Wildlife trade, sanctions and compliance: lessons from the CITES regime |
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| Authors: | ROSALIND REEVE |
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| Affiliation: | Associate Fellow with the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. She is the author of Policing international trade in endangered species: the CITES treaty and compliance;(2002). She has been researching and writing on the wildlife trade since 1986 and has advised governments and campaigned for prominent NGOs on this issue. From 1992 to 1994 she was involved in negotiating the first regional agreement establishing an intergovernmental task force to combat the illegal wildlife trade. |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
The international community possesses a powerful tool to control wildlife trade—the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). For over 20 years it has used trade sanctions as the cornerstone of a unique compliance system that has evolved through practice and secondary rules. This article discusses the mechanisms through which sanctions are imposed and assesses their effectiveness. The CITES compliance system has evolved largely in isolation from other environmental treaties, yet there are lessons that could be learned by other trade-related agreements that are in the process of developing their mechanisms to address non-compliance. CITES is particularly dependent on a sanctions-based approach because of the lack of funds to support capacity building. The article demonstrates through the national legislation project how sanctions used to back-up technical assistance can indirectly build capacity to implement the treaty. It concludes by arguing that guidelines on compliance currently under negotiation risk undermining the CITES compliance system and eroding the gains of the last three decades. |
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