Principled pragmatism in climate policy? The EU and changing practices of climate justice

Climate change constitutes one of the most pressing political problems of our time and has profound implications for global justice. However, despite the recent progress of the international negotiations embodied in the Paris Agreement, most scientists and activists agree that the adopted measures are not adequate or ‘just’ considering the magnitude of the problem. Thus, there is a pressing need for political forerunners that could push the regime towards a more just handling of the problem. The European Union for most of the time has presented itself as a strong advocate for progressive climate action and has been called a climate vanguard or ‘green normative power’. This paper critically assesses the EU's role concerning climate change from a perspective of global political justice, which builds on a tripartite theoretical conception, consisting of ‘non-domination’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘mutual recognition’. It inquires to which conceptions of justice the EU's climate strategy and approach to the international negotiations have corresponded, how and why changes have come about, and whether the EU was able to influence the international regime. The paper finds that while the EU started out from a focus on political measures linked to impartiality, after the failed negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 it has become more open towards policies and instruments in line with mutual recognition and non-domination. Thus, the emphasis moved away from top-down, legally binding measures, towards voluntary bottom-up procedures, a recognition of difference and diplomatic outreach activities. While this shift was necessary to reinstate the EU's influence and secure the Paris Agreement, it could hamper the quest for robust climate abatement measures and global climate justice.     

Italian universities,Fascism and the promotion of corporative studies

This article deals with a specific aspect of the development of corporativism as ‘unofficial’ doctrine of Fascist Italy: its presence in Italian universities. It argues that corporatist schools followed the fortune of the ideals they were called to represent, which were definitely eclipsed by the mid-1930s, when the economic crisis called for more direct and effective forms of state intervention in economic life. In the universities, the rise of corporativism as a specific field of study, and the broader project of creating an ideologically educated future ruling class, challenged the domination exercised by the powerful faculties of law in particular, which traditionally were the key paths for access to the legal profession and the civil service. The resistance of the conservative university establishment meant that the plans to promote corporatist curricula had failed well before the fall of the regime, but many of those appointed to teach Corporative Studies under Fascism maintained their academic positions in Italy's ‘de-Fascistized’ post-war law faculties, and made innovative contributions to Italian social and economic thought.     

Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to revolution?

Syria was, until recently, seen as a ‘successful’ example of authoritarian ‘upgrading’ or ‘modernization;’ yet in 2011 the Syrian regime faced revolution from below: what went wrong? Bashar al‐Asad inherited a flawed regime yet managed to start the integration of his country into the world capitalist market, without forfeiting the nationalist card by, for instance, attempting to acquire legitimacy from opposition to Israel and the US invasion of Iraq. Yet, despite his expectations and that of most analysts, his regime proved susceptible to the Arab uprising. This article examines the causes and development of the Syrian uprising of 2011. It contextualizes the revolt by showing how the construction of the regime built in vulnerabilities requiring constant ‘upgradings’ that produced a more durable regime but had long term costs. It focuses on Bashar al‐Asad's struggles to ‘modernize’ authoritarianism by consolidating his own ‘reformist’ faction, balancing between the regime's nationalist legitimacy and its need for incorporation into the world economy; his shifting of the regime's social base to a new class of crony capitalists; and his effort to manage participatory pressures through limited liberalization and ‘divide and rule’. The seeds of the uprising are located in these changes, notably the abandonment of the regime's rural constituency and debilitating of its institutions. Yet, it was Asad's inadequate response to legitimate grievances and excessive repression that turned demands for reform into attempted revolution. The article then analyses the uprising, looking at the contrary social bases and strategies of regime and opposition, and the dynamics by which violence and foreign intervention have escalated, before finishing with comments on the likely prognosis.     

‘Fare di ogni famiglia italiana un fortilizio’: The League of Nations' economic sanctions and everyday life in Venice 1

Abstract

The imposition of punitive sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations in November 1935 in response to the invasion of Ethiopia, a fellow league member, provided the fascist regime with an opportunity to mobilize the civilian population into ‘resistance’ against the ‘economic siege’ and to promote its ideals of nationalism, imperialist expansion and autarchy. This article examines the way in which the fascist authorities in Venice, aided by a supportive local press, sought to use the sanctions and ‘sanctions resistance’ to engage Venetians – especially women – in the fascist project and explores the effect of the anti-sanctions resistance measures on Venetians' daily lives. Placing importance both upon the regime's intentions as well as Venetians' reception of the anti-sanctions rhetoric, and drawing upon Michel de Certeau's observations on The Practice of Everyday Life, the article argues that Venetians' reception of such propaganda was characterized above all by confusion and by a multiplicity of personal choices and reactions, spanning a range of possible responses from unequivocal support through passive acceptance or indifference to outright rejection or subversion of the sanctions resistance measures that sought to elicit consent for the fascist project.     

Australia's ‘special strategic relationship’ with Japan: another ‘China choice’?

In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.     

Europe and the new balance of global order

The European Union has become an important shaping factor in international relations, but how and under what conditions it can exercise influence and contribute constructively to global order are still not well analysed. In fact, the EU's contribution may resemble more that of a force in physics than of a great power in the traditional sense of international relations (which the EU is not, and will not become in the near future), and its influence depends probably more on what the EU represents and how well it manages its own realm, rather than on what it can do externally. In this sense, European influence in international relations presently benefits from past achievements, and may therefore have peaked if the twin challenges of enlargement and national structural deficiencies are not addressed effectively. But even if the European Union does master those challenges successfully, and thus manages to sustain and perhaps even enhance its influence as a force in international relations, it will still have to proceed cautiously and clearly focus its attempts on shaping its external environment and contributing to a ‘concrete’ or ‘civilized’ global order. In a global setting that, despite appearances to the contrary, seems characterized by a diffusion rather than a concentration of power and by strong tendencies towards entropy rather than order, the EU can and will probably not remain America's principal ally in sustaining Pax Americana. Nor does it seem likely to become an equal partner in a constructive, balanced transatlantic relationship, let alone a great power capable of challenging, perhaps together with others, America's apparent pre‐eminence. The most plausible assumption for the EU's future role in the new balance of global order is that of a ‘civilian force’ with a regional focus. It may best be able to contribute to global order by managing its own realm well, promoting the normative and institutional infrastructure for civilized international relations, not least in the sense of functioning statehood, and working towards effective multilateralism.     

Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya*

This article is based on a debate held on 22 March 2011 at Chatham House on ‘Was Iraq an unjust war?’ David Fisher argues that the war fully failed to meet any of the just war criteria. The war was undertaken to disarm Iraq of its WMD but the evidence that it had such weapons was inadequate. There were concerns about the justice of the cause, reinforced by doubts that those initiating military action avowedly on behalf of the UN had the requisite competent authority to do so, given the absence of any international consensus in favour of military action. The doubts were further reinforced by concern that action was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort. Crucially, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seek to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. The individual failures mutually reinforced each other, so building up cumulatively to support the conclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and without adequate planning how to achieve a just outcome following military action to impose regime change. It thus failed the two key tests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken, designed to ensure that military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result. By contrast, current coalition operations in Libya are, so far, just. This is a humanitarian operation undertaken to halt a humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place, with wide international support, including authorization by the UN Security Council. Nigel Biggar argues that the fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from grave errors, some of them morally culpable, does not yet establish its overall injustice. All wars are morally flawed, even just ones. Further, even if the invasion were illegal, that need not make it immoral. The authority of moral law trumps that of international law, and where the politics of the Security Council prevent the UN from enforcing the law, unauthorized enforcement could be morally justified. Further still, massive civilian casualties do not by themselves make an unjust war. The decisive considerations are those of just cause, last resort and right intention. Proportionality is not among them, because estimating it is far too uncertain. The persistently atrocious nature of the Saddam Hussein regime satisfies just cause; evidence of collapsing containment grounds last resort; and the Coalition's costly correction of early errors proved the seriousness of its good intentions. In sum the invasion and occupation of Iraq was, despite grave errors, justified. Regarding Libya, Biggar notes the recurrence of conflict over the interpretation of international law. He wonders how those who distinguish sharply between protecting civilians and regime change imagine that dissident civilians are to be ‘kept’ safe while Qadhafi remains in power. Against those who clamour for a clear exit‐strategy, he counsels agility, while urging sensitivity to the limits of our power. What was right to begin may become imprudent to continue.     

Kant on Hobbes,peace, and obedience

Kant's essay ‘On the common saying: “This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice”’ contains a chapter ‘On the relationship of theory to practice in political right’ to which he added, in brackets, ‘(Against Hobbes)’. The problem is that Kant leaves his Hobbes-criticism implicit. The main point seems to be the Hobbes's citizens are without any rights. We explore the differences and similarities between Kant's and Hobbes's political views and evaluate the effectiveness of Kant's criticism. We pay attention to Nominalism and Platonism, the idea of happiness in social life, the use and role of the Golden Rule (Categorical Imperative) in political thought, the quest for freedom, and the principle of political non-resistance. Especially freedom of speech is important for Kant as an Enlightenment thinker. This is the only right Kant's citizens may have, independently of the sovereign's will. Our conclusion is that both Kant and Hobbes emphasize peace and order under sovereign power although they do not agree on how such an ideal can be achieved.     

Genderism and the Bathroom Problem: (re)materialising sexed sites, (re)creating sexed bodies

This article introduces the possibilities of a new term, ‘genderism’, to describe the hostile readings of, and reactions to, gender ambiguous bodies. Genderism is used here to articulate instances of discrimination that are based on the discontinuities between the sex with which an individual identifies and how others, in a variety of spaces, read their sex. The article suggests that intersections between queer theories, that destabilise the dichotomy of man/woman, and performative geographies, that recognise the (re)formation of space, could facilitate, and indeed necessitate, a consideration of how the illusion of dichotomous sexes is (re)formed at the site of the body (re)constituting men and women in context. Nine women, who participated in a wider research project about non‐heterosexual women's lives, spoke of being mistaken for men yet understanding themselves and living as women. Using these narratives the ‘bathroom problem’, where women are read as men in toilets and as a result subjected to abusive and even violent reactions, is examined. These policing behaviours demonstrate the instability of sexed norms as well as how sites can be (re)made ‘woman only’ and simultaneously ‘women's’ bodies (re)produced. The article then examines how women negotiate the policing of sexed spaces such that bodies, sexed sites (toilets) and the location of these sites (nightclubs, service stations) are mutually constituted within sexed regimes of power. In this way the article aims to explore how sexed power relations (re)form the mundane ‘stuff’ of everyday life by examining moments where boundaries of gender difference are overtly (en)forced.     

Society as a Code: Bentham and the Fabric of Order

The essay argues that Jeremy Bentham played a major role in the transitional process between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries leading to the ‘discovery' or ‘invention of society' as an order, i.e., as an autonomous object of knowledge. By comparing Bentham's discourse with those developed by select protagonists of that transition, particularly Ferguson, Sieyès, and Mirabeau, it is shown how society emerges as the logical and historical space of a set of relationships that affects both the rationalisation and the practice of government. In contrast with Michel Foucault's interpretation of Bentham's role in the genealogy of neoliberalism, recently developed by Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, this paper suggests that ‘the new governmental reason’ rose from within the discourse of law. Consequently, the problem of ‘constitution’ was not left behind by the epistemological change of the eighteenth century, as they argue. Rather, the scientific and political understanding of society as a code became the base for an innovative conception of both law and politics.     

‘Afterschool and during vacations’: on labor and schooling in the postcolony

ABSTRACT

The Indian state's recent deregulation of child labor, several years after it passed a law making schooling free and compulsory, forces us to attend to the distinct dynamic between child labor and schooling that frame contemporary efforts around compulsory education. This paper opens-up this terrain through historicizing the child-figure – who combines school with wage labor – within the workings of colonial and postcolonial capitalism. It discusses how the strong and continuing traces of a longer history of exclusions is manifest in the widespread global construction of ‘school’ as inherently ‘fungible’ or the fragility of the school form, as central to this moment of compulsory schooling. Through a focus on this subaltern child-figure, this paper contends that both the ‘fungibility’ of schools for marginal children as well as the privatization of child labor foregrounds the antipolitics that undergirds the current fraught working out of compulsory education in the postcolony.     

Shades of green: Public opinion on environmental issues in Australia

Data from the 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies are used to investigate whether public concern about the environment has declined in Australia over recent years. Questions of the ranking and structure of environmental concerns and of levels of support for environmental organisations are addressed. The data show that public concern about the environment remains high on an ‘agenda of long‐term issues’, that environmental concerns form two distinct clusters (termed ‘brown’ and ‘green') and that active support for environmental organisations correlates only with the green cluster. It is argued that these findings give no more than partial support to the ‘organisational’, ‘postmaterialist’ and ‘risk society’ perspectives on environmental issues.     

The Indian State in a Liberalizing Landscape

There has been much discussion recently on the ‘great Indian land grab’, that is, the acquisition of productive land by the government, and the handing over of this land to large‐scale industry. What do these ongoing land transfers tell us about the nature of the state? This article builds a picture of the state in a liberalizing landscape based on empirical evidence. It outlines the role of the state in Kutch during a transfer of 30 km² of forest and coastal land to a cement manufacturing and exporting operation ‘Karkhana Ltd.’ (pseudonym). Karkhana's experience does not evince a state in withdrawal. Nor do we witness a regulatory state that watches a changing economy from the legal and coercive sidelines. Instead, the case study is able to reinforce heterodox perspectives that place the state at the centre of India's new economy as a close ally of big capital. Taking these views forward, the author suggests that the state's role in this alliance is that of a normative legitimator of liberalization, a buffer in the contentious politics of land, and an institutional promoter of and manoeuvrer through the new land regime. A multifaceted state is indispensable to India's liberalizing landscape.     

Asia‐Pacific security regimes: Conditions and constraints

Security regimes constitute an important test of the ‘liberal’ school of thought in contemporary international relations. In the Asia‐Pacific, interest is growing over how they may contribute to that region's future order and stability. It is argued here, however, that Asia‐Pacific security regimes cannot succeed unless ‘realist’ power‐balancing strategies are first applied, affording time for patterns of structural leadership to shape enduring security norms and institutions. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is arguably the region's first potential post‐cold war security regime. Its fate, or that of its successor security regimes in the Asia‐Pacific, depends upon satisfying four critical conditions for regime building and upon winning the acceptance of China and the United States, the region's two key ‘structural leaders’. While the ARF does not at present seem close to satisfying these criteria, it may help to provide the breathing space necessary for a successful transition from a competitive cold war environment to a more cooperative climate in the Asia‐Pacific.     

Writing Back? Jalal Al-e Ahmad's (1923–69) Reflections on Selected Periods of Iranian History1

As a collectively acting subject, the Pahlavi regime constituted itself through a functional memory by construing a particular past. In this way, the official or political memory served as the regime's key legitimizing factor. Both Pahlavi shahs attempted to appropriate the Iranian past as well as its future; that is, they legitimized their rule in retrospect and sought to immortalize themselves prospectively. In contrast to the official historiography, ‘counter-memories’ are often established. The motive in producing such a ‘counter-memory,’ whose founders are usually the conquered and oppressed, is to delegitimize the perceived oppressive balance of power. An outspoken critic of the Pahlavi regime, the Iranian teacher and writer Jalal Al-e Ahmad ‘wrote back,’ trying his hand at a ‘counter memory’.     

Europe as a global actor: empire by example?

The European Union (EU) spreads its norms and extends its power in various parts of the world in a truly imperial fashion. This is because the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination or even formal annexations. This effort has proved most successful in the EU's immediate neighbourhood where the Union has enormous political and economic leverage and where there has been a strong and ever‐growing convergence of norms and values. However, in the global arena where actors do not share European norms and the EU has limited power, the results are limited. Consequently, it is not only Europe's ethical agenda that is in limbo; some basic social preferences across the EU seem also to be unsustainable. Can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them? The challenge lies not only in enhancing Europe's global power, but also primarily in exporting rules and norms for which there is more demand among existing and emerging global players. This means that Europe should engage in a dialogue that will help it to establish commonly shared rules of morality and global governance. Only then can Europe's exercise of power be seen as legitimate. It also means that Europe should try to become a ‘model power’ rather than a ‘superpower’, to use David Miliband's expression. The latter approach would imply the creation of a strong European centre able to impose economic pains on uncooperative actors. The former would imply showing other actors that European norms can also work for them and providing economic incentives for adopting these norms. To be successful in today's world, Europe needs to export its governance to other countries, but it can do it in a modest and novel way that will not provoke accusations of ‘regulatory imperialism’.     

International reactions to the Scottish referendum

The referendum on whether Scotland should become an independent country will be held on 18 September 2014. This article reflects on the evolution of foreign governments' attitudes towards the referendum since its confirmation in October 2012, and on their expectations should a ‘yes’ vote result. With few exceptions, they have adopted a policy of non‐intervention, treating the referendum as the UK's domestic affair. President Obama's expression on 5 June 2014 of his desire for the UK to remain ‘a strong, robust, united and effective partner’ may, however, be seen as a sign of increasing apprehension abroad. Concerns of foreign governments aroused by the referendum include the diminution of the UK's power and role in international affairs, the possible encouragement of other secessionist movements, and disturbance to international organizations and alliances. It is commonly assumed that Scotland would become a reasonably prosperous and reliable small state. But how would the rest of the UK (rUK), a much more powerful and populous country, respond to ‘the loss of Scotland’? How would it affect the UK's already unsettled relations with the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership? Despite many uncertainties and a febrile political atmosphere, it is widely expected abroad that Scotland and rUK would settle into a cooperative relationship after a difficult transitional period, and that an independent Scotland would be accepted into the EU and NATO if it displayed flexibility on important issues.     

From ‘Global’ to ‘Revolutionary’ Development

This article argues that Horner and Hulme's call for moving towards ‘global development’ to do justice to changing 21^st century development geographies neither contributes to advancing our understanding of contemporary development challenges nor helps articulate realistic responses to tackle them. A key problem is that they try to explain several general trends in the geography of development with reference to mainstream statistics without appropriate critical reflection or adequate theorization. Focusing specifically on the environmental and conservation aspects of development, this article contends that these omissions not only confuse the debate on the current state and geographies of development, they risk something more serious, namely the reinforcement of a generic development narrative which will intensify 21^st century development challenges. The article concludes that what we need is not global development but revolutionary development.     

Front and Back Covers,Volume 28, Number 6. December 2012

Front and back cover caption, volume 28 issue 6 Front cover LIBERTE, EGALITE, FRATERNITE Most French towns have at least one street, avenue or square named after the Republic, in a tradition that dates back to the late 19th century. The Place de la République with its monumental statue is a familiar Parisian landmark, yet smaller towns would also adorn their squares, city halls and law courts with symbolic representations of the Republic, such as in this picture. A female allegory is taken to embody the values of the Republic: liberty, equality and fraternity. Once brandished in the revolutionary struggle against the monarchy, against aristocratic and clerical privileges, these principles have retained their universal appeal. Liberté, égalité, fraternité are the common denominator that French politicians of all hues can agree on, apart from the far‐right Front National which is seen as standing outside this Republican consensus, as its policies would for instance openly deny equal treatment to residents with non‐European backgrounds. EU border policing practices show that the moral and political dilemmata epitomized in French politics have begun to affect the entire continent: How much freedom of movement are Europeans prepared to grant to those who want to partake in our relative wealth and freedom? What are the limits of liberty? How far do our feelings of fraternity extend in times of austerity? In this new Europe, with countries straining under unsustainable debt burdens, and seemingly less willing to share their remaining riches, discursive markers are shifting almost imperceptibly. Claims to freedom and equality may come from unexpected quarters, as Anne Friederike Delouis writes in her article on the French far‐right fringe. Back cover FORTRESS EUROPE Protesting asylum seekers and irregular migrants face police in Spain's North African enclave of Ceuta, August 2010. The protest erupted amid migrants’ uncertainty over the length of time they were kept in the enclave before transfer to mainland Spain, enacted here in the protesters’‘shackling’ of each other in front of the cameras. Ceuta and its sister enclave Melilla have been key outposts in the EU's swiftly evolving border regime since 2005, when sub‐Saharan migrants launched what the media called a ‘massive assault’ on the territories’ perimeter fences. The ensuing crackdowns led to a displacement of routes towards the Canary Islands and an unprecedented naval operation in response. Still, migrants kept coming – across the Greek‐Turkish border in 2010 and to Italy in 2011. As a result, the EU is fast‐tracking a ‘European external border surveillance system’ involving further investments. For the border guards and defence contractors involved, clandestine migration has become big business. The high stakes in controlling migration stoke increasing tensions, however – as seen in Ceuta's 2010 protest and the desperate mass entry attempts across Melilla's high‐tech fence in 2012. As Ruben Andersson argues in this issue, such tensions highlight larger contradictions in the EU's border regime, which conceptualizes migrants as a source of risk to the external border – while feeding on this very risk. An anthropological lens on this ‘game of risk’ reveals how the business of bordering Europe is a fraught enterprise in which border guards, defence contractors, migrants and smugglers are stuck in a feedback loop, generating ever stranger and more distressing sights at the southern frontiers of Europe.     

Timor-Leste and the discourse of state failure

The disorder in Timor-Leste in 2006, the collapse of the Alkatiri government, and the political crisis following the 2007 parliamentary elections have all fuelled speculation that the country is a potential ‘failing state’. After outlining the history of the latter concept, this paper examines the Timor-Leste case in relation to the phenomena associated with social and political instability. It has exhibited tensions between the civil regime and the military, apparently deepening ethnic/regional differences, weakness in governance institutions and a dependence upon state office as a means to wealth/power; all of these factors are associated with instability. In addition, some policy choices have fostered particular grievances. Timor-Leste's situation with reference specifically to the comparative literatures on ‘state failure’ and on ‘Africanisation’ is then reviewed. State failure literature suggests that regime type and executive recruitment and participation practices are crucial; as a new democracy hitherto dominated by a distinct political faction and facing vital electoral contests, the political system was bound to exhibit turbulence. However, Timor-Leste should be seen in a broader comparative context; accordingly though clearly at risk some caveats should be entered on the prospects for ‘failure’ of the Timor-Leste state. Timor Leste never having been the site of a fully functioning state, its politics more resemble Melanesia than Africa.