The disturbance and endurance of norms in ASEAN: peaceful but stressful

Since the Cold War, South-East Asia has been marked by a period of relative calm and stability. Yet this peace belies ongoing tensions, mistrust and stress in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and among its member states. Within the scholarship on ASEAN, not enough attention is devoted to these underlying currents. How and in what way do tensions stress the ASEAN norms? What are some of the coping mechanisms adopted by ASEAN and its member states? Engaging with the scholarship on norms, the author contends that changes wrought in this relationship are both extra- and intra-mural. These have accelerated as contentious issues—particularly the South China Sea disputes—gain more visibility. The author argues that ASEAN is put under pressure, firstly, through a more muscular Chinese foreign policy that disrupts but does not yet break the fundamental norms of ASEAN and, secondly, through internal contestation over ASEAN norms that challenges the meaning of these norms. Essentially, the article gives an account of how internal and external pressures are burdening ASEAN norms but yet remain durable because of resistance against duress by the bloc and member states. This is done through an examination of instances where the established order and practices in the region were disturbed, and the response to this disturbance.     

Rising Sino-Japanese competition: perspectives from South-East Asian elites

One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam—perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South-East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with major-power dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions.     

Back to the Future? Regionalism in South‐East Asia Under Unilateral Pressure

This article assesses the prospects for regionalization in South-East Asia. It takes as its point of departure the contradiction between a regionalized and a unilateral world order as typically pursued by the EU and US respectively. It acknowledges the commonly accepted thesis that since September 11, 2001, the US has increasingly exercised a unilateral world order and that this poses a challenge to global regionalization. South-East Asia, a conflict-ridden, previously 'peripheral', region with a'successful' regionalization has been depicted as a 'second front' in the war against terrorism and is thus eligible for considerable US pressure. In this context, the 'ASEAN way', commonly benignly viewed, has been criticized for being shallow, 'allowing' terrorism to operate regionally. However, since 2001, and especially after the Bali bombings in 2003, ASEAN, as well as its member states, have devoted themselves to the war against terrorism. To some extent this has allowed the US a great influence in individual countries and altered regionalization. However, at the same time, the US 'needs' South-East Asian regional organization for combating international terrorism. Moreover, the US offensive in South-East Asia has caused both Japan and China to respond and strike deals on regional cooperation with ASEAN/South-East Asia, achieving long-awaited progress. Thus, the unilateral approach to global order does not, de facto, counteract regionalization, but rather operates through it, and to some extent triggers it. The counterintuitive conclusion is thus that an increasing unilateral pressure may not preclude a continued global regionalization, and that these two orders are not necessarily incompatible.     

Post‐conflict Statebuilding and State Legitimacy: From Negative to Positive Peace?

This article is concerned with the potential that statebuilding interventions have to institutionalize social justice, in addition to their more immediate ‘negative’ peace mandates, and the impact this might have, both on local state legitimacy and the character of the ‘peace’ that might follow. Much recent scholarship has stressed the legitimacy of a state's behaviour in relation to conformity to global governance norms or democratic ‘best practice’. Less evident is a discussion of the extent to which post‐conflict polities are able to engender the societal legitimacy central to political stability. As long as this level of legitimacy is absent (and it is hard to generate), civil society is likely to remain distant from the state, and peace and stability may remain elusive. A solution to this may be to apply existing international legislation centred in the UN and the ILO to compel international organizations and national states to deliver basic needs security through their institutions. This has the effect of stimulating local‐level state legitimacy while simultaneously formalizing social justice and positive peacebuilding.     

Asia‐Pacific security regimes: Conditions and constraints

Security regimes constitute an important test of the ‘liberal’ school of thought in contemporary international relations. In the Asia‐Pacific, interest is growing over how they may contribute to that region's future order and stability. It is argued here, however, that Asia‐Pacific security regimes cannot succeed unless ‘realist’ power‐balancing strategies are first applied, affording time for patterns of structural leadership to shape enduring security norms and institutions. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is arguably the region's first potential post‐cold war security regime. Its fate, or that of its successor security regimes in the Asia‐Pacific, depends upon satisfying four critical conditions for regime building and upon winning the acceptance of China and the United States, the region's two key ‘structural leaders’. While the ARF does not at present seem close to satisfying these criteria, it may help to provide the breathing space necessary for a successful transition from a competitive cold war environment to a more cooperative climate in the Asia‐Pacific.     

Regionalising resource security in the Asia-Pacific: the challenge of economic nationalism

In recent years, efforts to institutionalise resource security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region have intensified. Soaring world prices for minerals and energy have seen a range of resource security strategies launched—through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Plus Three, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit—all of which aim to promote intergovernmental dialogue, policy coordination and the integration of regional resource markets. However, the practical achievements of these regional efforts have been limited, as none have advanced beyond dialogue activities to more formalised types of resource security cooperation. This article examines the dynamics of these abortive attempts to regionalise resource cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, arguing that economic nationalist resource policy preferences held by governments have acted as a major obstacle to cooperation. Through an analysis of national resource policy regimes and the outputs of recent cooperative efforts, it demonstrates how economic nationalism has encouraged inward-looking and sovereignty-conscious actions on the part of major resource players in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, intergovernmental resource cooperation has been limited to informal and voluntary ‘soft-law’ initiatives, which have not made a substantive contribution to the resource security of economies in the region.     

Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South‐East Asia

In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South‐East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non‐interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: ‘to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single‐party dominant regimes in South‐East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy.     

Japan’s strategic interests in the South China Sea: beyond the horizon?

Japan has a national interest in the South China Sea issue. Although its direct commitment is ultimately limited in a material sense due to a lack of military capabilities, as well as political and constitutional constraints on the Self-Defense Force, Japan has maintained its firm stance to uphold international maritime rules and norms, and nurtured strong diplomatic relations and conducted maritime capacity-building programs with the South-East Asian states, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These actions contribute to consolidating the rule of law at sea and provide those claimant states an opportunity to withstand pressures from China. Given the Trump administration’s unclear South China Sea policy and South-East Asia’s strategic uncertainty, Japan is becoming a key player in maintaining regional maritime stability in East Asia through diplomacy.     

The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: an assessment

ABSTRACT

Eleven years after it was abandoned, the so-called Indo-Pacific concept is back with a vengeance in regional security debates. At the 2017 Shangri-la Dialogue, there were only five mentions of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ at the annual defence ministerial forum. In the following year, the figure had jumped to 92. The Indo-Pacific Four countries promoting the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) concept share many principles, including freedom of navigation and overflight, connectivity and economic growth, and respect for the rule of law. There are, however, clear points of divergence between them, such that there are actually different Indo-Pacific strategies among the Indo-Pacific Four. Even if the Indo-Pacific Four manage to resolve these issues (and the possibility of this is low), it is not likely that ASEAN would endorse the FOIP concept. The reality remains that Indonesia and ASEAN have taken a different approach to the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN approach is to appropriate elements of FOIP strategy which are more attractive to ASEAN (for example, connectivity and infrastructure), yet reject elements of FOIP strategy which ASEAN deems inappropriate (the exclusion of China and the loss of ASEAN centrality). This does not augur well for the adoption, in its entirety, of the FOIP concept by ASEAN.     

澳大利亚与柬埔寨的和平进程

印度支那是战后国际关系的一个焦点地区。1978年越南对柬埔寨的入侵使柬国内政治局势更加扑朔迷离。在柬埔寨漫长的和平进程中,包括中国、法国、东盟、澳大利亚在内的国际社会发挥了积极的建设性的协调作用。联合国组织更是责无旁贷地组织并主导了柬埔寨大选。本要探讨的是作为一个中等实力的国家——澳大利亚,如何利用自己的外交资源、影响以及一个相对中立的国家所享有的独特的外交协调能力及优势,与国际社会一道推动柬埔寨和平进程。     

The political future of ASEAN after the Asian crisis

The 1997 Asian financial crisis has been a debilitating experience for the ASEAN countries, with attendant political transformation and economic readjustment. Regional unity has also been affected: ASEAN appears to lack resolve and cohesion as well as the ability to forge common action. While political change has been effected and more open systems are in place, ASEAN countries now seem set to bounce back with renewed vigour and a business-as-usual approach to their economies. However, ASEAN's revitalization into the next century will significantly depend on the region's most important polity, Indonesia, the country most affected by the crisis and now undergoing substantive change.     

Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter‐Governmental Authority on Development

This article assesses the contribution that IGAD has made to regional security in the Horn of Africa since the adoption of its peace and security mandate in 1996. It describes the evolution of IGAD and its mandate in the context of regional conflict and wider African peace and security processes. It explores the local dynamics of the two major IGAD‐led peace processes, in Sudan (1993–2005) and in Somalia (2002–2004), and discusses the effectiveness of IGAD's institutional role. A consideration of the wider impact of the peace agreements highlights the way IGAD has enhanced its role by setting the agenda on peace support operations in Somalia. The article concludes that IGAD's successes are more the result of regional power politics than of its institutional strength per se. Despite the obvious need for a better regional security framework, the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict‐resolution capability will remain limited. However, IGAD brings a new diplomatic dimension to conflict management that locks in regional states and locks out interested parties beyond the region. With regard to Somalia, the organization has played a pivotal role in directing African and wider international responses to conflict in the region.     

Paths ahead for East Asia and Asia–Pacific regionalism

East Asia and the Asia–Pacific are core components of the global economy, and there have been important recent developments in the regionalism of both regions. After the 1997–1998 financial crisis, East Asian countries initiated more exclusive regional cooperation and integration ventures mainly through ASEAN Plus Three, but lately this process has stumbled. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has also failed to make substantial progress. Attention has instead increasingly turned to free trade agreements (FTAs), yet these have hitherto been overwhelmingly bilateral in nature. There are still only a few truly regional FTAs in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific—and these are on a sub‐regional scale. However, various frustrations over the messy and fractious pattern of heterogeneous bilateral agreements led to the recent initiation of ‘grand regional’ FTA talks. The Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an Asia–Pacific‐based, United States‐led project while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an East Asia‐centred project. Each contains highly diverse memberships and the successful conclusion of TPP and RCEP talks is not assured. It is argued that, if negotiated, the RCEP is more likely to advance meaningful and effective regionalism than the TPP due to the former ascribing more importance to regional community‐building. Furthermore, bilateral FTAs already in force may over the long term transform into more comprehensive economic agreements that address new regional and global challenges such as energy security and climate change.     

Japan’s Twin-Track Diplomacy during the Cambodian Conflict, 1979–84: A “Member of the West” Pursuing an Independent Foreign Policy 1

The Cambodian conflict and the increase of the Cold War tension following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed major challenges to Japan’s Southeast Asia policy but, contrary to what is claimed in the existing research, did not halt Tokyo’s efforts to promote peaceful coexistence between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina. Declassified documents and other primary sources show that through the adoption of a twin-track diplomatic line, Japan acted as an “Asian member of the West”, committing to the anti-Soviet alignment but at the same time continuing to pursue its regional objectives. By engaging Vietnam and striving for a “regional” solution to the Cambodian conflict, Japan followed an independent diplomatic line, eventually expanding its role in Southeast Asia beyond the economic dimension to security issues. In the end, Japan’s bridging efforts in Southeast Asia, envisioned by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977, helped Tokyo to lay the foundation for its involvement in the mature stage of the Cambodian peace process after the late 1980s.     

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

This article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.     

Dangerous Liaisons: Neoliberal Foreign Policy and Australia's Regional Engagement

Recent dramatic events in the Asia/Pacific region have prompted a reassessment within the Australian community of the prevailing analytical and policy orthodoxies associated with our contemporary regional engagements. This paper, written well before the serious upheavals in Indonesia and Malaysia, warns of the likelihood of such upheavals taking place and of the long-term dangers faced by Australian foreign policy in relation to them. In this context it concentrates primarily on Australia's explicit and enthusiastic commitment to a neoliberal global trade agenda and its less explicit but still solid commitment to a neo-Realist security agenda. It suggests that the tensions intrinsic to this policy matrix could provoke major problems for Australia in the future. More specifically, it argues that the pursuit of traditional (elite-centred) political stability and radical (market-driven) economic prosperity in the Asia/Pacific might well accelerate an opposite scenario, as people throughout the region resist the processes of rapid free-market development and ongoing political repression. It urges less fealty to the latest grand-theory of (Western) global power and a more serious empirical analysis of the implications of it for Australia's long term future in the Asia/Pacific.     

A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture

This article examines how the African Union (AU) has handled Africa's peace and security challenges since 2002, defines what has been successful and what remains aspirational. It does so by examining how the AU has responded, from using sanctions against coups, to deploying peacekeeping missions and mediating in conflicts. An African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has developed since 2002, including a Peace and Security Council, an African Standby Force, a Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise. This sounds impressive, but the operationalization record is patchy: AU‐deployed missions have been fully dependent on external donors; harmonization is a major problem; serious questions remain over AU capacity; and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are developing at a quicker pace than the AU. Given these circumstances and its internal capacity deficit, the AU will likely struggle to exercise oversight of regional processes, including the development of regional standby force arrangements. APSA is clearly based on a liberal peace model, yet democratic systems, respect for human rights and good governance aren't always in place in African countries, and the self‐interest of elites continues to be a constraint on APSA and its success. Over the last decade the AU has found a voice and, despite some setbacks, it has shown through AMISOM in Somalia that it is capable of conducting a successful peacemaking operation. Its biggest challenge is not making the decision to intervene or deploy forces, but the capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. APSA's dependence on external partners needs to diminish over the next decade if better African solutions are to be found to peace and security challenges in the continent. Yet, the internationalized nature of crises such as the one in Mali in 2012–13 requires international partnerships. Not all of Africa's security problems can be solved by Africa alone, but APSA does provide a vision framework for African and external partnership.     

A Path to “Emergent Peace” in Northeast Asia: The Shadow of the Past Matters

This article explores the possibility of institutional multilateralism in Northeast Asia from the perspective of “emergent peace”. The main argument of the article is that a self-organising peace process arising from institutional multilateralism is constrained and enabled by the existing “morphogenetic fields”, the formative social spheres of collective action. Similar ideas or initiatives that are pursued by an agent/agents may result in different consequences depending on the characteristics of the morphogenetic fields. This argument is examined through two case studies. The first is Jean Monnet in Europe, who played a pivotal role in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the other is Ahn Jung-geun in Northeast Asia, who proposed the detailed ideas of pan-Asianism akin to Monnet but failed to play a role as an agent. The case studies demonstrate that the feature of the morphogenetic fields is determined by the characteristics of embedded agency at a critical juncture, while the agency is bounded by the particular spatial and temporal conditions of the morphogenetic fields. In search of an emergent peace process in Northeast Asia, this article particularly highlights the Six-Party Talks, arguing that they are a by-product of, and an alternative to, the San Francisco System.     

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes

The article examines the extent to which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have gained from their participation in ASEAN. To assess the security and diplomatic benefits of their membership, it identifies three expectations held by the Indochinese states—enhanced international status, improved security and relations vis-à-vis other ASEAN members, and more room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The study demonstrates, however, that while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are less isolated internationally after joining ASEAN, the actual benefits in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states have been more ambiguous. With ASEAN in mind, the article concludes by discussing the possible costs and drawbacks of enlargement that can transform any international organisation into a less influential and cohesive institution.     

The ASEAN‐China Free Trade Area: genesis and implications

The Asia‐Pacific region's vulnerabilities to the consequences of globalisation were vividly revealed by its financial crisis in 1997–98. ASEAN states considered the US and APEC less than helpful during the crisis, and they found the conditionalities imposed by the IMF unpalatable. But ASEAN as a regional organisation has been much weakened, and it has been working hard to revive its influence. The ‘ASEAN plus 3’ approach has been perceived as an important means to strengthen ASEAN's status and relevance. The ASEAN‐China Free Trade Area is undoubtedly an outstanding achievement of this approach; but ASEAN has been trying to keep its options open. On the other hand, China has been concerned with the danger of a deterioration in Sino‐American relations and the increasing distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. Improvement of China‐ASEAN relations therefore assumes increasing significance in China's regional policy; and enhancing mutual interests and interdependence is the best way to erode the ASEAN states' perception of the ‘China threat’. But China must not neglect the interests of Japan and South Korea or underestimate ASEAN's resistance to the exclusion of the US and its desire to maintain a balance of power in the region. The ASEAN‐China Free Trade Area, hopefully, should also facilitate the narrowing of the gap between the more developed and the developing ASEAN members, as well as that between the more prosperous coastal provinces and the poor interior provinces in China. In many ways, the establishment of the ASEAN‐China Free Trade Area represents a challenge to what can be achieved in the mutual engagement process.