史学会第八次代表大会暨学术研讨会在徐州召开。来自北京大学、复旦大学、天津师范大学、中国社会科学院、英国伯明翰大学、法国社会高等研究院等70家国内外高等院校和科研院所的P30余名专家学者参加会议。围绕大会主题"中世纪东西方社会与现代转型"北京大学朱孝远教授、天津师范大学王亚平     

跨国史视角下的冷战终结北大核心

关于冷战终结问题的研究不能仅仅考察相关国家政府的战略、政策和行动,还应该采用跨国史的视角关注非国家行为体的作用。以“帕格沃什科学与世界事务会议”“防止核战国际医生组织”“裁军与安全问题独立委员会”为代表的跨国组织参与塑造了美苏两国领导人的安全观念,推动美苏之间的地缘政治对抗和核军备竞赛走向终结。而以“赫尔辛基观察”为核心的跨国人权网络改变了苏联和东欧国家领导人的人权观念,缓解了东西方之间的意识形态对抗,促进了东欧剧变,推动了冷战的终结。对跨国力量的关注可以开辟很多新题材和新领域,将更多的行为体纳入学者的视野,拓展和深化对冷战终结问题乃至整个冷战进程的理解。     

读万卷书行万里路--魏宏运先生访谈录

魏宏运教授是中国现代史研究的知名专家,是20世纪50年代最早投身中国现代史研究的学者之一。他在主持华北抗日根据地史料的收集整理,率先与国外学者合作进行口述史调查研究,改进、拓宽民国社会史研究的方法与领域,培养中国现代史研究领域的年轻学者,积极推动中国现代史研究参与国际学术交流等方面,做出卓越的成就。     

由东西方姓名看其文化之异同

姓名是社会文化的反映,本文主要以中、俄、英、美四国为例,对东西方姓名文化的不同点,主要从姓与名产生的时间先后,姓与名的排列顺序及姓名的文化色彩三方面进行了比较。通过对东西方姓名文化的异同点进行分析、比较,回顾姓名的发展演变史,旨在了解影响东西方人命名的社会文化因素,从而加深对东西方各民族的融合、交流与合作。     

多维视野下的西方“军事革命”研究

西方学界的“军事革命”研究,是“新军事史”范式下的分支领域,集中考察近代早期欧洲社会文化转型、现代国家形成及世界格局转型,致力于以军事因素阐释现代世界起源。在社会文化史路径下,“军事革命”研究关注欧洲贵族与士兵境况及“军事启蒙运动”,并与其他“新军事史”研究形成互补关系;在“国家形成”论题中,“军事革命”研究与历史社会学存在跨学科关联;而在全球史视野下,“军事革命”与欧洲崛起之间的因果关系遭到质疑和挑战,亚洲“军事革命”转而成为新的研究重点,“军事革命”因此超出欧洲范围成为全球史研究重要领域。“军事革命”研究的发展体现了西方学术革新进程,为国内学界相关研究提供了重要参考。     

Nixon's Coup: Establishing the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1969–70

In early 1969 the new US President, Richard Nixon, suggested the expansion of allied political consultation, as well as the setting up of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committee which would deal with environmental problems. The Americans stressed that their proposal did not involve merely the technical aspects of environmental protection, but also the need for modern governance to evolve in order to safeguard the ‘quality of life’, a prime aspect affecting the legitimisation of the political and social systems. The US proposal was not received enthusiastically by the allies, who had little desire for radical changes, and did not regard this as a proper subject for the alliance; some even feared that a NATO role in environmental questions might mask a US disengagement from European security, especially during an era of détente. However, after making sure that the new committee would be fully under the control of the Council (in accordance with NATO's inter-governmental character), the allies finally agreed to its creation. The NATO discussions on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) point to the emergence of a new, more complex international agenda, and raise interesting questions regarding transatlantic relations during an era of wider transitions.     

CANADIAN NOVELS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND HISTORIANS

Most discussions about the impact of Afghanistan on the future of NATO focus on transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Union. But for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed into the south, facing heavy resistance and fighting from Taliban insurgents, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic Alliance. While this may seem surprising, given the cutbacks in Canadian defense spending in the 1990s and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany, it should not. For during that so-called dark decade, Canada continued to make major contributions to NATO and European security. This essay argues that Ottawa's multi-faceted military and political support of the “new” NATO of the post–Cold War era continued when the alliance undertook its involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, in its efforts in support of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the alliance that seems stronger than NATO's collective commitment to itself.     

Rommel's Desert War

The article discusses why and how the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European allies came to hold such divergent opinions over what was at stake in Vietnam. It also examines how European reluctance to fight alongside the United States in South-East Asia affected relations within NATO. The voices of the smaller NATO members will also be considered. The article concludes that the transatlantic rift was contained not just because of cold-war realities but also because the Johnson and Nixon administrations took steps to repair the transatlantic relationship and because European integration acted as a binding force.     

Helmut Schmidt and the Shaping of Western Security in the Late 1970s: the Guadeloupe Summit of 1979

On 5 and 6 January 1979, US President Jimmy Carter, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. These secret talks à quatre were intended to be a relaxed frank and free exchange on the current state of global politics, though Western security issues lay at the discussions’ heart. As we now know, it had been Schmidt who, behind the scenes, had been pressing the Carter administration to pursue informal (transatlantic) summitry - the Chancellor's preferred modus operandi. In view of growing Euro-strategic imbalances due to Soviet arms build-up, he sought to achieve political co-ordination among the key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) players on the theatre-nuclear-forces-modernisation-cum-arms-control issue. Schmidt's pushiness reflected West Germany's new political assertiveness, but also the Chancellor's desire to personally promote national interests in nuclear politics at the top table (similar to his approach as a shaper of international economic and energy policies). This article will explore why this ‘parley at the summit’ mattered, how within this intimate forum Schmidt pursued his goals, what diplomatic tactics and methods he employed, and to what extent he managed to control and shape proceedings and outcomes.     

‘Cruising toward nuclear danger’: Canadian anti-nuclear activism,Pierre Trudeau’s peace mission,and the transatlantic partnership

In March 1982, news broke that the US Air Force planned to test cruise missiles in Canada. The issue brought the Euromissiles Crisis home to Canada, as Canadians took to the streets in record numbers to oppose the tests. Anti-nuclear activists linked their ‘refuse the cruise’ protests to anti-nuclear demonstrations taking place across the West. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau too saw testing in a transatlantic context, insisting they were part of Canada’s NATO obligations. Neither European nor American, the Canadians had an unusual place in NATO. Often, this translated to being completely ignored: transatlantic issues, including the decade-long Euromissiles Crisis, tended to be seen as US–Western European issues. This article considers the ways in which the Euromissiles Crisis came home to Canada and situates Canada in a broader transatlantic landscape. The Euromissiles Crisis framed Canadian debates over cruise missile testing, encouraging activists and politicians to think about how the threat of nuclear war could be reduced.     

试析尼克松政府的环境外交

在尼克松执政时期,环境成为美国外交的主要议题之一.尼克松政府通过北约、经济合作与发展组织和联合国国际组织,围绕环境监管、环境保护和污染治理等主题进行外交活动.尼克松的环境外交体现出其先行一步的外交构想和具体的环境行动.美国的环境外交因先于其他国家而取得了国际环境领域的有利地位,并推动了20世纪70年代初环境领域的国际合作达到一个高潮.不过,尼克松的环境外交更多地着眼于美国所处的国内外环境形势和现实利益,与第三世界为实现符合发展中国家利益的环境主张形成了明显的对照.     

Re-designing military security in Europe: cooperation and competition between the European community and NATO during the early 1980s

Abstract

In the early 1980s, the member-states of the European Community (‘the Ten’) extended their foreign-policy cooperation into the field of security and disarmament. They advanced a proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process. As disarmament was a preserve and priority concern of NATO, the move engendered both competition and cooperation between NATO and European Political Cooperation (EPC), that is, the mechanism the Ten used to elaborate common positions. This article analyses these dynamics by paying particular attention to the exchange of ideas between the two forums. It also shows the key role of some Western European governments in inspiring competition or promoting cooperation between the two organizations, and the rationales and drivers behind their actions. The article proves that Cold War concerns played a key role in this regard: the will to preserve European détente and the need to address domestic opinion critical of an escalation of the East–West confrontation motivated their initiative in the disarmament field. At the same time, concern that the Soviets might exploit divergences across the Atlantic prompted their attempts to secure NATO’s cohesion and project a strong image of unity.     

NATO expansion: ‘a policy error of historic importance’

European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear‐weapons‐free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal.     

Introduction: The Future of Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

In her Introduction to this issue of International Affairs devoted to the future of Europe and the transatlantic relationship, Julie Smith highlights the challenges facing the West's major organizations—the European Union and NATO. The Convention on the Future of Europe, enlargement of both NATO and the EU, the euro debate, and the tensions in the transatlantic relationship are discussed in the context of the articles in these pages.     

The ultimate test case: can Europe and America forge a joint strategy for the wider Middle East?

The call for a common US–European approach to the multiple problems of the wider Middle East region has become the latest truism of the transatlantic circuit. But the Middle East is also the region that has historically most divided Americans and Europeans. Steven Everts argues that, despite the different reflexes and assumptions, a joint transatlantic effort is both necessary and feasible. But it will only work if both sides are prepared to adjust policies, allocate sufficient resources and, most of all, take political risks. He sketches a joint strategy based on four pillars: a new international bargain for Iraq; keeping the two-state solution alive in Israel–Palestine; preventing the next transatlantic bust-up over Iran; and with regard to the crisis of governance, taking concrete steps to promote political reforms throughout the region. The author concludes that in the Middle East, Europe must be more strategically daring while America must be more politically astute.