美日对中国研制核武器的认识与对策(1959-1969)

本文依据近年来美日两国政府的解密档案,探讨美日对中国研制核武器的认识与对策.20世纪60年代,中国研制核武器的进程引起美日两国的高度关注.美日两国对中国研制核武器进程认识的根本特点,是低估中国的核科学技术水平和中国拥有核武器在军事战略领域的意义,强调中国研制核武器对亚洲非共产党国家的政治心理影响.在美日两国谋划遏制中国政策的过程中,美国放弃了在日本本土部署核武器、摧毁中国核设施、美苏联合清除中国核能力、向日本转让核武器等种种构想,转而承诺向日本提供核保护和宇宙空间技术援助.日本政府则自觉选择了依赖美国核保护和美日宇宙空间技术合作的战略方针,同中国进行对抗与竞争.这种态势乃是美日关系和亚洲冷战进程中出现的新特征.     

《日美相互合作及安全保障条约》新论

《日美相互合作及安全保障条约》(一般称为新《日美安保条约》)标志着美日关系发展的新阶段。美国将修改《日美安保条约》作为确保自由使用冲绳军事基地的手段,而日本将其作为争取返还冲绳的重要途径。新《日美安保条约》确定了“事前协商”制,又保留了种种“例外”。新《日美安保条约》在适用范围问题上采取了“日本本土”与“远东”并用的方式。这一切都体现了美日两国战略利益的差异与汇合。     

战前日美经济关系的变化及其对日本外交政策的影响

一次大战后,日美矛盾成为远东太平洋地区国际关系的焦点,与美国争夺中国市场成为日本对外政策的核心和出发点。由于美国经济对全球的影响力和日本资本主义本身对国际市场的严重依赖,日美两国经济关系的消长成为影响日本对外政策制定的重要因素。20年代日本外交标榜“与欧美列强协调一致”、“不干涉中国内政”和“经济往来”,即所谓“协调外交”。30年代初起,以“九一八”事变为转折点,这一国际协调外交迅速向武力外交转化。经“一·二八”事变、“七·七事变、”“八·一三”事变,直至挑起珍珠港事变,导致太平洋战争全面爆发。引起日本外交剧烈变化的原因是多方面的,本文试图从一战后日美矛盾这一基本要素出发,探讨这一时期日美两国经济关系对日本外交政策的影响。     

1941年美国冻结中日资产案北大核心

1941年美国同时冻结中、日两国资产,标志着太平洋战争爆发前美国远东政策的转折,加速了第二次世界大战全球局势的演变。在该案酝酿、决策和实施过程中,中国因素均产生独特影响,彰显出中国抗战在世界反法西斯战争全局中不可替代的战略地位。面对中国战时外汇危机,美国总统特使居里提议冻结中国在美资产以实现“外部外汇管制”,中方进而要求美国政府将冻结中、日资产两案捆绑进行。为促使美国政府内部统一意见,国民政府积极配合罗斯福总统的特使外交,并与美国财政部合作开展对华经济调查,经过长达半年的反复磋商,就中国外汇管制的必要性和紧迫性与美方达成重要共识。在美日谈判之际,国民政府竭力敦促美国坚守冻结日资的底线,有力推进了战时中美战略合作关系的发展,开辟了中、美、英等国共同抗击日本侵略的格局。     

论佐藤内阁时期的日美关系——从依附走向相互依存

佐藤内阁时期（１９６４·１１·９——１９７２·７·７）是战后日美关系史上的一个重要转折时期。这期间日本利用日益膨胀的经济实力,借美国深陷越南战争的泥沼不能自拔、经济实力大幅度滑坡、在远东急需日本提供战略合作的有利时机,围绕越南战争、东南亚开发、东亚战略“换肩”、小笠原、冲绳的施政权归还等问题展开频繁的首脑外交,不仅顺利解决了日本战败遗留下来的日美间最大的外交课题,而且顺利实现了日美在远东的战略“换肩”,极大地提高了日本在美国远东战略中的地位和作用。使日美关系从战后日本对美依附时代,进入了日美相互依存时代,为７０年代初日本结束“战后”时期迈出了决定性的一步。     

冷战后日美关系重新调整

1992年1月,美国总统布什访问日本,日本国总理大臣及美利坚合众国总统共同发表了《有关日美全球伙伴关系的东京宣言》,并根据宣言精神制定了日美《全球伙伴关系行动计划》。宫泽首相说。宣言具有“划时代意义”,布什总统说,美日现在正进入“新的合作时代”。宣言提出了日美两国未来的合作课题,它的发表是对东西冷战结束     

丸山真男学术立论中的事实与想象--"原型论"与"日本主义"情结

丸山真男的学术研究,在揭示出“日本早期近代化的基础奠定于江户时代”这一重要事实的同时,也超事实超学理地扩张了他的想象,这种想象,集中体现在他所提出的“原型论”当中,由于该理论与“日本主义”之间存有内在,本质和必然的联系,而这种联系又直接与少数人根深蒂固的“中国文化蔑视论”互为表里,因此,提出并正确认识这一问题,相信将有助于加强21世纪中日两国深层次的学术交流。     

19世纪末至20世纪20年代的移民问题与日美关系

移民问题是19世纪末至20世纪20年代影响日美关系最重要的问题之一。日美两国围绕移民问题产生的外交纠纷与日美在远东太平洋地区逐渐发生摩擦和争执的时间是吻合的。日俄战争特别是第一次世界大战后,日本的大国心态急剧膨胀,引发了美国人对国家利益与安全的担忧。美国借移民问题压制日本并最终通过了含有严重歧视日本人条款的《1924年移民法》,给日美关系的发展埋下了重大隐患。     

关于中日钓鱼岛主权的历史争端与战略思考

在中日间围绕钓鱼岛主权的争端中,日本屡屡挑战中国国家利益的底线,成为中日关系发展面临的最大障碍与核心问题。日本政府通过不断促使钓鱼岛列岛主权争端的升级,掀动“中国威胁”论,调整和扩充日本的军事力量,并通过日美同盟把美国紧紧捆绑在日本的战略布局当中,实现一石三乌的战略效应。日本安保战略和政策的调整明确而具体地反映了日本对...     

美日贸易摩擦及其发展趋势

美日贸易摩擦及其发展趋势王媛第二次世界大战后,日本在美国的“经济援助”和扶植下,生产迅速恢复发展,到１９５５年达到战前最高水平。其时,日本的外贸在美国的垄断下,对美贸易长期入超。然而,随着日本经济的迅速增长,从５０年代后期起,日本对美贸易逐渐由劣势转...     

二战后美国对日本的粮食战略及其影响

二战后,日本经济凋零,粮食短缺问题严重,国民生计惨淡,社会矛盾丛生。为了解决这些问题,美国占领当局分别从外部和内部开展粮食援助和粮食强征。这一系列政策在实现美国自身的经济需求与政治目的的同时,也确实对日本的农业与社会步入正常化发挥了重要作用,为之后日本的经济腾飞奠定了坚实基础。战后初期的粮食政策连同日本经济复苏后美国长期实施的粮食倾销,共同构成了二战后美国对日粮食战略的主要内容。美国的粮食战略缓解了战后初期日本严重的粮食危机,部分解决了美国国内的粮食过剩问题,改变了日本人的饮食结构与饮食习惯,挤压了该国粮食的生存能力和发展空间,影响了日本的粮食安全乃至政治、经济主权与独立发展进程,也加剧了美日间的贸易摩擦。     

‘Wean them away from French tutelage’: Franco-Indian nuclear relations and Anglo-American anxieties during the early Cold War, 1948–1952

The 1951 Franco-Indian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was the first such cooperation outside the Manhattan Project, and preceded President Eisenhower's 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal. This cooperation on one hand upset the United Kingdom, which regretted losing leverage over its former colony to its colonial rival, and on the other, enhanced the United States' interest in playing a key role in the region. Based on multi-archival research, this paper explores the significance of Franco-Indian nuclear relations against the backdrop of Anglo-American endeavours to censor information related to atomic energy and to secure control of strategic minerals during the early Cold War.     

How proactive? How pacifist? Charting Japan’s evolving defence posture

After 60 years maintaining Self-Defense Forces rather than a normal military, Japan is moving towards exercising collective self-defence, long restricted by interpretations of its 1945 Peace Constitution. The merits of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's ‘proactive pacifism’ are intensely debated by those welcoming greater international contributions from Japan and others suspicious of Japanese ‘remilitarisation’. A nation’s defence posture can theoretically be hijacked by aggressive nationalists, shift to pacifist isolationism, or rely on non-military internationalism or multilateral security cooperation. This article assesses competing explanations about the post-war trajectory of Japan’s defence posture by charting variation in military doctrine and capabilities. The analysis finds that Tokyo has made incremental policy adjustments under domestic and international constraints, and is not aggressively remilitarising.     

杜勒斯与美国的琉球政策(1950-1951)

如何处理琉球群岛,是美国战后对日和约中需要解决的主要问题之一。1950年4月,杜勒斯被杜鲁门总统任命为国务卿顾问,负责对日和约问题。当时,美国政府内部特别是军方和国务院之间对此存在争论和分歧。杜勒斯因应美国遏制共产主义发展的亚洲政策主要目标,与美国政府内部各方、美国各盟国、苏联、日本等折冲博弈,基本上界定了琉球政策的框架。为满足各方需求,杜勒斯创造了“剩余主权”这一全新概念,通过《旧金山和约》确保了在联合国托管的名义下,美国对北纬29度以南的琉球群岛进行排他性战略控制。同时,杜勒斯主导了《美日安保条约》《美澳新安全条约》《美菲共同防御条约》的形成,初步构建了美国在亚太地区以琉球群岛军事基地为核心的防卫体系。     

Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: soft power,nation branding and the question of ‘international cultural exchange’

This paper critically examines the development of what is known as ‘pop-culture diplomacy’ in Japan. In the postwar era, the country’s cultural diplomacy was propelled by the necessity to soften anti-Japan perceptions, notably in Southeast Asia. In the late 1980s, the popularity of Japanese media culture in Asia began to attract the attention of policy makers, while subsequent globalized practices of soft power and nation branding gave greater emphasis to the use of media culture to internationally enhance the image of the nation, which has meant the promotion of ‘pop-culture diplomacy’ and, more broadly, ‘Cool Japan’. It is argued that pop-culture diplomacy goes no further than a one-way projection and does not seriously engage with cross-border dialogue. The Japanese case also shows that pop-culture diplomacy hinders meaningful engagement with internal cultural diversity and suggests the necessity of taking domestic implications of cultural diplomacy seriously.     

The Unflinching Mr. Smith and the Nuclear Age**

This article focuses on the U.S. diplomat and nuclear arms control negotiator Gerald (Gerry) Coat Smith in order to cast new light on the importance of diplomats in the context of the set of international activities currently labelled as “science diplomacy.” Smith, a lawyer by training, was a key negotiator in many international agreements on post-WW2 atomic energy projects, from those on uranium prospecting and mining, to reactors technologies to later ones on non-proliferation and disarmament. His career in science (nuclear) diplomacy also epitomized the shortcomings of efforts to align other countries’ posture on nuclear affairs to U.S. wishes. In particular, the unswerving diplomat increasingly understood that strong-arm tactics to dissuade other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons would not limit proliferation. Not only did this inform later U.S. diplomacy approaches, but it lent itself to the ascendancy of the new notion of “soft power” as critical to the re-definition of international affairs.     

日本新能源产业的发展模式

从能源安全、经济发展和生态环境考虑,日本制定了详细而切实可行的新能源产业扶持政策,在官、产、学一体化积极推动下,新能源产业取得了巨大发展,为日本经济的可持续发展奠定了坚实的基础。     

Selling the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Prospect Theory and the Campaign to Frame the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Abstract

This paper examines the Obama administration’s arguments for ratifying the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities and whether these claims encouraged U.S. senators to approve the agreement. The analysis relies on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory in which more risk is taken to avoid certain loss and improve conditions when options are framed in terms of losses rather than gains. We argue that the Obama administration was able to persuade Democratic senators to support the JCPOA by arguing the agreement had the potential to curb the development of nuclear weapons by the Iranian regime. But more importantly, the administration was able to frame the status quo as a certain loss, and thus, the risk associated with the JCPOA was acceptable in comparison to not adopting the agreement. Our analysis of the Obama administration’s lobbying efforts and the Democratic senators' statements in support of the agreement demonstrate the value of applying prospect theory to understanding decision making with respect to American foreign policy formulation.     

The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics

This article reviews and assesses the outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP‐21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Paris in December 2015. It argues that the Paris Agreement breaks new ground in international climate policy, by acknowledging the primacy of domestic politics in climate change and allowing countries to set their own level of ambition for climate change mitigation. It creates a framework for making voluntary pledges that can be compared and reviewed internationally, in the hope that global ambition can be increased through a process of ‘naming and shaming’. By sidestepping distributional conflicts, the Paris Agreement manages to remove one of the biggest barriers to international climate cooperation. It recognizes that none of the major powers can be forced into drastic emissions cuts. However, instead of leaving mitigation efforts to an entirely bottom‐up logic, it embeds country pledges in an international system of climate accountability and a ‘ratchet mechanism’, thus offering the chance of more durable international cooperation. At the same time, it is far from clear whether the treaty can actually deliver on the urgent need to de‐carbonize the global economy. The past record of climate policies suggests that governments have a tendency to express lofty aspirations but avoid tough decisions. For the Paris Agreement to make a difference, the new logic of ‘pledge and review’ will need to mobilize international and domestic pressure and generate political momentum behind more substantial climate policies worldwide. It matters, therefore, whether the Paris Agreement's new approach can be made to work.     

Point Predictions and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Data Mining Approach—U.S. Nuclear Policy as Proof of Concept

In Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), information processing under the constraints of limited attention and bounded rationality leads to stick‐slip dynamics in policy outcomes. Empirical work in this field often focuses on the macro level. Using the case of nuclear energy policy in the United States as proof of concept, we demonstrate how decisive budget changes in a specific policy subsystem can be linked to attention of Congress and the president. We utilize a mixed‐methods data‐mining approach: Maximum likelihood estimation is used to analyze the distribution of the nuclear energy RD&D budget. Then attention data of both Congress and the president are structured by means of cluster analysis and principal component analysis. Finally, these data are used in a generalized linear model to predict specific budget shifts. The article is designed as a proof of concept: In the case of nuclear energy policy, we are able to predict budget shifts without violating the assumptions of PET. More importantly: we can demonstrate that attention is not only affecting the final policy outcome but also the corridor of the possible.